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Introduction 
The nature of the projections presented in this study is 
determined by the problems identified as being most important 
during consideration of the question of Latin American 
development. The international strategy and the programme of 
action for Latin America were in fact designed to deal with 
the central problems, and the quantitative work was therefore 
focused on consideration of objectives, goals and policies that 
will make it possible to overcome the current situation. In 
order to understand the approach adopted in the projections put 
forward here it is therefore essential to bear in mind the main 
conclusions reached in the analysis. In the document "Latin 
American Development in the 1980s" the Secretariat stresses 
three fundamental aspects of the situation with regard to the 
socio-economic process and its evolution. 
These aspects are: firstly, the continued existence of 
production structures and policies that have lead to the 
development of extremely inequitable societies, where the 
results of growth are concentrated in small sectors of the 
population and are insufficient to meet requirements that are 
expanding as a result of the high rate of population growth 
prevailing in the region; secondly, the decline in, or the low 
level of, the economic growth rates recorded in the majority of 
the Latin American countries, whose recovery appears to be 
influenced by such factors as the instability and uncertainty 
that to a great extent surround the development of the world 
economy; and, thirdly, the continuing assymetry in the pattern 
of foreign relations as regards the nature of the flows of 
exported and imported goods, deterioration of the terms of 
trade and growth of the external debt. 
The nature, scope and variety of the problems identified 
determined the type of projections that had to be prepared. 
In view of the importance of population issues, a special 
part of this study is devoted to the situation as regards, and 
prospects for, population growth, taking account of such factors 
as population dynamism and spatial distribution of the 
population, population age structure, trends in the economically 
active population, and the supply of labour. Only one 
hypothesis, representing an intermediate position between the 
high and the low, has been used in the population projections, 
since, in the time-frame considered here, the changes that the 
economic options considered here would produce in the 
demographic variables alter neither the nature nor the relative 
importance of such fundamental issues as the employment problem. 
On the other hand, the macro-economic projections, by 
sector of activity, employment and sectoral productivity, 
foreign trade, external financing and indebtedness, have been 
organized on the basis of two growth scenarios. In general 
terms, the first of these scenarios corresponds to the 
continuation of growth trends in the context of the policies 
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u n d e r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n , w h i c h a r e f o c u s e d on a c h i e v i n g s p e c i f i c 
g o a l s ; i n o t h e r w o r d s , t h i s i s a p r o j e c t i o n b a s e d on a dynamic 
g r o w t h f o r e c a s t , s t a r t i n g f r o m t h e i n i t i a l s i t u a t i o n and 
p r o s p e c t s v i s u a l i z e d a s a r e s u l t o f i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f e c o n o m i c 
p o l i c y t h a t h a s a l r e a d y b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d . I n t h e s e c o n d 
s c e n a r i o i t i s a s sumed t h a t t h e r e w i l l b e a m a j o r c h a n g e i n 
t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y a n d , a t t h e same t i m e , t h a t a new 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i c o r d e r w i l l b e e s t a b l i s h e d . 
The g r o w t h r a t e s i n t h e g r o s s d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t t h a t 
i d e n t i f y t h e s c e n a r i o s c o r r e s p o n d , i n q u a n t i t a t i v e t e r m s , t o 
t h e q u a l i t a t i v e h y p o t h e s i s made i n e a c h s c e n a r i o a t t h e c o u n t r y 
l e v e l . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e r e s u l t s p r e s e n t e d f o r t h e r e g i o n a s 
a w h o l e and f o r v a r i o u s g r o u p s o f c o u n t r i e s c o n s t i t u t e a v e r a g e s 
t h a t may b e i n f l u e n c e d t o a v a r y i n g e x t e n t by t h e i m p o r t a n c e 
o f one o r s e v e r a l c o u n t r i e s , d e p e n d i n g on t h e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c 
a r e a u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I n a n y e v e n t , i n t h e t r e n d s s c e n a r i o 
e c o n o m i c g r o w t h r a t e s w i l l b e l o w e r t h a n i n t h e s c e n a r i o 
i n v o l v i n g g r e a t e r i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l c h a n g e , w h i c h h a s b e e n 
c a l l e d t h e " n o r m a t i v e " s c e n a r i o , o w i n g , i n t e r a l i a , t o t h e 
f a c t t h a t i t p u t s f o r w a r d h y p o t h e s e s t h a t d e p e n d n o t o n l y on 
g r o w t h p o t e n t i a l and i n t e r n a l e f f o r t , b u t a l s o on s u b s t a n t i a l 
c h a n g e s a t t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l i n t h e s p h e r e o f e x t e r n a l 
c o - o p e r a t i o n . The same a p p l i e s i n t h e c a s e o f f o r e i g n - t r a d e 
g r o w t h r a t e s , e x t e r n a l - f i n a n c i n g s u m s , i n c r e a s e s i n 
p r o d u c t i v i t y and employment a n d , u l t i m a t e l y , n u m e r o u s a s p e c t s 
t h a t t r a n s l a t e t h e c h i e f h y p o t h e s e s u s e d i n t h e p r o j e c t i o n s 
e x e r c i s e . 
F o r a n a l y t i c a l r e a s o n s , p r o j e c t i o n s w e r e p r e p a r e d o f f o u r 
f u n d a m e n t a l a s p e c t s t h a t w e r e i n t e r r e l a t e d s o a s t o f o r m a 
b a s i s f o r t h e g r o w t h s c e n a r i o s . 
F i r s t l y , p o p u l a t i o n a s p e c t s w e r e s t u d i e d w i t h a v i e w t o 
i d e n t i f y i n g a number o f m a j o r p r o b l e m s e x p e r i e n c e d a t t h e s t a g e 
o f p o p u l a t i o n t r a n s i t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h L a t i n A m e r i c a i s p a s s i n g 
a n d , a t t h e same t i m e , m e a s u r i n g e x p a n s i o n o f t h e l a b o u r f o r c e 
and d e t e r m i n i n g w h e r e i t i s c o n c e n t r a t e d ; t h e l a t t e r i s a 
b a s i c component o f a n a l y s i s o f t h e employment s i t u a t i o n and 
employment p r o s p e c t s . 
S e c o n d l y , t h e c h i e f m a c r o - e c o n o m i c v a r i a b l e s and 
r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r c a p i t a l f o r m a t i o n and e x t e r n a l f i n a n c i n g i n 
k e e p i n g w i t h t h e p r o p o s e d economic g r o w t h i n e a c h s c e n a r i o 
w e r e d e t e r m i n e d . C u r r e n t income f r o m e x p o r t s p l a y s an 
e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y i m p o r t a n t r o l e i n t h a t c o n n e x i o n , s i n c e i n t h e 
g l o b a l m o d e l t h e s e r e s o u r c e s a r e t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r s t r i k i n g 
a b a l a n c e b e t w e e n s a v i n g and i n v e s t m e n t a n d f o r t h e e x t e r n a l 
a c c o u n t s , g i v e n t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s on e x t e r n a l f i n a n c i n g . 
The p a t t e r n s o f o u t p u t and l a b o u r p r o d u c t i v i t y by s e c t o r 
o f e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y w e r e t h e n e x a m i n e d w i t h a v i e w t o e n s u r i n g 
t h a t t h e y m a t c h e d t h e g l o b a l p r o j e c t i o n s c o m p a r i n g t h e 
employment b a l a n c e w i t h l a b o u r - f o r c e p r o j e c t i o n s . 
L a s t l y , t h e p r o s p e c t s f o r g r o w t h i n e x p o r t s w e r e e x p l o r e d 
t h r o u g h a n a l y s i s o f t h e f o r e i g n - t r a d e p a t t e r n , b o t h i n t e r m s 
o f t y p e s o f g o o d s and p l a c e o f d e s t i n a t i o n ; p a r t i c u l a r 
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importance was attached in that connexion to the ratio between 
primary goods and manufactured products and to the regional or 
extra-regional character of foreign trade. 
For presentation purposes this document begins with an 
analysis of population trends and prospects. A brief 
description of the scenarios follows, and then the chief set of 
projections on which those scenarios are based is consideredi 
economic growth, internal effort, sectoral structure, 
productivity and employment and external economic relations. 
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I. LATIN AMERICAN POPULATION TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 
1. Position of Latin America in the world 
as regards population 
Over the past three decades the Latin American population 
grew at a faster rate than that of any other region of the world. 
Consequently, its share of world population rose from 6„5% in 
1950 to 8 . 2% in 1980; it is anticipated that by the year 2000 
its share will have risen to 9.2% (see tables 1 and 2). 
In a number of ways Latin America's population 
characteristics are similar to those of other developing regions; 
other characteristics place it in an intermediate position 
between the developed regions and the other regions. Its crude 
birth rate is lower than that of Africa and Southern Asia, 
although it is more than twice that of North America and Europe 
(see table 3). On the other hand, its mortality rate is 
slightly lower than that of the two latter regions, and almost 
half that of Africa. 
The drop in mortality rates has not been set off by a 
corresponding decline in birth rates, which is what is 
responsible for the high population growth rate observed. 
Furthermore, although it is anticipated that in the two coming 
decades there will be a drop in birth rates, those rates will 
remain relatively high and much closer to the current rates of 
Africa and Southern Asia than to those of the developed 
countries.1/ 
2. The demographic development of Latin America 
Between 1950 and 1980 the population of Latin America 
grew at an annual.rate of 2.7% and its level more than doubled, 
rising from 164.1 million inhabitants to 363.4 million 
inhabitants. For the region as a whole the rise in the 
population growth rate began to be noted from the 1940s onwards 
and reached a peak in the five-year period 1960-1965; 
subsequently, there has been a slow but steady drop (see 
table 4). 
At the country level, rates of population expansion have 
been relatively disparate. Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Haiti, 
Uruguay and the English-speaking Caribbean countries had the 
lowest growth rates, and their share of the region's population 
dropped from 24.9% in 1950 to 18.7% in 1980, whereas, at the 
other extreme, in the same years the population growth rate of 
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela rose from 51.6% to 57.1% (see 
table 5). 
1/ This is without taking migratory movements into 
consideration. 
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Table 7 
RELATIVE WORLD POPULATION GROWTH, BY REGION 
1950 = 100 
Region 1975 1980 
World total 160 176 
Africa 185 214 
Latin America 196 221aI 
North America 142 148 
Eastern Asia 157 169 
Southern Asia 177 201 
Europe 121 123 
Oceania 167 180 
Soviet Union 141 148 
Source : World Population Trends and Prospects by Country 
1950-2000, Summary Report of the 1978 Assessment. 
United Nations, ST/ESA/SER,R/33. 
a/ Boletin Demogrâfico N°27, CELADE, January 1981. 
Following the drop in crude mortality rates, crude birth 
rates began to decline too, but only slowly and with a time-lag. 
The drop in those rates marked the beginning of a "demographic 
transition" similar to that already experienced by the countries 
that are now developed, but obviously starting on the basis of 
higher rates than those countries had in the period of highest 
population growth. However, the experience gained in various 
periods'and in different places does not make it possible to 
define this process of transition with any degree of exactitude. 
There is, in fact, a wide disparity in the pattern of the 
Latin American countries, although it has general 
characteristics by which it may be described. For example, it 
is not possible to speak of a gradual and uniform process for 
all the countries as their development progresses, especially 
since some factors that have a bearing on the demographic 
phenomenon affect them almost simultaneously, virtually 
regardless of their economic situation. 
Various factors were responsible for the drop in 
mortality, such as progress in sanitary techniques, the rise in 
income and nutrition levels, higher levels of education and 
improved living conditions. Without any doubt, there is a 
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Table 2 
WORLD POPULATION BY REGIONS AND PROJECTIONS 1950-2000 
1950 1980 1990 2000 
Region — — — — 
Thousands Percentage Thousands Percentage Thousands Percentage Thousands Percentage 
Total population 2 513 478 100.0 4 409 
11 100.0 5 255 251 100.0 6 155 081 100.0 
Af r i ca 218 992 8 .7 469 361 10.6 630 373 12.0 828 052 13 .4 
Lat in America a / 164 086 6 .5 363 394 8 .2 458 364 8 . 7 564 570 9 . 2 
North America 166 046 6 .6 246 350 5 . 6 270 469 5 . 1 289 546 4 . 7 
Eas tern Asia 673 243 26.8 1 135 850 25 .8 1 274 490 2 4 . 3 1 405 916 22 .8 
Southern Asia 706 408 28.1 1 421 712 32.2 1 802 590 34 .3 2 205 337 35.8 
Europe 391 978 15.6 483 532 11.0 501 170 9 . 5 520 223 8 . 5 
Oceania 12 648 0 . 5 22 775 0 . 5 26 161 0 . 5 29 620 0 . 5 
Soviet Union 180 075 7 .2 266 666 6o l 291 637 5 . 6 311 817 5 . 1 
Source! United Nat ions , World Population Trends and Prospec ts by Country, 1950-2000, ST/ESA/SER.R/33. 
a / CELADE, Bolet in Demogrâfico NO 27, January 1981. 
Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD: SELECTED 
DEMOGRAPHIC INDICATORS 
Region 
Crude birth 
rate 
(per thousand) 
(1975-1980) 
Crude death 
rate 
(per thousand) 
(1975-1980) 
Life expectancy 
(years) 
(1975-1980) 
World Total 29 .4 11.5 57^ . 4 
Africa .0 17.1 -p
 
CO
 
Latin America 35 8.t+ 63.4 
North America 15 .3 9.0 73.2 
Eastern Asia 21 .7 8.6 64.7 
Southern Asia 38 .9 14.1 51.8 
Europe 14 .5 10.6 71.9 
Oceania 21 .6 9.0 65.7 
Soviet Union 18. .3 8.9 69.6 
Source: Selected Demographic Indicators by Country, 1950-2000: 
Demographic Estimates and Projections as assessed in 
1978. United Nations, ST/ESA/SER.R/38. 
relationship between the application of certain technologies 
and a rise in levels of nutrition, on the one hand, and the 
economic development of the countries applying them, on the 
other. However, the increasingly wide-spread diffusion of new 
methods of sanitation made it possible to extend them gradually 
to countries with lower levels of development and different 
economic characteristics from those of the countries that first 
adopted them. The consequent drop in mortality rates is thus 
not so closely related to the level of development of the 
countries in which it occurs as it once was; in addition, the 
impact of the introduction of those technologies and innovations 
differs, depending on the demographic characteristics of the 
recipient country. Thus, the relationships between the 
mortality patterns of the less developed countries of the region, 
which have a given income level, cannot be equated with those 
that occurred in other developing countries that are now 
economically in the lead, and even less so with those in the 
present industrialized countries. 
Figure 1 shows how, in various periods, the ratio between 
per capita gross domestic product and life expectancy has 
evolved in 18 Latin American countries (it is considered that 
8 
Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA:a/ GROWTH RATE OF TOTAL POPULATION 
(Per thousand) 
Period Natural 
growth Migration 
Total 
growth 
1960-1965 28.8 -0.6 28.2 
1965-1970 27.7 -0.7 27.0 
1970-1975 26.1 -0.5 25.6 
1975-1980 24.9 -0.4 24.5 
1980-1985 24.3 -0.4 23.9 
Source: CELADE, Boletin Demografico N°27, Santiago, Chile, 
January 1981. 
a/ Excluding the English-speaking Caribbean countries. 
life expectancy reflects a country's mortality conditions at a 
given time). In general terms, it may be observed that as the 
level of the gross domestic product rises life expectancy 
increases, but that the correlative rate of increase in life 
expectancy gradually slows down. This is due to limitations 
relating to human life itself and to the fact that at relatively 
high levels of life expectancy it becomes increasingly difficult 
to raise life expectancy further owing to lack of scientific 
and technological knowledge and to the extremely high costs 
involved. In lower income countries, on the other hand, more 
significant results can be achieved through the introduction 
of mass measures such as vaccination, use of antibiotics and 
provision of safe drinking water. Thus, the displacement of 
the curve representing the relationship between the two 
variables at different periods of time means that the rise in 
life expectancy does not depend solely on the level in the 
per capita gross domestic, product, but also on other factors, 
such as those referred to above. For a given level of per 
capita gross domestic product, the less developed countries now 
achieve higher levels of life expectancy than did their 
predecessors under similar conditions. 
Displacements also occur in the curve illustrating the 
relationship between levels of per capita gross domestic 
product and crude birth rates, indicating that the demographic 
behaviour of the Latin American countries differs at equivalent 
GDP levels (see figure 2). The social mechanism that causes 
the drop in birth rates is more complex, however. The desire to' 
prolong life is a uniform and prevalent attitude all over the 
world that offers little scope for variation. This is not true 
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Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH BY AREAS AND COUNTRIES 
Region 
1950 1980 Annual growth 
(pe rcen tages ) 
1950-1980 Thousands 
Percentage 
of t o t a l 
Thousands 
Percentage 
of t o t a l 
Argentina 17 150 10.5 27 036 7 . 4 1 .37 
Bol iv ia 2 706 1 .6 5 570 1 . 5 2 .19 
Braz i l 52 842 32.2 122 320 33.7 2 .55 
Colombia 11 597 7 .2 25 794 7 . 1 2 . 4 3 
Costa Rica 858 0 .5 2 213 0 . 6 2 .88 
Cuba 5 858 3.6 9 732 2 . 9 1 . 5 3 
Chile 6 091 3.7 11 104 3 . 1 1 .82 
Ecuador 3 307 2 .0 8 021 2 . 2 2 .69 
El Salvador 1 940 1 .2 4 797 1 . 3 2 .75 
Guatemala 2 962 1 .7 7 262 2 . 0 2 . 7 3 
Ha i t i 3 097 1.9 5 809 1 . 6 1.90 
Honduras 1 401 0 .9 3 691 1 . 0 2 . 9 5 
Mexico 26 886 16.3 69 752 19 .1 2 .90 
Nicaragua 1 109 0 .7 2 733 0 . 8 2 . 7 4 
Panama 825 0 .5 1 896 0 . 5 2 .81 
Paraguay 1 371 0 .8 3 168 0 . 9 2 .54 
Peru 7 988 4 .9 17 625 4 . 9 2 .40 
Dominican Republic 2 361 1 .5 5 947 1 . 6 3.10 
Uruguay 2 194 1 . 3 2 924 0 . 8 0 .90 
Venezuela 5 139 3.1 15 620 4 . 3 3 .39 
EnElish-SDeakinK 
Caribbean count r ies 6 344 M 10 380 2 .9 1.30 
Total region 164 026 100.0 363 394 100.0 2 . 6 9 
Source! CELADE, Bole t ín Demográfico N2 27, January 1981. 
Expectation of 
l i f e at b i r th 
(years) 
7 5 r 
Figure 1 
EXPECTATION OP LIFE AT BIRTH AHD PÉR CAPITA GROSS DOHESTIC PRODUCT 
IH 1950, I960, 1970 AND 1979 
6<_ 
It 
X 10 
—- - •"^ '^3.1970 
1979 
-XÎ 
X12 
1 Argentina 
2 Bolivia 
5 Brazil 
4 Colombia 
5 Costa Rica 
6 Chile 
7 Ecuador 
8 El Salvador 
9 Guatemala 
A 1970 10 Haiti 
11 Honduras 
1979 12 Mexico 
15 Nicaragua 
14 Panama 
15 Paraguay 
16 Peru 
17 Dominican Republic 
18 Uruguay 
J I 1 L J L J L -J- J L J 
1500 1700 
Per capita gross domestic product 
(1975 dollars) 
11 
Figure 2 
CRUDE BIRTH RATE AND PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
IN 1950, I960, 1970 AND 1979 
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of birth-related attitudes. The influence of the different 
cultural patterns associated with human groups is likewise 
reflected in a wide variety of attitudes and a slower reaction 
to changing circumstances, although the experience acquired 
seems to indicate that in the long term the birth rate is also 
subject to the general tendency to decline observed in processes 
of "demographic transition". However, it is possible that 
traditional attitudes will change more rapidly than they have 
up until now, owing to the adoption of new policies, such as 
the dissemination of birth-control practices in a number of 
countries. 
There are other component of the demographic situation 
that cannot be reduced to uniform behaviour patterns; take, 
for example, the different population growth trends of the 
Latin American countries grouped by decreasing level of life 
expectancy at birth (see table 6). 
In the period 1975-1980, in the group of countries with 
the highest life expectancy those with the lower per capita 
gross domestic product had the highest fertility and birth 
rates,2/ which, together with a lower mortality rate, results 
in rates of natural population increase twice those of 
Argentina and Uruguay and, in turn, gives rise to higher 
dependency indexes. In view of the fact that the life 
expectancy of all these countries is virtually the same 
(approximately 70 years), the trends described indicate that 
the most important phase of the process of demographic 
transition is still under-way in Costa Rica and Panama, whereas 
in Argentina and Uruguay there seems to be a greater 
deceleration, with natural population growth rates close to 
those of the developed countries (10.2 and 12.4 per thousand, 
respectively). 
In the second group, which includes countries with.a life 
expectancy of between 61.8 andi66.2 years, namely, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela, 
the position of Chile stands out clearly, since it is close to 
that of Argentina and Uruguay with regard to all demographic 
variables (see table 6). The other countries of the group 
display wide disparities. If, for.example, for the purposes of 
comparison the vegetative growth rate' is taken as an indicator, 
it will be seen that in the period 1975-1980 El Salvador, 
Mexico, Paraguay and Venezuela showed annual growth rates of 
29.1 to 32.6% per thousand inhabitants; these are high levels 
of growth which, on the one hand, result in high dependency 
indexes and give rise to serious problems relating to the 
creation of new sources of employment and, on the other hand, 
2/ In 1979 their per capita gross domestic product was 
somewhat over US$ 1 000, in 1975 dollars, whereas Argentina 
and Uruguay had per capita gross domestic product levels of 
US$ 1 309 and US$ 1 679, respectively. 
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Table 2 
LATIN AMERICA: CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES BY LIFE EXPECTANCY PERIOD 1975-1980 
Global Crude Crude 
L i fe f e r t i l i t y b i r t h death 
expectancy r a t e r a t e 
( y e a r s ) (pe r (pe r (pe r 
thousand) thousand) thousand; 
Natural 
growth 
r a t e 
(pe r 
thousand; 
Popula t ion 
aged 65 and 
over as a 
percentage 
of t o t g l 
populat ion 
(percentage) 
Dependency 
index 
(percentage) 
Per c a p i t a 
gross , 
domestic 
product 
in 1979 
(1975 
d o l l a r s ) 
Over 69 years 
Costa Rica 
Panama 
Uruguay 
Argentina 
61.8 to 66.5 years 
Venezuela 
Chi le 
Mexico 
Paraguay 
Colombia 
El Salvador 
Braz i l 
55.0 to 60.0 years 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Guatemala 
Peru 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Less than 55.0 years 
H a i t i 
Bol iv ia 
69.7 
69.7 
69.5 
69.2 
66.2 
65.7 
£>4.4 
64 .1 
62.2 
62.2 
61.8 
6 0 . 3 
60.0 
57.8 
57.6 
57 .1 
55.2 
50.7 
48.6 
4 .6 
4 . 1 
2 .9 
2 .9 
4 .7 
3 . 1 
5 . 4 
5 .2 
4 . 3 
6.0 
4 .5 
5 .0 
6 . 3 
5 .7 
5 .5 
7 . 1 
6.6 
5 .9 
6 .4 
29.0 
31.3 
20 .3 
21.2 
36.9 
25.4 
38 .3 
36.7 
32.1 
42.1 
33.3 
36.7 
41.6 
41.1 
38.6 
47.0 
46.6 
41.8 
44.8 
5 . 3 
6.0 
10.1 
8.9 
6.2 
8.1 
7 . 8 
7 .7 
8.2 
9 . 4 
9 . 3 
9 . 0 
10.4 
10.9 
11.6 
11.8 
12.2 
15.7 
17.5 
23.8 
25.4 
10.2 
12.4 
30.8 
17.4 
30.5 
29 .1 
23.8 
32.6 
24.1 
27.7 
31.2 
30.2 
27.0 
35.2 
34.5 
26.1 
27.4 
3 .5 
4 .0 
9 .9 
8 . 4 
2 .7 
5 .6 
3.5 
3 .4 
3 . 3 
3 .4 
3.9 
2 .7 
3 .6 
2.8 
3.4 
2 . 7 
2 .4 
3 .6 
3 . 3 
76.6 
81.2 
59.6 
57.5 
84.1 
64 .3 
95 .1 
87.7 
79 .5 
9 5 . 3 
78.6 
95.7 
9 3 . 1 
90.0 
86.1 
102.4 
102.4 
89 .1 
87 .3 
1 077 
1 058 
1 309 
1 679 
350 
949 
319 
680 
585 
402 
157 
647 
601 
616 
878 
347 
418 
158 
502 
Source: CEPAL, on the b a s i s of data from CELADE, Bole t ín Na 27, Sant iago, Chi le , January 1981. 
are not in any way in keeping with values relating to life 
expectancy or with the per capita gross domestic product. An 
example in that connexion is the case of Brazil and Mexico, 
which are the countries with the greatest population (53% of 
the population of Latin America in 1980); whereas there is no 
significant difference in their per capita gross domestic 
product, namely, US$ 1 157 and US$ 1 319, their natural 
population growth rates are 24.1 and 30.5 per thousand, 
respectively; likewise, Colombia, which has a per capita GDP 
level that is approximately half that of Brazil, has a natural 
growth rate that is virtually the same as that of Brazil (23.8 
per thousand). 
The third group, which is made up of countries with a 
life expectancy of 55 to 60 years, includes the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru. In 
general terms, it may be said that this group displays a greater 
degree of homogeneity in its demographic indicators than the 
two above-mentioned groups. In this group there is a certain 
correlation between natural population growth rates and the 
per capita gross domestic product; moreover, with regard to the 
former variable, attention should be drawn to the explosive 
growth rates reached in Honduras and Nicaragua, since they are 
around 35 per thousand; dependency indexes that even exceed 
100% may also be noted. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that 
very definite trends can be made out; although it is true that 
birth and death rates tend to be higher in cases where per 
capita GDP levels are generally low, this does not shed any 
light on the transitional phases in which the natural growth 
rates begin to enter a cycle of decline. For example, in that 
connexion, although the countries with the lowest life 
expectancy in the region, Bolivia and Haiti, display relatively 
high birth rates, they show a relatively low rate of vegetative 
growth (approximately 27 per thousand) and lower dependency 
indexes than those of the preceding group, owing to their high 
level of mortality (17.5 and 15.7 per thousand); however, 
judging by their vegetative-growth rate and their dependency 
index, it could not be said that their demographic situation is 
more satisfactory, and, furthermore, the logical trend would be 
for mortality rates to drop and, probably, for there to be a 
relatively prolonged acceleration in the natural population 
growth rate. 
In all this spectrum one fact becomes absolutely clear. 
With the exception of Argentina and Uruguay and, to a lesser 
extent, Chile, the Latin American countries are facing rates of 
population growth that constitute a real challenge to 
development strategies and policies, particularly strategies 
and policies with a view to improving the employment situation 
and provision of basic services for human development. There 
is no doubt that natural population growth rates of 24 to 35 
per thousand (with the exception of those of the three countries 
mentioned above) call for high rates of economic growth and 
implementation of policies with a substantial social content. 
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3. Structure of population by age 
The patterns of past demographic behaviour referred to 
above have given each of the Latin American countries its 
distinct population dynamics, whose socio-economic repercussions 
differ not only with regard to the quantitative differences 
noted but also with regard to the level and quality of each 
country's development. Population structure by age is one of 
the major components of population dynamics, since it has a 
considerable impact on more important issues that have to be 
dealt with in the economic and social sphere. For example, a 
bigger share of the population in the younger age group means 
that education requirements are greater; whereas if there is a 
larger share in the working age group it will be necessary for 
there to be greater employment absorption in order to rais.e 
private income and improve income distribution. 
Consideration of the population structure by age reveals 
widely varying situations from country to country. If 
dependency indexes 3/ are taken as a basis for comparison, it 
may be noted that in most countries the indexes in question were 
over 80% in the period 1975-1980 (see table 6); however, the 
differences in the share of the economically active population 
(EAP) are considerable, and currently in Latin America they are 
inversely correlated to the natural population growth rate 
rather than to the per capita gross domestic product. In 
Argentina and Uruguay, where demographic growth is slow and the 
population is relatively old, the dependency indexes are the 
lowest in the region (57.5% and 59.6%). This index is also 
significantly lower in Chile (64.3%) than in the rest of Latin 
America, but in Chile it is accompanied by a lower per capita 
GDP level than those of the two countries mentioned above. 
Brazil and Mexico, which have gross domestic product levels 
higher than that of Chile, are significantly different in that 
the dependency index of the former is under 80% and its rate of 
natural increase is 24.1 per thousand, whereas in the latter 
country these indicators are 95% and 30.5 per thousand, 
respectively*. Indexes similar to those of Mexico are found in 
countries at lower levels of economic development, such as the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador and El Salvador. However, in these 
latter countries absorption of the expanding labour force into 
the labour market gives rise to very different problems, in 
view of their restricted resources and the scale and structure 
of their production systems. 
Honduras and Nicaragua are in a special position, since 
in the regional context they have one of the lowest levels of 
per capita gross domestic product and the highest rate of 
natural population increase; these factors have contributed to 
3/ Defined as the ratio between the sum of the population 
from 0 to 14 years of age and 65 and over and the population 
aged 15 to 64 years. 
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producing a high proportion of young people, to the extent that, 
together, young people and the population aged over 65 years 
exceed the number of economically active persons, leading to 
dependency indexes of over 100%. 
Lastly, it is necessary to stress the impact of these high 
population growth rates in producing population age structures 
that, in themselves, give rise to problems of particular 
significance in the economic and social field. In 1980 Latin 
America had a population under the age of 14- years representing 
40% of its total population, whereas the economically active 
population was 55.8% and the population over 65 years of age 
4.2%; it is thus easy to visualize the task that has to be 
faced in order to provide gainful employment to a population 
segment on whose work another population segment representing 
nearly 80% of the former segment depends. Moreover, it should 
not be forgotten that this average conceals extreme situations, 
such as those already mentioned, in which the number of 
economically inactive persons is equal to, or exceeds, the 
number of those that are potentially in a position to work. 
For example, it will suffice to point out that in 1975 in the 
developed regions 4/ only one quarter of the population was 
under the age of 15 years, whereas the dependency ratio was 60%. 
4. Urbanization 
The accelerating process of urbanization in Latin America 
is closely related to the trends noted in the "demographic 
transition" of'the various individual countries. It was 
possible to establish on the basis of estimates for the 1950s 
that approximately half of the increase in the rural population 
emigrated to the cities. However, despite this accelerated 
urbanization process, Latin America is at a slighter higher 
level than the average level of urbanization reached by the 
world population. In the region as a whole, the urban 
population rose from 57.5% in 1970 to 64.4% in 1980. It is 
estimated that in the 1970s approximately 86.7% of the total 
population increase took place in the cities. 
There were considerable differences from country to country 
in spatial terms. Three groups of countries may be distinguished 
in that connexion. The first group is made up of Argentina, 
Chile and Uruguay, which in the past three decades have shown 
annual population growth rates below 20 per thousand, urban 
growth equal to, or below, 30%, and expansion of the economically 
active population of below 20 per thousand; in all the countries 
in question the total and urban population growth rates began to 
decline before the 1970s, and, furthermore, the rural population 
dropped even in absolute terms.5/ These countries also have 
4/ The Year Book of Labour Statistics, ILO, 1978. 
5/ With the exception of Cuba, where it is growing at 
rates close to zero. 
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urban population percentages exceeding 80% of the total (see 
table 7). In short, these are countries in which population 
trends have consistently been ahead of those of most countries 
of the region. 
At the other extreme, in the group made up of Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and 
Venezuela, there are still extremely high population growth 
rates (29 or more per thousand in 1975-1980) and the urban 
segment is still growing at annual rates of 4-5 per thousand 
or more. The countries in question simultaneously show 
relatively high rates of rural population growth (20 per 
thousand or more in 1975-1980), with the exception of Mexico 
and Venezuela, where the rate in question has dropped to a 
little over 10 and 5 per thousand, respectively, and urban 
population percentages are significantly higher (66% and 79%), 
in contrast with the average of under 45% for the remaining 
countries of the group. In short, these are countries in which 
there has been a lag in the development of population phenomena 
in comparison with the average situation in the region and where 
rates have been higher than those of the countries in the first 
group at an equivalent point in time. 
The remaining countries, which are not considered in the 
preceding groups, make up a whole that is close to the regional 
average. Brazil and Colombia stand out owing to the fact that, 
in addition to being the countries with the largest populations 
in this group,- they already have declining total, urban and 
rural population growth rates; the rural population growth rate 
dropped to below 10% per thousand in Brazil and is close to 
zero in Colombia. At the same time, the share of the urban 
population is around 65% of the total, a proportion that is 
close to the regional average and is particularly noteworthy 
owing to its decentralization in a large number of urban centres. 
There is no question that this aspect is extremely important, 
in view of the fact that, just as it will be necessary in the 
future to conduct a differentiated analysis at the country 
level, given the disparities observed, in a number of countries, 
such as those referred to above, it is possible that it will 
also be necessary to make a differentiated analysis of the 
regions of which those countries are composed. 
5. Prospects for population growth in Latin America 
It could be seen from the retrospective analysis that 
there are marked differences in the economic and social 
situation of the individual countries and, within that spectrum, 
significant variations with regard to population growth rates. 
The mechanisms expressing the interrelationship between 
demographic behaviour and development level are still not well 
known; but it is accepted that in the long term such a 
relationship develops and that mutual influence is exerted. 
However, population evolution, at least in the course of 
periods that are not long enough for demographic behaviour to 
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Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): URBAN POPULATION AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATIONS/, 1970 AND 1980 
Country 
1970 1980 
Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
Argentina 78.5 21.5 100.0 82.7 17.3 100.0 
Bol iv ia 34.9 65.1 100.0 40.2 59.8 100.0 
Brazi l 55.8 44.2 100.0 64.1 35.9 100.0 
Colombia 59.2 40.8 100.0 67.6 32.4 100.0 
Costa Rica 38.8 61.2 100.0 45.8 54.2 100.6 
Chile 75.2 24.8 100.0 81.1 18.9 100.0 
Ecuador 39.5 60 .5 100.0 44 .3 55.7 100.0 
El Salvador 39.5 60 .5 100.0 44.4 55.6 100.0 
Guatemala 33.7 66 .3 100.0 38.4 61.6 100.0 
H a i t i 19.8 81.2 100.0 25.0 75.0 100.0 
Honduras 33.2 66.8 100.0 40.2 50.8 100.0 
Mexico 58.9 41.1 100.0 66.4 33.6 100.0 
Nicaragua 47.0 53.0 100.0 54 .3 45.7 100.0 
Panama 47.8 52.2 100.0 54.4 45.6 100.0 
Paraguay 37.2 62.8 100.0 42.1 57.9 100.0 
Peru 58.0 48.0 100.0 65 .5 34.5 100.0 
Dominican Republic 39.4 60.6 100.0 47.2 52.8 100.0 
Uruguay 80.8 19.2 100.0 84.8 15.2 100.0 
Venezuela 72.0 28.0 100.0 78.9 21 .1 100.0 
Lat in America 
(19 count r ies ) 57.5 42.5 100.0 64.4 35.6 100.0 
Source: CELADE, Bolet in Demografico N3 23, January 1979« 
a / Defined as such in the case of each individual country. 
react to changes in the economic situation or to other factors 
that may affect it, displays some inertia, which is also 
related to the slowness with which changes in the different 
demographic variables act on population trends. Thus, it may 
be considered that for all practical purposes trends in the 
principal demographic variables for the next two decades are 
already determined, and that, if changes occur, they will not 
be very significant unless unusual events that are impossible 
to forecast occur or, because of lack of sufficient knowledge, 
inadequate consideration has been given to the possible impact 
of intensive population policies now being carried out. 
It must be borned in mind that often it is not easy to 
detect changes in demographic behaviour as rapidly as is 
necessary. The basic data, most of which are taken from 
periodic censuses, are usually difficult to collect, and their 
processing takes a long time. Thus, there are delays in making 
the results available, which has a bearing on the timeliness of 
the estimates and therefore on the correctness of the future 
trends. The effects of programmes, activities and investment 
with direct or indirect impact on the demographic behaviour of 
various sectors of the population (such as family planning 
programmes) are slow to manifest themselves, but once they have 
evolved their impact spreads gradually. Thus, despite the 
complexity of determining the impact of such aspects on 
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Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): TOTAL POPULATION, 1980-2000 
( In thousands a t mid-year) 
• 
Country 1980 1990 2000 
Annual growth r a t e 
(pe r thousand) 
1980- 1990- 1980-
1990 2000 2000 
Laree countr ies 
Argentina 27 056 30 277 35 222 11.4 9 . 5 10.4 
Brazi l 122 320 153 171 187 494 22.7 20.4 21.6 
Mexico 69 752 91 976 115 659 28.0 25.2 25.6 
Subtotal 219 108 275 424 336 375 23.1 20.2 21.7 
Medium-sized count r ies 
Colombia 25 794 31 820 37 999 21.2 17.9 19.6 
Chile 11 104 15 061 14 934 16.4 13.5 14.9 
Peru 17 625 25 555 30 703 28.5 27 .7 28 .1 
Venezuela 15 620 21 284 27 207 31.4 24.9 28 .1 
Subtotal 70 143 89 520 110 843 24.7 21.4 25 .1 
Small countr ies 
Bol ivia 5 570 7 314 9 724 27.6 28.9 28 .3 
Costa Rica 2 213 2 776 3 377 22.9 19.8 21.4 
Ecuador 8 021 10 949 14 596 31.6 29.2 30.4 
El Salvador 4 797 6 484 8 708 30.6 29.9 30 .5 
Guatemala 7 262 9 676 12 739 29 .1 27.9 28.5 
Ha i t i 5 809 7 509 9 860 26.0 27.6 26.8 
Honduras 5 691 5 105 6 978 35.0 31.7 52.4 
Nicaragua 2 733 5 778 5 154 52.9 31.5 52.2 
Panama 1 896 2 346 2 823 21.5 18.7 20 .1 
Paraguay 3 168 4 231 5 405 29.4 24.8 27 .1 
Dominican Republic 5 947 7 534 9 329 25.9 21.6 22.8 
Uruguay 2 924 5 166 3 44S 8 .0 8 .6 8 . 3 
Subtotal 54 031 70 868 92 l 4 l 27.5 26.6 27.0 
Lat in America 
(19 countr ies) 343 282 345 812 539 359 24.2 21 .5 22.8 
Source! CEPAL, on the bas i s of data from CELADE, Boletín Demográfico N2 27, 
January, 1981. 
demographic trends, it is not very likely that there will be 
significant variations in the projections presented below as 
regards long-term trends, all the more so in the case of those 
variables that depend on births that have already occurred, as 
in the case of the economically active population, which 
absorbs population increments after a given period of time. 
Likewise, the general drop anticipated in birth rates will 
bring about a certain decline in the overall population growth 
rate (see table 8). In that connexion, the countries that are 
exceptions, namely, Bolivia, Haiti and Uruguay, are self-
explanatory; whereas it is anticipated that in the first two 
countries there will be a substantially greater drop in 
mortality rates than in birth rates (it should be remembered 
that the former are the highest in the region), it is expected 
that in Uruguay, whose population growth rate has dropped to 
the lowest in the region, the migration rate will not be at the 
high negative level it was at in the past (see table 9). 
The classification of countries in the tables containing 
the demographic projections was established on the basis of 
their economic scale, with the purpose of providing a basis for 
the analysis and projections of Latin American development 
presented in the second part of this paper. Therefore, even 
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LATIN AMERICA! 
Table 9 
POPULATION GROWTH RAIES, 1975-1980 AND 1955-2000 
Country 
Per capita 
gross domestic 
Global fertility 
rate 
Crude birth rate 
(per thousand) 
Crude mortality rate 
(per thousand) 
: Migration rate 
(per thousand) 
product 1979 1975- 1995- 1975- 1995- 1975- 1995- 1975- 1995-
(1975 dollars) 1980 ' 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 1980 2000 
Large countries 
Argentina 1 679 2.87 2.46 21.24 18.13 8.85 9 .51 0.27 0.22 
Brazil 1 319 4.50 3.28 33.26 26.92 9 .13 7 .23 - -
Mexico 1 157 5.40 3.25 38.26 27.29 7.76 5.25 -0 .77 - 0 . 4 6 
Medium-sized countries 
Colombia 585 4.31 3.00 32.06 24.32 8 .23 6.86 - 2 . 4 5 - 0 . 6 9 
Chile 949 3.10 2.50 23.41 20.05 8.05 7 .15 - 0 . 3 1 - 0 . 2 3 
Peru 878 5.49 4.60 38.56 34.36 11.56 7 . 5 3 - -
Venezuela 2 350 4 .74 3.27 36.93 27.04 6.17 4.85 4.18 0.97 
Small countries 
Bolivia 502 6.39 5.50 44.84 39.56 17.48 9 .76 - 1 . 5 3 - 0 . 8 8 
Costa Rica 1 077 3.57 2.87 29.05 23.79 5.27 5.05 - -
Ecuador 601 6.29 4.72 41.60 33.46 10.43 5.59 - 0 . 8 6 -0 .16 
El Salvador 402 6 .01 4.45 42.06 34.22 9.44 5 .23 - 3 . 3 6 -
Guatemala 616 5 .68 4 .31 41.11 33.62 10.91 6 .28 - -
Haiti 158 5.92 5.15 41.84 39.1? 15.70 10.31 - 2 . 3 7 - 1 . 4 1 
Honduras 347 7 .14 5.00 48.60 37.99 11.81 6 .26 - -
Nicaragua 418 6.57 5.04 46.64 38.05 12.18 6.62 -1 .66 - 0 . 8 8 
Panama 1 058 4.12 2 .85 31.35 23.86 5.96 5.50 -0 .92 - 0 . 6 1 
Paraguay 680 5.20 3.75 36.75 29.50 7.67 6 .11 3.76 -
Dominican Republic 647 5.00 3.20 36.66 27.92 9.00 5.98 - 2 . 0 8 - 1 . 3 1 
Uruguay 1 309 2.89 2.55 20.29 18.80 10.11 9 .95 - 4 . 5 1 - 0 . 3 6 
Total Latin America 1 096 4.62 3.39 33.87 27.34 8.95 6 .78 -0 .40 - 0 . 1 7 
Total growth rate^/ 
(per thousand) 
1975-
1960 
1995-
2000 
12.65 
24.1? 
29.72 
21. 38 
17.05 
27.00 
34.94 
25.83 
23.79 
30.31 
29.27 
30.21 
23.77 
35.24 
32.80 
24.47 
32.83 
25.59 
5.67 
24.52 
8 .84 
19.69 
21.59 
16.78 
12.67 
26.83 
23.19 
28.72 
18.74 
27.72 
28.99 
27.34 
27.41 
31.73 
30.55 
17.75 
23.40 
20.63 
8.49 
20.40 
Sources CEPAL, on the basis of data from CELADE, Boletín Demográfico N2 27, January 1981. 
a/ Equals the difference between the birth and death rates, plus (+) the migration rate. 
although this classification is not strictly in keeping with a 
demographic perspective, it is useful for the purpose of 
considering the relationships between certain demographic 
variables and a number of areas of economic growth. 
However, since it is a question of country averages, it 
is necessary to stress the most significant or atypical trends 
in a given case, where necessary. Thus, for example, although 
the drop in the population growth rate anticipated in Latin 
America in the coming two decades would appear to be a 
prolongation of the transition process mentioned earlier, it is 
nevertheless true that its scale and intensity will be strongly 
influenced by the course taken by Mexico. It is expected that 
the population growth rate in the region will drop from 24.5 
per thousand in the period 1975-1980 to 24.2 and 21.3 in the 
1980s and 1990s ,6/ whereas in Mexico it will drop from 29.7 to 
28.0 and 23.2, respectively. In other words, it is only once 
Mexico's population growth rate has significantly dropped that 
the region's population growth rates will also do so, while 
nevertheless maintaining much higher levels than the current 
levels of any developed country. 
There will continue to be considerable disparities with 
regard to overall population growth within the individual 
groups of countries. These disparities will be much more marked 
in the 1980s and 1990s, and in the second half of the 1990s the 
differences in question will become less pronounced, with lower 
rates that will be closer to per capita GDP product levels. In 
this context, there will be a particularly sharp drop in the 
rates in question above all in Mexico and Venezuela and in 
general in the countries with higher per capita GDP levels, 
namely, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Panama. Moreover, in 
connexion with this aspect, the drop in migratory movements 
will be greater in Paraguay and Venezuela. 
In any event, if the individual groups of countries are 
considered as a whole, it may be noted that the potential for 
reducing the population growth rate is apparently greater in 
the large and medium-sized countries and that there is very 
little potential in the small countries in that connexion (see 
table 8). This suggests that the larger economies would be in 
a better position to modernize, tackle the rapid urbanization 
process and raise their population's educational and health 
levels, which are factors that unquestionably have an impact on 
fertility, birth and death rates; however, these trends also 
imply an improvement in distribution of income, since, if this 
does not take place, it will not be possible to extend the 
socio-economic benefits referred to the lowest-income population 
segments, which are precisely the ones where the highest 
population growth rates are generated. In that connexion, it 
has been noted in a number of surveys of Latin American countries 
that households with incomes on the borderline of critical 
poverty have twice the number of dependents below the age of 14 
years that non-poor household have; this applies in both 
6/ If Mexico were excluded, the latter rates would be 
approximately 23.1 and 21.1 per thousand. 
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urban and rural areas. Moreover, this bears out the assertion 
that fertility rates are closely related to the income levels 
of the poorest groups and that the relatively uneven 
distribution of income in a number of countries would appear to 
be a factor that contributes to those countries' high birth 
rates. It also bears out the views of authors who claim that, 
although the relationships between income levels and birth rates 
are indirect, such relationships are nevertheless relatively 
uniform and provide reasonable degree of accuracy with regard 
to demographic transition trends (see figure 2). Furthermore, 
it supports the conclusion drawn by a number of authors that 
development policies should take account of the impact of 
education, health and other socio-economic processes on 
population growth, rather than continuing to treat birth rates 
as an external variable in development plans. 
Among the countries with larger economies, Argentina will 
continue to have a declining population growth rate as a result 
of a drop in the birth rate and a small increase in mortality 
(a unique case in the region) arising from its population's 
ageing process; towards the end of the century its annual rate 
of population growth will drop to 8.8 per thousand, thus only 
slightly exceeding that of Uruguay, whose demographic traits 
are extremely similar. In Mexico there will be a sharper drop 
in the birth rate than in Brazil, with the result that the 
birth rate will level off in both countries in the period 
1995-2000; the differences noted in overall population growth 
in the period in question will therefore be attributable to the 
continuing presence of disparities in mortality rates (see 
table 9). These projections take on greater importance when 
account is taken of the fact that the drop anticipated in the 
rate of expansion of the birth rate in Mexico is the sharpest 
in the region (almost 11 points per thousand between 1975-1980 
and 1995-2000) and that, nevertheless, together these countries 
will continue in the year 2000 to have 56% of the population 
of Latin America (19 countries) and to have population growth 
rates of approximately 20 per thousand, which is an extremely 
high figure when compared with the former situation in countries 
that are now developed at a point when they had per capita GDP 
levels similar to those that the two countries in question will 
have at the end of the century. 
In the medium-sized countries the "most outstanding aspect 
is the drop anticipated in the birth rate of Venezuela; this 
will be the sharpest drop after that of Mexico and will amount 
to 9.9 points per thousand between the five-year periods 
1975-1980 and 1995-2000, which, together with an equally marked 
drop in the migration rate, will lead to a population increase, 
which although relatively high (23.2 per thousand in 1995-2000) 
will be more in keeping with its per capita GDP level, which 
will continue to be the highest in the region. The rate of 
population growth in Colombia and Chile will continue to drop; 
in the former country there will be a greater drop in the birth 
rate, but the negative effect of the migration rate will also 
decrease, with the result that towards the period 1995-2000 
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the differences will be maintained at rates of 16.8 and 12.7 
per thousand, respectively. It should, in any event, be noted 
that when compared with those of Venezuela these figures are 
relatively low; the same is so in comparison with those of 
Peru, where birth and death rates will offset each other and 
there will not be a reduction in the population growth rate 
between 1975-1980 and 1995-2000, when there will be an average 
of 27 per thousand. 
Reference has already been made to a number of 
outstanding traits in the small countries. In Uruguay, which 
currently has the lowest population growth rate in the region 
(5.7 per thousand in 1975-1980), the rate will rise to 8.5 in 
the five-year period 1995-2000. but this will be almost entirely 
owing to the drop in the negative effect of the migration rate 
(from -4.5 to -0.4 per thousand) between the abovementioned 
periods. The other two countries in which there will be a rise 
in the population growth rate are Bolivia and Haiti, but for 
entirely different reasons; on the one hand, their birth rates 
will not drop significantly (particularly in Haiti, which has 
the lowest per capita income) and will be the highest in the 
region at the end of the century and, on the other hand, they 
will experience the most drastic drops in their mortality 
rates. This is thus the situation in the two countries that 
are lagging furthest behind in the demographic transition that 
Latin America is experiencing. 
In general, the countries with small economies will 
continue to have the highest population growth rates in the 
region. The exceptions will be Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay, 
which recorded a per capita gross domestic product of over 
US$ 1 000 (1975 dollars) in 1979, whereas in the other countries 
it was between US$ 350 and US$ 680 (only US$ 160 in Haiti). 
However, there will in any event be an inverse correlation 
between the per capita gross domestic product and the rate of 
population growth. At the same time, in the countries in 
question as a whole there will be a drop in the birth rate of 
almost 20% and a decrease in the mortality rate of somewhat 
over 40%, which, together with a general drop anticipated in 
net migration, which is normally negative (except in Paraguay 
in the period 1975-1980), would mean that there will be only a 
slight reduction in the overall population growth rate. Thus, 
between the 1980s and 1990s that rate will drop from 27.5 to 
26.6 per thousand, which are certainly high figures even in 
the context of the developing countries of other regions. 
It is not superfluous to reiterate that the projections 
presented here largely reflect what could be interpreted as 
long-term population inertia, adjusted in a number of ways by 
elements that have recently become known and that are expected 
to have a certain impact on future population trends. For 
example, the drop projected in Mexico's birth rate is largely 
based on the policy of promoting the strengthening of 
responsible parenthood that is being practiced in that country, 
which in general means having a smaller number of children and 
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providing those children with enhanced living conditions. An 
endeavour has been made to measure this aspect through the 
birth rate, but there is obviously a high degree of uncertainty, 
particularly if account is taken of the fact that in the future 
the policy in question could be accompanied by more advanced 
techniques that are simple to absorb, especially by low-income 
population segments. 
6. Growth of the economically active population (EAP) 
In recent years the phase of demographic transition 
through which Latin America is passing, which is marked by 
high growth rates that are in the process of declining in most 
countries, has had the most impact with regard to the relative 
increase in the EAP and expansion of the labour supply. 
Despite the appreciable economic growth recorded in many 
countries of the region, there is no doubt that underemployment 
continues to exist and has become worst in a number of cases. 
Therefore, in spite of the fact that the problem exists to 
varying extents from country to country, it is clear that the 
rate and characteristics of past economic growth have not made 
it possible to absorb the expanding labour supply productively 
and thus to reduce, or at least halt the exacerbation of, 
situations where there is poverty and indigence. 
The continuing existence of a high proportion of inactive 
persons in the population segment^that is of working age means 
that technical and human resources are being wasted to a 
certain extent. Policies with a view to providing new members 
of the labour force with appropriate employment and to 
improving utilization of those who remain redundant are thus a 
challenge, not only as regards achieving more satisfactory 
growth rates, but also as regards establishing an economic 
system that will make it possible to meet the demand for 
employment in a dynamic manner; in other words, by combining 
requirements relating to production through use of modern 
technology with the expansion of employment resulting from 
population growth. Of course, this is extremely complex, since, 
on the one hand, raising production levels calls for 
productivity gains, which are linked to use of capital-
intensive technology and, on thet other hand, for the 
availability of a labour force that has skills in keeping with 
those resources. Since a considerable drop in the birth rate 
is anticipated, the proportion of the population aged under 
14 years will drop, and, on the other hand, the proportion of 
the population of working age will increase considerably and 
there will be a slight increase in the proportion of the 
population of over 65 years of age (see table 10); the need 
to equip the members of the labour force with appropriate 
skills, as an ideal way of facilitating their incorporation 
into the production process, will become more pressing. 
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Table 10 
LATIN AMERICAí TOTAL POPULATION AND AGE STRUCTURE 
1980 2000 I n C r e a S e 1980-2000 
1980-2000 (annual 
Percentage Percentage , Percentage growth rate, 
Thousands Thousands Thousands . 
of total of total of total per cent) 
Total 353 014 100.0 551 076 100.0 198 06l 100.0 2.3 
0 - 1 4 years 1^0 849 to.O 192 107 34.9 51 257 25.9 1.6 
15 - 64 years 196 864 55.8 332 017 60.2 134 792 68.0 2.6 
65 years and over 14 g4l 4.2 26 952 4.9 12 Oil 6.1 3.0 
Source: CELÂDE, Boletín Demográfico N2 27, January 1981. 
Achievement of higher levels of absorption of labour with 
adequate productivity levels and less differentiation according 
to the activities carried out would make it possible to attain 
two extremely important goals: on the one hand, there would be 
a trend towards improved primary distribution.of income and, on 
the other hand, if there is a significant drop in dependency 
indexes, from 79% in 1980 to 66% by the year 2000, the burden 
that the inactive population represents will be much more 
tolerable. 
In the region as a whole the proportion of the 
economically active population in relation to the total 
population will rise from 55.8% in 1980 to 60.2% in the year 
2000; however, if its contribution to the anticipated 
population increase in the period in question is considered, 
that proportion rises to 68%. A preponderant role will be 
played in that connexion, by trends in the large and medium-
sized countries, in whose population increases the share of 
the economically active population will rise to 70% and 65%, 
respectively, while it will only be 61% in the small countries 
(see table 11). There is an inverse relationship between these 
percentages and the ascending order of the overall population 
growth rate these groups will have, starting with the larger 
groups;7/ in other words, where there is a lower population 
growth rate, the maturing (over 14 years of age) and ageing of 
the population (over 65 years of age) is accentuated. A 
situation will thus develop in which there will continue to be 
greater pressure in the small countries as regards the 
dependency ratio; or, considering the problem from a different 
viewpoint, the population increase in the countries in question 
over the two forthcoming decades will result in a proportion 
'of members of the population under the age of 14 years (35%) 
that is higher than in the medium-sized (27%) and large (23%) 
countries; this is a phenomenon with different connotations 
relating to such questions regarding development of youth as 
nutrition and education. 
The share of the economically active population in the 
total population will drop in Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay 
in the five-year periods 1975-1980 and 1995-2000. This will be 
so in Argentina and Uruguay owing to their low demographic 
growth rate and to the ageing of their population; but those 
two countries will in any event maintain relatively high 
proportions that will be similar to those of the more developed 
regions 8/ (see table 12). In Bolivia, on the other hand, this 
7/ In the period 1980-2000 these rates will be: large 
countries, 21.7; medium-sized countries, 23.1; and small sized 
countries, 27.0 per thousand. 
8/ In 1975 in these regions approximately 64.5% of the 
population was between the age of 15 and 64 years and 10.5% 
was over the age of 65 years. (See Year Book of Labour 
Statistics, op.cit.) 
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Table 11 
LATI» AMERICAS POPULATION GROWTH BETWEEN 1980-2000 
(Thousands) 
Percentage Percentage of t o t a l 
of t o t a l f o r each country 
65 and f o r Lat in 0-14 15-64 0-14 65 and 15-64 over America over 
Larpje coun t r i e s 
Argentina 910.6 4 079.6 1 195.1 6 185.3 3 .2 14.72 65.96 19-32 
Braz i l 15 658.8 44 957.6 4 557.4 65 173.8 33.1 24 .03 68.98 6 .99 Mexico 10 822.6 33 112.2 1 972.2 45 907.0 23 .1 23.57 72.13 4 .30 
Total 27 392.0 82 149.4 7 724.7 117 266.1 59.8 23.36 70.05 6.59 
Medium-sized coun t r i e s 
Colombia 2 245.5 9 149.4 809.9 12 204.8 6 . 2 18.40 74.96 6 .64 
Chi le 573.3 2 859.6 396.6 3 829.5 1 .9 14.97 74.67 10.36 
Peru 4 960.6 7 625.0 492.2 13 077.8 6 .7 37.93 58.31 3.76 
Venezuela 3 132.9 7 763.1 691.5 11 587.5 5 .9 27.04 67.00 5 .96 
Total 10 912.4 27 397.1 2 390.2 40 699.6 20 .7 26 .81 67.32 5 .87 
Small count r ies 
Bol ivia 1 813.7 2 209.6 130.9 4 154.2 2 . 1 43.66 53.19 3 .15 
Costa Rica 233.2 841.7 89.1 1 164.0 0 . 6 20.04 72.31 7 .65 Ecuador 2 462.5 3 879.0 233.2 6 574.7 3 .4 37.45 59.00 3 .55 
El Salvador 1 372.1 2 320.1 218.9 3 911.1 2 . 0 35.08 59.32 5 .60 
Guatemala 1 830.0 3 364.2 282.2 5 476.4 2 . 8 33.42 61.43 5 .15 
Ha i t i 1 747.7 2 202.5 101.1 4 051.3 2 . 1 43.14 54.37 2 .49 
Honduras 1 187.3 1 971.0 128.9 3 287.2 1 . 7 36.12 59.96 3.92 
Nicaragua 958.8 1 404.0 58 .3 2 421.1 1 .2 39.60 58.00 2 .41 
Panama 134.3 719.1 73.2 926.6 0 . 5 14.49 77.61 7 .90 
Paraguay 685.2 1 458.2 93.4 2 236.8 1 . 1 30.65 65.17 4 .18 
Dominican Republic 647.8 2 552.0 182.8 3 382.6 1 .7 19.15 75.45 5.40 
Uruguay 104.0 305.2 114.8 524.0 0 . 3 19.85 58.24 21.91 Tota l 13 176.6 23 226.6 1 706.8 38 110.0 19.5 34.60 60.90 4 . 5 0 
Lat in America 
(19 coun t r i e s ) 51 481.0. 132 773.1 11 821.7 196 075.7 100.0 26.26 67.71 6 . 0 3 
Source: CEPAL, on the bas i s of da ta from CELADE, Bole t ín Demográfico Na 27 , January 1981, 
Tab le 12 
LATIH AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES)! POPULATION STRUCTURE AND INCREMENTS, Bï AGE, 1980-2000 
( P e r c e n t a g e of t o t a l f o r each c o u n t r y ) 
1975-1980 1995-2000 I n c r e m e n t 1980-2000 
Country 0 - 1 4 15-64 6 5 and 0 - 1 4 15-64 65 and 0 - 1 4 15-64 65 and 
y e a r s y e a r s over y e a r s y e a r s o v e r y e a r s y e a r s ove r 
Large c o u n t r i e s 
Argen t ina 2 8 . 1 5 68 .49 8 . 3 8 25 .87 6 3 . 5 6 1 0 . 5 7 14 .72 6 5 . 9 6 1 9 . 3 2 
B r a z i l 4 0 . 1 1 56 .00 3 .89 34 .45 6 0 . 5 9 4 . 9 7 2 4 . 0 3 6 8 . 9 8 6 . 9 9 
Mexico 4 5 . 2 4 51 .25 3 . 5 1 37 .48 5 8 . 8 1 3 . 7 1 2 3 . 5 7 7 2 . 1 3 4 . 3 0 
Medium-sized c o u n t r i e s 
6 . 6 4 Colombia 4 0 . 9 3 55 .72 3 . 3 5 33 .64 6 1 . 9 7 4 . 3 9 18 .40 7 4 . 9 6 
C h i l e 3 3 . 8 3 6 0 . 8 5 5 . 3 2 2 8 . 7 6 6 4 . 6 9 6 . 5 5 14 .97 74 .67 1 0 . 3 6 
Peru 4 2 . 8 1 53 .74 3 .45 40 .75 5 5 . 7 8 3 . 4 7 3 7 . 9 3 58 .31 3 .76 
Venezuela 4 2 . 9 8 5 4 . 3 1 2 . 7 0 36 .81 59 .56 3 . 6 3 2 7 . 0 4 6 7 . 0 0 5 . 9 6 
Small c o u n t r i e s 
B o l i v i a 4 3 . 3 1 53 .40 3 .29 43 .68 53 .10 3 . 2 3 4 3 . 6 6 53 .19 3 . 1 5 
Costa Rica 3 9 . 8 3 56 .64 3 . 5 3 32 .35 6 2 . 8 1 4 . 8 4 2 0 . 0 4 7 2 . 3 1 7 . 6 5 
Ecuador 4 4 . 6 1 51 .79 3 . 6 1 42 .05 5 4 . 4 5 3 . 5 0 37 .45 5 9 . 0 0 3 . 5 5 
E l Sa lvador 4 5 . 4 2 51 .20 3 . 3 8 41 .29 54 .96 3 . 7 6 35 .08 59 .32 5 . 6 0 
Guatemala 4 4 . 5 3 52 .64 2 . 8 3 39 .93 56 .34 3 . 7 2 33 .42 6 1 . 4 3 5 . 1 5 
H a i t i 43 .49 5 2 . 9 1 3 . 6 0 43 .48 5 3 . 3 6 3 . 1 6 4 3 . 1 4 5 4 . 3 7 2 . 4 9 
H9nduras 4 7 . 9 2 49 .41 2 . 6 7 42 .80 5 3 . 9 5 3 . 2 5 36 .12 5 9 . 9 6 3 .92 
Nicaragua 4 8 . 1 8 49 .40 2 . 4 2 44 .68 5 2 . 9 1 2 . 4 1 39-60 5 8 . 0 0 2 . 4 1 
Panama 4 0 . 8 1 55 .18 4 . 0 1 32.16 6 2 . 6 0 5 . 2 4 14 .49 7 7 . 6 1 7 . 9 0 
Paraguay 4 3 . 2 8 53 .27 3 . 4 4 38 .58 57 .68 3 . 7 4 3 0 . 6 5 6 5 . 1 7 4 . 1 8 
Dominican Repub l i c 4 6 . 1 5 51 .10 2 . 7 5 36.27 6 0 . 1 2 3 . 6 1 19-15 7 5 . 4 5 5 . 4 0 
Uruguay 2 7 . 4 8 6 2 . 6 4 9 . 8 8 2 6 . 2 3 6 1 . 8 0 11 .97 19 .85 5 8 . 2 4 2 1 . 9 1 
Source : CEPAL, on t h e b a s i s of d a t a from CELADE, B o l e t í n Demográfico N2 27 , J a n u a r y 1981 . 
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phenomenon will result from a higher population growth rate, 
which will mean that a higher proportion of young people will 
have to be supported (43.7% in 1995-2000). 
Among the large countries, it is interesting to note the 
course taken by the economically active population in Brazil 
and Mexico. Towards the end of the century its share of the 
total population will level off at around 60% owing to the sharp 
drop anticipated in Mexico's population growth rate, whose scale 
may be appreciated if it is borned in mind that that rate will 
decline from 29.7 to 21.6 per thousand between 1975-1980 and 
1995-2000, whereas in Brazil the corresponding figures will be 
24.1 and 19.7, respectively. Thus, in marginal terms the 
increases in the economically active population in the period 
1980-2000 will represent 72% of the total population in Mexico 
and 69% in Brazil; these are certainly high percentages that 
will call for a considerable effort in the field of employment. 
Furthermore, although the increases in the population under the 
age of 14 years will be moderate, by the end of the century 
that population segment will nevertheless represent 35% of the 
total population, a proportion that will considerably exceed 
that of Argentina (26%), which will be the closest to the 
current proportion of the developed countries. 
With the exception of Peru, in the medium-sized countries 
there will also be major changes in the population structure by 
age. In the period 1995-2000, the share of the economically 
active population in Chile, Colombia and Venezuela will reach 
levels very similar to those of the large countries (between 
59% and 64%), but it is only in Chile that the proportion of 
young people (below the age of 14 years) will drop below 30%; 
it should be stressed once again that Venezuela's structure by 
age will become closer to that of the first two countries as a 
result of a significant drop in its birth, migration and overall 
population growth rates.9/ In Peru, on the other hand, the 
moderate drop in the birth rate will be offset by the drop in 
the death rate with the result that its population growth rate 
and its population structure by age will hardly change. 
Among the small countries, the share of the economically 
active population in the total population will be the highest 
in those countries with the highest per capita gross domestic 
product, such as Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay (somewhat over 
60% in 1995-2000); in addition to those countries there is the 
Dominican Republic, which will have a similar proportion, but 
in this case owing to the marked drop in its birth rate which 
will be comparable only to that projected for Mexico and 
Venezuela (see table 9). Apart from these countries, and 
Bolivia and Haiti, which are lagging behind in the demographic 
process and whose population structure by age will remain 
9/ The latter will drop from 34.9 to 23.2 per thousand 
between the five-year periods 1975-1980 and 1995-2000, 
representing the greatest reduction projected at the country 
level. 
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practically constant, there will be a small amount of progress 
in the other small countries with regard to the share of their 
economically active population in the total population, since 
the countries in question will continue to have a high 
proportion of young people, even exceeding 40%, and a 
proportion of EAP of approximately 55% until the last five years 
of the century (see table 12). However, there is an important 
difference; the high population growth rates these countries 
will have in comparison with the other countries will probably 
give rise to more pressing problems both from the point of view 
of employment and social questions. 
If the contribution made by each group of countries to 
the increase in the region's population between 1980 and 2000 
(see table 13) is considered, it may be seen that their age 
composition is closely linked to overall population growth 
levels. In other words, if population growth rates are low, 
the population's potential for ageing is greater; in the large 
countries the percentages corresponding to the age groups 
between 15 and 64 years (61.9%) and 65 years and over (65.3%) 
are thus above the average contribution (15.7%). In the 
medium-sized countries there is a virtual balance among the 
various age groups, whereas in the small countries, whose 
population growth rates are the highest, there would be high 
proportions of young people and declining shares for the higher 
age groups. 
In short, although in the countries with larger economies 
the economically active population will represent a higher 
proportion of the total population, the lower population growth 
rate of those countries will in any event have a lower impact 
on demand for employment than in the other groups of countries 
and, on the other hand, will enable them to reduce further 
their dependency index, as the proportion of young people 
gradually becomes smaller. 
In general, an attempt has been made in these projections 
to group together the most relevant situations and prospects 
confronting the various countries as regards population 
questions. An endeavour has also been made to link such 
questions with economic growth, which is considered in chapter 
2 of this paper, particularly as its relates to employment. 
However, it should be stressed that it is not possible to make 
more categorical generalizations than those made, particularly 
in view of the fact that there is a considerable degree of 
uncertainty in this field, owing not only to its frequently 
rather unclear relationship with the economic and social trends 
in individual countries, but also to the sensitivity displayed 
by demographic variables in a number of cases to changes in 
techniques and policies with a view to controlling births and 
reducing mortality. 
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Table 13 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): AGE STRUCTURE OF POPULATION 
IN THE PERIOD 1960-2000 
(Percentages of Latin American total) 
Age (years) 
0-14 15-64 65 and 
over 
Total 
Large countries 53.2 61.9 65.3 59.7 
Medium-sized countries 21.2 20.6 20.2 20.8 
Small countries 25.6 17.5 14.5 19.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of data from CELADE, Boletln 
Demografico N° 27, January 1981. 
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II. MACROECONOMIC, SECTORAL AND EXTERNAL-
SECTOR PROJECTIONS: ANALYSIS OF 
THE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS 
1. The scenarios 
The Latin American development projections have been 
divided into two scenarios. Basically, these two scenarios 
differ in that the first one calls for an extrapolation of 
historical trends in the context of development of the current 
structure; the second scenario, on the other hand, calls for 
materialization of internal structural reforms and substantial 
changes in the method of organization and functioning of 
external relations and the world economy. The changes in 
question are related to the proposals set forth in the 
International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations 
Development Decade, adopted at the end of 1980 by the United 
Nations General Assembly. 
The first scenario, which is called the trends scenario, 
is focussed on prospects relating to the development process 
in the event that the internal and external factors with the 
greatest impact on economic dynamism continue to behave more 
or less as they have over recent decades, and that the economic 
changes currently under way take place. 
•According to the Secretariat's study, although this 
scenario is based on the assumption that there will be a 
relatively high rate of economic growth, this rate of growth 
will not be high enough to provide an adequate solution to the 
employment problem and to bring about a balance in external 
accounts. Thus, in this alternative social problems are not 
dealt with adequately and the asymmetrical nature of external 
relations remains essentially unchanged. 
In the 1970s economic growth reached an annual rate of 
somewhat below 6%. However, in the first four years of that 
decade the economic growth rate was above 7%. Subsequently, 
from 1976 onwards, a basic characteristic of the economic 
process was its marked instability and a considerable slackening 
of expansion. It is obvious that trends in the external sector 
influenced the course followed by the Latin American countries, 
although to varying degrees in the one-direction or the other. 
It must, at the same time, be acknowledged that internal policy 
has been the other major factor responsible for greater or 
leisser economic dynamism. In actual fact, the situations 
created from the middle of the 1970s onwards led in general to 
expansion of the external debt, which had repercussions later on, 
particularly owing to the impact of debt-servicing on the 
balance of payments, leading to a new area of external 
vulnerability. 
Therefore, in this trend scenario at the country level a 
growth rate was adopted that is adapted to particular national 
situations and is, in general, closer to long-term trends than 
was the case in the first four years of the 1970s. However, it 
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should be stressed that a growth rate following the established 
trend implies that the policy endeavour made by Governments 
over recent years will be pursued, which would make it possible 
to overcome the slackening of growth recorded in the period 
1975-1980 at least in part. Thus, for the region as a whole 
the growth rate for established trends results in an annual 
average rate of 6%. The slight increase in comparison with 
the historical long-term rate is basically due to the greater 
impact on the regional product of the countries with larger 
economies and populations, whose growth rates are above average. 
Employment problems have a particular impact on the scale 
and nature of social problems. Considerable diversity is noted 
in the pattern of product per person employed, both from one 
production sector to another and within the individual 
production sectors. These factors, together with the 
concentration of the means of production and land ownership, 
generate an extremely inequitable income distribution. 
Furthermore, this process is acufe.,.- ...ed by the high rate of 
expansion of the labour force. In ord-r to assess the probable 
trends in such social questions, hypotheses have been adopted 
in the trends scenario that make it possible to consider 
employment prospects and trends in production disparities. In 
this scenario demographic and labour-force projections assume 
that current trends will ( tinue, particularly with regard to 
employment rates of womei.. With regard to growth rates of the 
product per person employed, these are slightly higher than 
those of the 1970s owing to the acceleration of the variable in 
question over recent decades. Thus, assuming that there will 
be no major changes in the current development modality, 
distribution of income will continue to depend largely on trends 
in production disparities and in employment and underemployment, 
and these latter variables will in turn depend on the level of 
economic dynamism and sectoral increases in productivity. 
The internal disequilibrium that has normally been 
characteristic of most Latin American economies, took on new 
connotations in the 1970s, particularly in the latter half of 
the 1970s. The considerable trade-balance deficits and the 
deterioration in the terms of trade experienced by a number of 
countries substantially raised the level of external 
indebtedness, which in many cases made it necessary to reverse 
to a great extent the trend towards rapid expansion of import 
that manifested itself early in the 1970s. However, despite 
the considerable efforts made by many countries, neither a 
reduction in the growth rate of imports nor a sharp increase in 
the growth'rate of exports made it possible to overcome the 
current-account deficit in the region's balance of payments, and 
the level of indebtedness has continued to rise. In this 
scenario it is assumed that governments will continue to 
endeavour to achieve equilibrium in their balances of payments 
and that, as a result of a lower rate of growth in the volume 
of imports, particularly fuel, and a great effort in the field 
of exports, there will be a reduction in the deficits, all of 
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which will reduce the scale of net external financing to levels 
regarded as acceptable in the long term. This will make it 
possible to restrict indebtedness levels to a certain extent 
and gradually to reduce the burden of debt-servicing. In any 
event, in view of the fact that in this scenario the form taken 
by international and interregional relations will basically not 
change, the required increase in the volume of exports will call 
for an increasing effort in the field of deliberate policies. 
Generally speaking, the second scenario reflects the 
proposals put forward in the International Development Strategy 
for the 1980s; it is therefore a normative scenario and not an 
extrapolation of current trends. It makes the assumption that 
institutional and structural changes will be made in the 
international economic order, in intra-regional relations and 
at the national level. It is unquestionable that this scenario 
represents an extraordinary challenge as regards existing 
knowledge and experience in the field of economic and social 
policy. Moreover, its materialization represents a sensitive 
political task. 
The need to accelerate economic growth is one of the 
basic elements of the scenario, in the context of a comprehensive 
strategy aimed at achieving an equitable distribution of income 
and a higher level of well-being for the entire population. A 
high degree of economic dynamism is required, inter alia, 
owing to the scale and seriousness of social problems, which 
will become greater, as already mentioned in the dynamic trends 
scenario. 
Taking account, on the one hand, of social requirements 
and the possibilities afforded by a major reform of the 
international and regional economy and, on the other hand, 
current difficulties, a higher rate of economic growth at the 
country level that was on average somewhat over 1% per year was 
adopted; this rate would make it possible to double the gross 
domestic product for the region as a whole by the end of the 
1980s. However, owing to the prevailing situation, the growth 
rate could be somewhat below that average early in the decade 
and somewhat above it in the second half of the decade. 
The demographic and labour-force projections are similar 
to those in the trends scenario, but since the higher level of 
economic dynamism calls for an increase in the rate of expansion 
of the product per employed person, elasticity in the expansion 
of employment is lower. However, it will be high enough to 
cope with the expansion of the labour force, although current 
underemployment levels will continue. The higher level of 
economic dynamism-will permit implementation of redistributive 
policies of a greater scope than the current ones; together 
with the reduction in employment disequilibria, these policies 
will form a sounder basis for action with a view to attenuating 
social problems. At the same time, it will be necessary to 
promote expansion of capital formation in order to raise 
productive capacity and the economy's level of efficiency. In 
that connexion, it is assumed that policies of a diverse nature 
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will be put forward that will basically be in keeping with the 
aim of achieving a significant improvement in distribution of 
income and with saving requirements in order to meet investment 
needs, which will ultimately make it necessary to restrain or 
reduce the level of consumption of upper-class population 
segments, in which a large proportion of income is concentrated. 
The restructuring of the international economic order and 
expansion of regional co-operation will be the basis of the 
scenario as regards external variables. Growth in imports will 
reach an annual rate of nearly 8% which calls for a level of 
elasticity above unity. Although this level of elasticity is 
somewhat below that of the 1970s, it is relatively high if 
account is taken of the fact that fuel imports will grow at a 
level of elasticity below zero. Growth will thus be achieved 
with a rising ratio between imports and product; this 
assumption is compatible with an increase in trade and the 
establishment of conditions that will result in a higher level 
of economic efficiency. 
It is at the same time assumed that net external financing 
will return to the average relative values of the past decade 
and that debt-servicing levels will drop to proportions of 
exports levels similar to those of the early 1970s. The 
purchasing power of exports will therefore rise at an annual 
rate of approximately 8%. Achievement of these levels of 
dynamism will have to be based on diversification of products 
and of areas of destination of the exports. Diversification of 
products calls for a sharp increase in the proportion of 
manufactured goods, while changes in place of destination will 
be accompanied by a new role for intra-regional trade, whose 
current share of total trade will virtually double. These 
and other changes will gradually reduce the relative size of 
the balance-of-payments deficits and lead to a greater degree 
of symmetry in the region's external economic relations. 
2. Macroeconomic and sectoral projections 
(a) Macroeconomic projections 
The difficult situation facing most Latin American 
countries imposes certain conditions on the economic prospects 
for the 1980s which will affect the scenarios reviewed here. 
It is useful to stress the common areas connected wil^h the 
domestic effort and with energy. 
In the past five years, Latin American countries have 
made a noteworthy effort by adopting policies and measures 
designed to limit the effects of the world recession and 
inflation on their domestic economies. This effort is 
expressed, inter alia, in the maintenance of a relatively high 
level of investment, the raising of the level of domestic 
saving, the attempt to control the growth of imports 
(particularly of fuels), and an exceptional growth of exports. 
Now the growth rates proposed in the two scenarios imply 
savings and investment efforts which differ in intensity 
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and nature but are in any case similar or greater than those 
already made in the long term. The continued growth trend 
assumes an improvement in the economic growth rate in respect 
of the recent evolution. The annual growth rate of 6% for 
this decade in the trend scenario may rightly be defined as a 
dynamic prognosis, in the sense that it will require a greater 
effort than in the past, although the process would continue 
in the framework of the prevailing policy. 
On the other hand, the growth of the product proposed in 
the normative scenario, with the gradual speeding up of growth 
to reach 6.8% annually by 1985 and 7.5% by 1990, implies the 
introduction of new external conditions and will require an 
appreciably greater domestic effort than in past decades, and 
an important structural transformation. 
The trend scenario involves a major effort as regards 
the expansion of foreign trade, which certainly has implications 
for the rate of accumulation. To achieve the requirements of 
savings-investment, assuming an external financing which does 
not adversely affect the balance of payments, will require 
higher growth rates of exports and imports than of the product 
(see tables It to 17). In these circumstances, and taking into 
account that trade with the OECD countries exceeds 70% of the 
regional total, one can understand the importance of the 
economic performance of the countries. Judging by various 
technical studies, the growth prospects of these countries in 
the next few years are clearly unfavourable, since the forecast 
is for slow economic growth, high unemployment and inflation 
rates, continued and even greater deficits in the balance of 
payments, exchange rate instability, etc., and this is spurring 
the use of protectionist measures in the industrialized 
countries which would further hinder trade flows and 
international co-operation, and ultimately the domestic 
accumulation process. 
If this situation continues, in order to uphold the 
prognosis of dynamic growth, Latin America would have to make 
efforts at the domestic level to increase its exports at a 
rate similar to that of imports in order to improve the balance-
of-payments situation and reduce the high percentage of exports 
(44%- in 1979) devoted to servicing the external debt. In this 
case, the growth of exports calls for regional solidarity aimed 
at winning greater access to markets and at increasing trade 
within the region, while the drops in import elasticity could 
be brought about by taking better advantage of the margin of 
substitution, particularly as regards food and fuels, which in 
some countries are very significant items. 
For the normative scenario, in which -as has already been 
mentioned- the gradual introduction of a new international 
economic order is assumed, the levels of investment, domestic 
savings and exports are well above those of recent decades. 
The investment requirements of both scenarios are high. 
In the trend scenario, investment would represent about 23% of 
the gross domestic product; in the normative scenario, they 
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Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES)^: EVOLUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EXTERNAL SECTOR 
Annual growth r a t e s 
( P e r c e n t a g e s ) ^ 
Period 
Gross 
domestic 
product 
Gross 
domestic 
investment 
Total 
consumption 
Exports of 
goods and 
s e rv i ce s 
Terms-of-
t r ade 
e f f e c t s 
Imports of 
goods and 
s e rv i ce s 
Net payment 
of p r o f i t s 
and i n t e r e s t 
Net 
ex te rna l 
f i nanc ing^ / 
Gross 
n a t i o n a l 
sav ing 
Gross 
domestic 
income 
H i s t o r i c a l evolut ion 
1950-1960 5 .3 6 . 2 4 .9 4.7 - 3.4 - - 4 . 6 4 .7 
1960-1970 5.4 6 .2 5 .2 4 .1 - 4.0 - - 6 . 1 5 .4 
1970-1975 6 .3 10.1 6 .6 0 .7 - 8 .7 - - 8 . 6 7 .0 
1975-1979 4.9 4.9 4 .5 8 .8 - 6 . 1 - - 6 .0 5 .1 
Trend scenar io 
1979-1990 5.9 5.1 6.1 6 . 3 - 6 . 2 - 5 .2 5 .9 
1990-2000 6 .1 6 .2 6.0 6.0 - 6 .1 - - 6 . 2 6 . 1 
Normative scenar io 
1979-1990 7 .0 8 .6 6 . 5 7 .6 - 7 .7 - - 9 . 0 7 . 1 
1990-2000 7 .9 8 .0 8.0 8.0 - 8 . 3 - - 8 .0 8 .0 
Source; CEPAL, on the bas i s of o f f i c i a l d a t a . 
a / Excluding Cuba and the English-speaking Caribbean coun t r i e s . 
b/ Based on values a t 1975 p r i c e s . 
c / Including net p r i v a t e t r a n s f e r payments. 
Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA (LARGE COUNTRIES)^/: EVOLUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EXTERNAL SECTOR 
Annual growth r a t e s 
(Percentages).!^ 
Period 
Gross 
domestic 
product 
Gross 
domestic 
investment 
Total 
consumption 
Exports of Terms-of-
goods and t r ade 
se rv i ces e f f e c t s 
Imports of 
goods and 
se rv i ces 
Net payment 
of p r o f i t s 
and i n t e r e s t 
Net 
ex te rna l 
f i n a n c i n g ^ 
Gross 
na t i ona l 
saving 
Gross 
domestic 
income 
H i s t o r i c a l evolut ion 
1950-1960 5 .4 7 . 4 4 .8 2.9 2.7 - - 5 .2 4 .9 
1960-1970 5 .8 6 .8 5 .4 5 .2 4.0 - - 7 . 2 5.7 
1970-1975 7 . 6 11.2 7 . 1 4 .4 10.1 - - 8 . 9 7 .6 
1975-1979 5.1 4 .5 4 .4 13.2 5.4 - - 6.0 5.0 
Trend scenar io 
1979-1990 6 . 3 5 .5 6 . 4 7 . 5 6 .6 - - 5.9 6 .3 
1990-2000 6 .4 6 . 5 6 .4 6 .4 6.0 - - 6 . 6 6 .4 
Normative scenar io 
1979-1990 7 . 3 8 . 5 6 . 8 8 . 5 7.7 - - 9 . 1 7 . 3 
1990-2000 8 .0 8 .0 8 .0 7 . 8 8.0 - - 8 .0 8 .0 
Source; CEPAL, on the bas is of o f f i c i a l da t a , 
a / Comprises: Argentina, Braz i l and Mexico, 
b/ Based on values a t 1975 p r i c e s , 
c / Inc luding net p r i va t e t r a n s f e r payments. 
Table 14 
LATIN AMERICA (MEDIUM-SIZED COUNTRIES^: EVOLUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EXTERNAL SECTOR 
Annual growth r a t e s b/ 
(Percentages) 
Per iod 
Gross 
domestic 
product 
Gross 
domestic 
investment 
.To t a l 
consumption 
Exports of Terms-of-
goods and t r ade 
s e r v i c e s e f f e c t s 
Imports of 
goods and 
s e r v i c e s 
Net payment 
of p r o f i t s 
and i n t e r e s t 
Net 
ex te rna l 
f inanc ing^ / 
Gross 
na t i ona l 
saving 
Gross 
domestic 
income 
H i s t o r i c a l evolut ion 
1950-1960 5 .9 5.9 5 .6 6 . 5 - 4 . 3 _ - 5.8 5 .1 
1960-1970 4 .5 4 . 1 5.0 3.0 - 2 . 8 - - 2.9 4 .4 
1970-1975 2 .5 6 .6 5.6 - 4 . 9 - 7 . 4 - - 7.7 5 .6 
1975-1979 4 .4 6 . 5 4 .6 4 .2 - 7 .0 - - 6 .8 5 .4 
Trend scenar io 
1979-1990 4 .5 3 .5 5 .3 3 .3 - 5 .6 - - 2 .4 4 .6 
1990-2000 4 .6 4 .6 4.7 5.0 - 5 .6 - - 4 . 5 4 .7 
Normative scenar io 
1979-1990 6 . 5 9 . 3 6 .4 5.7 - 8 . 4 - - 8 . 5 6 .7 
1990-2000 7 .9 8 .0 8 . 1 8 .4 - 8 . 9 - - 8 .0 8 . 1 
Source! CEPAL, on the bas i s of o f f i c i a l d a t a , 
a / Comprises: Colombia, Chi le , Peru and Venezuela, 
b/ Based on values a t 1975 p r i c e s . 
c / Including net p r i va t e t r a n s f e r payments. 
Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES)^! EVOLUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EXTERNAL SECTOR 
Annual growth r a t e s b/ 
Gross Gross 
Total 
consumption 
Exports of Terms-of- Imports of Net payment Net Gross Gross 
Period domestic 
product 
domestic 
investment 
goods and 
s e r v i c e s 
t r a d e 
e f f e c t s 
goods and 
se rv ices 
of p r o f i t s 
and i n t e r e s t 
ex te rna l 
f i nanc ing^ / 
n a t i o n a l 
saving 
domestic 
income 
H i s t o r i c a l evolut ion 
1950-1960 3 . 5 3 .9 3 .8 3 .2 _ 4.3 _ - - 0 . 7 6 .1 
196O-I97O 4 .6 7 . 2 4 .4 5 .6 - 6 .5 - - 7 .1 4.7 
1970-1975 5 .6 9 .0 4 .9 6 .7 - 6.7 - - 8.7 5 .5 
1975-1979 4 .6 4 .9 5 .4 5 .3 
Trend scenar io 
6.7 3 .5 5 .1 
1979-1990 5 .0 4 .1 4 .8 6 .7 - 5.4 - - 5 .2 8 . 2 
1990-2000 5 .3 5 .4 5 .4 5 .6 
Normative scenar io 
5.6 5 .4 5 .3 
1979-1990 6 . 5 8 . 5 5 .5 7 . 8 - 6.6 - - 10.4 6 .4 
1990-2000 7 . 8 7 . 8 7 . 8 8 .0 - 8 .1 - - 7 . 8 7 .7 
Sourcei CEPAL, on the bas i s of o f f i c i a l d a t a . 
a / Comprises! Bo l iv i a , Costa Rica , Ecuador, El Sa lvador , Guatemala, H a i t i , Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Dominican Republic and Uruguay. 
J>/ Based ón values a t 1975 p r i c e s . 
cf Including net p r i v a t e t r a n s f e r payments. 
would rise to 27.7% in 1985 and 29.3% in 1990 (see tables 18 to 
21). These percentages are largely determined by the 
economically larger countries, but represent a narrowing of the 
wide range of investment coefficients in the Latin American 
countries.10/ In order to speed up the growth of the region as 
a whole, investment should be increased during the period 
1979-1990 at an annual rate of 8.6%, with rates of 8.5% in the 
economically larger countries and 9.1%-in the remaining 16 
countries. Both the coefficients and the growth rates of 
investment mentioned seem high, although they have been reached 
during some periods. 
At the beginning of the 1970s the product/capital ratio 
increased owing to favourable external conditions which 
permitted a greater openness of the economies and contributed 
to making supply more flexible and demand more dynamic; this 
in turn considerably stimulated a better use of capital and 
better advantage being taken of installed capacity. However, 
after the oil crisis, a decline was observed, originating in 
the new restrictions. Thus, while during the period 1970-1974 
the region as a whole achieved an annual growth of the product 
of 7.1%, with an investment coefficient of 25%, in the period 
1975-1979, although this coefficient was maintained, the annual 
increase in the product declined to 4.9%, as a result of the 
severe limitations generated by the external sector and the 
persistent deterioration of the terms of trade of the oil-
importing countries.11/ The problem thus hinges not only on 
achieving the volumes of investment mentioned, but also on 
reaching a suitable combination of external financing and 
domestic saving, so that excessive pressure is not exerted on 
the balance of payments, while at the same time the process of 
accumulation is strengthened and greater use is made of 
installed capacity. 
The share of net external financing in total gross 
investment increased significantly in the oil-deficit countries, 
from 9.8% in 1970 to 13.8% in 1979, while in the oil-exporting 
countries it remained at 11.4% and 10.4% respectively. This 
financing has therefore become an important supplement to the 
growth of national saving and investment; however, the country's 
high level of indebtedness, as reflected in the high proportion 
of export earnings devoted to servicing it (44% on the average 
for Latin America), has had paradoxical effects. On the one 
hand, owing to the inertia of their growth, the countries are 
finding it increasingly difficult to reduce their balance-of-
payments deficit; on the other hand, the increases have 
inevitable repercussions in the form of the greater financial 
burden of the debt. In the projections for both scenarios, 
10/ While in 1979 these coefficients ranged from 14% to 
35%, in 1990 the range would be from 20% to 38%. 
11/ For fifteen Latin American countries (excluding 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela) the negative effect in 
1980 amounted to 8% of their exports of goods and services. 
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Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA(X9 COUNTRIES^: DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EVOLUTION OF EXTERNAL SECTOR 
Percentages with r e spec t to gross domestic product b/ 
Year 
Gross 
domestic 
product 
Gross 
domestic 
investment 
Tota l 
consumption 
Exports of 
goods and 
s e r v i c e s 
Terms-of-
t r ade 
e f f e c t s 
Imports of 
goods and 
se rv i ces 
Net payment 
of p r o f i t s 
and i n t e r e s t 
Net 
ex te rna l 
f i nanc ing^ / 
Gross 
n a t i o n a l 
saving 
Gross 
domestic 
income 
H i s t o r i c a l evolut ion 1950-1979 
1950 100.0 17.9 80.9 19.0 2 . 3 17.9 2 .4 - 1 . 0 18.9 102.3 
I960 100.0 19.4 77 .6 17.9 - 3 . 1 14.9 1 . 8 1 . 8 17 .6 96 .9 
1970 100.0 21.0 76 .3 15.9 - 3 . 4 13.1 1 . 6 2 .2 18 .8 96 .6 
1975 100.0 25.1 77 .5 12.1 0 . 0 14.7 1 . 5 4 . 1 21.0 100.0 
1979 100.0 25.0 76 .3 14.0 0 . 6 15.3 2 .4 3 .2 21.8 100.6 
Trend scenar io 
1990 100.0 23.1 78 .1 14.7 0 . 8 15.8 2 .4 2 . 8 20 .3 100.8 
2000 100.0 23.3 77.9 14.4 0 . 8 15.8 2-3 2 .7 20.6 100.8 
Normative scenar io 
1990 100.0 29.3 72.3 14.7 1 . 2 16.4 2 . 2 2 .7 26.6 101.2 
2000 100.0 29.4 72.8 15.0 1 . 5 17.0 2 .0 2 . 6 26.8 101.5 
Source: CEPAL, on the bas i s of o f f i c i a l data» 
a / Excluding Cuba and the English-speaking Caribbean c o u n t r i e s . 
b/ Based on values a t 1975 p r i c e s . 
c / Including net p r i v a t e t r a n s f e r payments. 
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Table 19 
LATIN AMERICA (LARGE COUNTRIES)!/! DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EVOLUTION OF EXTERNAL SECTOR 
Percen tages wi th r e s p e c t to g ross domestic product b / 
Year 
Gross 
domest ic 
product 
Gross 
domest ic 
investment 
To ta l 
consumption 
Expor t s of 
goods and 
s e r v i c e s 
Terms-of - Impor t s of 
t r a d e goods and 
e f f e c t s s e r v i c e s 
Net payment 
of p r o f i t s 
and i n t e r e s t 
Net 
e x t e r n a l 
f i n a n c i n g ^ / 
Gross 
n a t i o n a l 
s av ing 
Gross 
domes t ic 
income 
H i s t o r i c a l evo lu t ion 1950-1979 
1950 100.0 16 .8 86 .0 12 .3 5 .0 1 5 . 2 0 . 9 - 1 . 2 1 8 . 0 105.0 
I960 100.0 20 .3 81 .7 9 . 6 0 . 3 11 .7 1 . 0 2 .7 1 7 . 6 100 .3 
1970 100.0 22 .2 7 8 . 6 9 . 1 - 0 . 2 9 -9 1 . 2 2 . 2 20 .0 9 9 . 8 
1975 100.0 26 .3 77 .0 7 . 8 1 1 . 1 1 . 7 5 .0 2 1 . 3 100 .0 
1979 100.0 25.7 75 .0 10 .5 - 0 . 4 11 .3 2 . 5 3 .7 22 .0 9 9 . 6 
Trend s c e n a r i o 
1990 100.0 23.7 76 .0 12 .0 - 0 . 4 11 .6 2 . 6 2 . 7 21 .0 9 9 . 6 
2000 100.0 23.9 75-7 12 .0 - 0 . 4 1 1 . 6 2 . 4 2 . 6 2 1 . 3 9 9 . 6 
Normative s c e n a r i o 
1990 100.0 29 .0 70 .9 11 .8 - 0 . 4 11 .7 2 . 4 2 .7 2 6 . 3 9 9 . 6 
2000 100.0 29.0 7 1 . 1 11 .7 - 0 . 3 1 1 . 8 2 . 1 2 . 5 2 6 . 5 99-7 
Source! CEPAL, on t h e b a s i s of o f f i c i a l d a t a , 
a / Comprises: Argent ina , B r a z i l and Mexico, 
b / Based on va lues a t 1975 p r i c e s , 
c / Inc lud ing ne t p r i v a t e t r a n s f e r payments. 
Table 12 
LATIN AHERICA (MEDIUM-SIZED COUNTRIES^: DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EVOLUTION OF EXTERNAL SECTOR 
Percentages with r e spec t to g ross domestic product b / 
Year 
Gross 
domestic 
product 
Gross 
domestic 
investment 
Tota l 
consumption 
Exports of 
goods and 
s e r v i c e s 
Terms-of- Imports of 
t r a d e goods and 
e f f e c t s s e r v i c e s 
Net payment 
of p r o f i t s 
and i n t e r e s t 
Net 
ex te rna l 
f i n a n c i n g ^ / 
Gross 
n a t i o n a l 
saving 
Gross 
domestic 
income 
H i s t o r i c a l evolut ion 1950-1979 
1950 100.0 22.8 64.7 35.8 - 6 . 2 23.3 6 . 5 2 .0 22.6 93 .8 
I960 100.0 18.9 65.1 38.1 - 1 2 . 8 20.1 4 . 1 - 1 . 1 20.0 87 .2 
1970 100.0 18.2 66.0 32.8 -14 .0 17.0 2 . 8 1 .0 17 .2 86 .0 
1975 100.0 22.2 76.7 22 .5 21.4 1 . 2 0 . 1 22.1 100.0 
1979 100.0 24.0 77.4 22.3 3.7 23.7 2 . 3 - 0 . 1 24.1 103.7 
Trend scenar io 
1990 100.0 21.6 85 .6 20.0 6 . 6 27.2 1 . 5 2.0 19 .6 106.6 
2000 100.0 21.6 86 .6 20.8 7 . 4 30.0 1 . 4 2 . 3 I 9 . 3 107.4 
Normative scenar io 
1990 100.0 J1 .8 76 .5 20 .5 7 . 5 28.8 1 . 2 2 .0 29.8 107.5 
2000 100.0 52.1 77.9 21 .5 8 . 8 31.5 1 . 1 2 . 3 29.8 108.8 
Source! CEPAL, on the bas i s of o f f i c i a l da t a , 
a / Comprises: Colombia, Chi le , Peru and Venezuela, 
b / Based on values a t 1975 p r i c e s , 
c / Including net p r i v a t e t r a n s f e r payments. 
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Tab le 14 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES)—^ : DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND" EVOLUTION OF EXTERNAL SECTOR 
P e r c e n t a g e s w i t h r e s p e c t t o g r o s s domes t i c p r o d u c t b / 
Year 
G r o s s 
d o m e s t i c 
p r o d u c t 
G r o s s 
domes t i c 
i n v e s t m e n t 
T o t a l 
consumption 
E x p o r t s of T e r m s - o f - I m p o r t s of 
goods and t r a d e goods and 
s e r v i c e s e f f e c t s s e r v i c e s 
Net payment 
of p r o f i t s 
and i n t e r e s t 
Net 
e x t e r n a l 
f i n a n c i n g ^ / 
G r o s s 
n a t i o n a l 
s a v i n g 
Gross 
d o m e s t i c 
income 
H i s t o r i c a l e v o l u t i o n 1950-1979 
1950 100 .0 1 3 . 9 8 5 . 7 2 2 . 3 4 . 5 21.8 2 . 7 - 2 . 3 1 6 . 2 1 0 4 . 5 
I960 100 .0 1 4 . 4 8 7 . 5 2 1 . 6 - 0 . 9 2 3 . 5 0 . 9 3 . 8 1 0 . 6 9 9 . 1 
1970 100 .0 1 8 . 5 8 5 . 9 2 3 . 8 0 . 6 2 8 . 2 1 . 1 4 . 9 1 3 . 6 9 9 . 4 
1975 1 0 0 . 0 2 1 . 7 8 3 . 0 2 5 . 0 2 9 . 7 1 . 2 5 . 9 1 5 . 8 1 0 0 . 0 
1979 100 .0 2 1 . 9 8 4 . 6 2 5 . 6 1 . 9 3 2 . 1 2 . 2 6 . 8 1 5 . 1 1 0 1 . 9 
Trend s c e n a r i o 
1990 100 .0 2 0 . 0 8 3 . 0 3 0 . 7 1 . 5 3 3 . 7 3 . 0 4 . 6 1 5 . 4 1 0 1 . 5 
2000 100 .0 2 0 . 2 8 3 . 4 3 1 . 7 1 . 3 3 4 . 8 2 . 9 4 . 6 1 5 . 6 1 0 1 . 3 
Normative s c e n a r i o 
1990 100 .0 2 7 . 0 7 6 . 3 2 9 . 5 1 . 6 3 2 . 8 2 . 8 4 . 5 2 2 . 5 1 0 1 . 6 
2000 100 .0 2 7 . 1 7 6 . 7 3 0 . 1 1 . 8 3 3 . 9 2 . 4 4 . 5 2 2 . 6 1 0 1 . 8 
Source: CEPAL, on t h e b a s i s of o f f i c i a l d a t a . 
a / Comprises : B o l i v i a , Cos ta R i c a , Ecuador , El S a l v a d o r , Guatemala , H a i t i , Honduras, N i c a r a g u a , Panama, Pa raguay , Dominican R e p u b l i c and Uruguay, 
b / Based on v a l u e s a t 1975 p r i c e s , 
c / I n c l u d i n g n e t p r i v a t e t r a n s f e r payments . 
therefore, a gradual reduction of the net external financing/ 
product ratio is proposed so that the average percentage for 
the decade will be more or less similar to that of the average 
of the last decade, with its periods of sizeable variations. 
For Latin America as a whole, therefore, net external financing 
would have to drop as a portion of the product from 3.2% in 
1979 to 2.7% in 1990, which assumes that the effort to 
accumulate national saving will have to be higher than that of 
the past decade. Thus, in the normative scenario the regional 
domestic saving product coefficient should increase from 21.8% 
in 1979 to 26.6% in 1990; these 4.8 percentage points largely 
exceed the 2.7% coefficient projected for net external financing 
in 1990, and to achieve them national saving in the region 
should grow at an annual rate of 9.1%, that is, with a product 
elasticity of 1.28. Although this figure was even exceeded 
during the 1970s (1.32), it should be borne in mind that in 
this case a relatively high growth rate of the product is 
involved, which also requires a high rate of dynamism in 
imports and exports; on the other hand, the improvement of the 
growth rate should cover all the countries of the region and 
not be concentrated as in the past in a small number of 
countries. 
The trends and conditions of the accumulation process in 
the two scenarios vary considerably from one country to another, 
and in many of them the speeding up of the growth rate will 
require relatively greater increases in investment and national 
saving, and therefore a greater effort in some than in others. 
In 1979 only seven countries of the region had a national 
saving/product coefficient (at 1975 prices) of over 20%, while, 
for example, in the normative scenario by the end of the 
decade in sixteen countries it would have a range from 20% to 
30%. At the level of groups of countries, in the three 
economically largest countries this coefficient should increase 
between 1979 and 1990 from 22.0% to 26.3%, in the four medium-
sized countries from 24.1% to 29.8%, and in the twelve smallest 
countries from 15.1% to 22.5%. In other words, even the last-
mentioned countries would reach the goal of 20% laid down in 
the Third International Development Strategy, for those 
countries which presently have a saving coefficient lower than 
15%. This Strategy establishes a total objective for the whole 
of developing countries of 24%. 
Mention must be made of the problem of energy as an 
important part of the effort which must be made to tackle the 
obstacles which, with varying degrees of intensity, have 
interfered with the growth of the majority of the countries, 
particularly as regards the supply of hydrocarbons. As is well 
known, Latin America as a whole possesses abundant resources in 
the three most important sources of commercial energy:12/ 
hydrocarbons (oil and natural gas), hydroelectricity and coal. 
The consumption of hydrocarbons predominates; in 1979 these 
12/ Excluding plant fuels. 
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fuels accounted for 76% of the generation of commercial energy 
in Latin America, and 84% if Brazil is excluded. At the country 
level this share fluctuates between 58% (Brazil) and practically 
100% (Barbados, Guyana). 
Of the 24 countries of the region, four possess 
hydrocarbon surpluses which considerably affect their exports,13/ 
and of these only Mexico and Venezuela generate large volumes 
in the world context. Another four countries are in a 
transition stage; Argentina and Peru show an upward trend, in 
which the former has achieved self-reliance in energy 
production,14/ while the latter became a net exporter at the 
end of the 1970s. The opposite is the case in Bolivia and 
Colombia. In Bolivia, the share of exports of petroleum and 
petroleum products in total exports of goods dropped from 
slightly over 30% in 1975 to around 5% in 1979, while Colombia 
went from being a net exporter to having to spend nearly 
US$ 400 million in 1980 on imports of petroleum and petroleum 
products, equivalent to 9.8% of its imports (CIF). Among the 
importing countries, Barbados, Brazil and Chile produced around 
20% of the oil they consumed in 1979, and Guatemala slightly 
over 5%, while the other twelve countries did not register any 
output. 
The production-consumption balance of petroleum and its 
products, in addition to being unfavourable at the level of the 
majority of the countries, shows a frank deterioration if the 
region is analysed as a whole. Between 1970 and 1979 the 
production/consumption ratio declined from 2.80 to 1.66, and if 
Mexico and Venezuela are excluded, from 0.77 to 0.68 
respectively.15/ These latter coefficients show the enormous 
concentration of oil production in Mexico and Venezuela, whose 
contribution to the region as a whole (24 countries) amounted 
to 73% in 1979. They are also estimated to possess around 80% 
of proven reserves. 
Between 1970 and 1980 imports of petroleum and petroleum 
products in relation to total imports (CIF) of the oil-deficit 
countries in the region rose from 7% to 26%, which in absolute 
values meant an increase from US$ 650 to US$ 15 385 million. 
In other words, while purchases of these fuels increased during 
1970-1980 at an annual rate of 42%, total imports increased by 
19% at current prices. 
13/ Ecuador, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. 
14/ Although in 1980 imports (CIF) of petroleum and 
petroleum products accounted for 6.2% of total imports (CIF). 
15/ Between 1975 and 1979, production of Mexican crude 
oil doubled and represented 34% and 68% respectively of 
Venezuela's output, so that if only Mexico is excluded the 
drop in this coefficient between 1970 and 1979 is from 3.26 
to 1.56. 
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In the great majority of the countries, the growth 
elasticity of the consumption of hydrocarbons with respect to 
the product dropped over the last two decades: of the 24 
countries of the region, it increased in only three oil-
exporters and Nicaragua (due in this latter case to the 
exceptional circumstances). On the average, in 19 countries 
of the region,16/ this elasticity dropped from 1.26 to 1.16 
during those decades. This trend, easily explained, suggest 
that in the future a further decline may be expected; thus in 
the projections in this study, elasticities of less than one 
are included. The historical experience of the developed 
countries also suggests this: the OECD countries, for example, 
showed coefficients of elasticity of around 1.07 in 1969-1973 
and 0.76 in 1975-1979.17/ 
The achievement of a reduction in the growth elasticity 
of the consumption of hydrocarbons, without affecting the 
growth potential of the countries, will be linked to the 
domestic effort made to implement a global and coherent energy 
strategy. In this regard an important step will be the 
implementation of policies aimed at the conservation of 
resources and the development of alternative energy sources 
such as hydroelectricity, coal, biogas, alcohol, nuclear energy 
and other non-conventional sources such as geothermal, wind, 
and sea energy. 
In-the projections, two hypotheses have been formulated 
as regards imports of petroleum and petroleum products in the 
deficit countries. The first is the reduction of the growth 
elasticity of these imports in relation to the gross domestic 
product, to 0.8; and the second is that prices will grow 
annually with an elasticity of 1.05 with respect to world 
inflation. By the end of the decade, these results indicate 
that the share of purchases of these fuels in total imports 
(CIF at current prices) of the oil-deficit countries would 
remain at around the 26% recorded in 1980. That is, only 
through efforts to achieve a relative reduction in the rate of 
consumption of petroleum and its products would it be possible 
to avoid the growth of dependence on the external sector, due 
to the probable increase in real prices, 
(b) Sectoral projections 
Various factors such as the economic size of the 
countries, the degree of integration of their economies, the 
supply of natural resources, demographic characteristics, 
social, cultural and technical conditions and strategies and 
policies have led to great differences in the level of 
economic and social development of the Latin American countries. 
16/ Excluding Cuba and the English-speaking Caribbean 
countries. 
17/ OECD, Economic Outlook, 25 July 1979. 
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The economically largest countries 18/ have made 
considerable headway in the industrialization process, 
generating in 1980 a value added in manufacturing amounting to 
31% of their total gross domestic product as against 20% and 
18% and the economically medium-sized 19/ and small countries 20/ 
respectively. Simultaneously, the share of agriculture in the 
largest countries (10%) is less than half that of the small 
countries (22.4-%). But the performance of the economies of the 
group of largest countries is characterized not only by these 
indicators but also by their greater dynamism over the last two 
decades. During the period 1960-1980 the annual growth rate of 
their global product was 6.1%, while that of the other sixteen 
countries only amounted to 4.1%.21/ 
In the projections analysed below, the aim is to explore 
the implications of the continuation of the long-term trends in 
the structure of production, sectoral productivity and 
employment and the repercussions of these interrelations on the 
unemployment rate, and on the other hand, the requirements for 
speeding up economic growth and the reduction of disparities in 
the course and dynamism of various types of countries. The 
first exercise is connected with the anaiysis of the "dynamic 
trend" scenario, while the second corresponds to the "normative" 
scenario. 
For the purposes of analysis, three main sectors have been 
defined: agriculture, which includes crop farming, stock 
breeding, hunting and fishing; industry, subdivided into 
manufacturing, mining and quarrying and construction; and 
services, including basic services (electricity, gas, water, 
transport and communications) and other services. In addition, 
the countries have been grouped in accordance with the three 
above-mentioned categories; that is, large, medium and small. 
In these sectoral projections/the projected horizon was 
extended until the end of the century, in view of the fact that 
they involve variables such as the economically active 
population and sectoral structure and productivity, which 
require relatively long periods in order for their performance 
to be evaluated more clearly. 
(i) Dynamic trend scenario 
The trend scenario assumes the resumption of the long-term 
evolution in which the process of industrialization exercised 
clear leadership in productive transformation and economic 
growth. The crisis undergone by the industrial sector in the 
past decade would thus be left behind, especially in the medium-
sized countries, where the conjunction of internal and external 
18/ Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
19/ Colombia, Chile, Peru and Venezuela. 
20/ Twelve countries, excluding the English-speaking 
Caribbean countries. 
21/ All figures based on values at 1975 prices. 
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factors caused the sector to slow down. The intensification of 
industrial growth would make it possible to continue 
introducing new technologies and products, and at the same time 
would allow for a significant expansion of regional trade in 
manufactured goods, a key element in overcoming the external 
imbalances. Services would retain their role of the last few 
years as the most important source of absorption of employment, 
although their contribution to the gross domestic product 
would remain practically constant. Agriculture would advance 
considerably towards satisfying the growth of domestic demand, 
apart from contributing to the formation of exportable 
surpluses. 
It may be rightly said that the recovery of certain 
sectoral growth rates which characterized long-term trends 
would in itself represent an effort, without neglecting the 
economic potential for achieving higher growth rates. In this 
regard it is useful to recall the drop in the annual growth 
rate of the global product during the last five years, which 
was around 5%, compared with the 6% postulated in this scenario 
for the long term. 
During the next two decades, according to this scenario, 
the agricultural sector would continue to reduce its share in 
the global product (see table 22), but this does not mean that 
its strategic importance would be less in terms of its function 
as a supplier of food and raw materials to satisfy domestic 
demand and maintain exportable surpluses. The annual growth 
rate of the agricultural product would be appreciable and would 
remain at around 3.6%; however its contribution to the total 
product would tend to drop from slightly over 11% in 1980 to 7% 
by the end of the century. 
Industry 22/ would have to increase its dynamism in 
comparison with the previous decade, in which its share of the 
global product remained stationary. Its annual growth rate of 
6.5% would enable it to increase its contribution to the total 
product from around 38% in the 1970s to 41% by the year 2000. 
The greatest increase in production would come from the 
manufacturing sector -an annual 6.7%- while construction and 
mining would significantly exceed the rate recorded in the 
previous decade (3.6% and 5.3% respectively). 
Basic services 23/ would constitute another dynamic 
element of the projected growth. The demand for services 
involved in the economic and social development process would 
become more pressing as progress is made in the structural 
transformation of the economy and an attempt is made to face up 
to the ensuing social repercussions. However, the annual growth 
rate of 6.6% would be significantly lower than the 7.9% achieved 
22/ Includes industrial manufacturing, mines and 
quarries and construction. 
23/ Includes electricity, gas and water and transport 
and communications. 
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Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EMPLOYMENT, BY SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
(Trend scenario and normative scenario. 1980-2000) 
Annual growth rates (per cent) Percentage of the total 
1950-
1960 
Gross domestic product a/ 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Other b/ 
Services 
Basic ç/ 
Other d/ 
Employment 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Other b/ 
Services 
Basic ç/ 
Other Zf 
Gross domestic product per person employed 
Agriculture 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Other b/ 
Services 
Basic 0/ 
Other d/ 
Total population 
Population of working age 
Economically active population 
Rate of open unemployment 
1960-
1970 
1970-
1980 
Trend 
scenario 
Normative 
scenario 
1980- 1990-
1990 2000 
1980- 1990-
1990 2000 
i960 1970 1980 
Trend 
scenario 
Normative 
scenario 
1990 2000 1990 2000 
5.3 
3.5 
6.6 
6.5 
6.6 
5.1 
5.1 
5.1 
2.1 
0.8 
2.5 
2.4 
2.7 
4.3 
3.7 
4.4 
3.1 
2.7 
4.0 
4.1 
3.8 
0.7 
1.3 
0.6 
5.4 
3.4 
5.9 
6.9 
4.1 
5.6 
6.2 
5.5 
2.0 
0.2 
3.4 
3.0 
4.5 
3.6 
2.1 
3.9 
3.3 
3.1 
2.4 
3.9 
-0.4 
1.9 
4.1 
1.6 
2.8 
5.6 
3.5 
5.6 
6.5 
3.6 
6.2 
7.9 
5.8 
2.6 
1.1 
2.7 
2.2 
3.6 
4.1 
3.6 
4.2 
2.9 
2.4 
2.9 
4.1 
0.0 
1.9 
4.1 
1.6 
5.9 
3.6 
6.4 
6.7 
5.3 
6.1 
6.6 
5.9 
2.5 
0.8 
2.5 
2.2 
3.2 
3.7 
2.9 
3.8 
3.3 
2.7 
3.7 
4.4 
2.1 
2.2 
3.6 
2.0 
3.0 
2.9 
6.0 
3.6 
6.5 
6.7 
5.8 
6.1 
6.7 
6.0 
2.5 
0.4 
2.4 
2.1 
3.1 
3.6 
2.8 
3.7 
3.5 
3.1 
3.9 
4.5 
2.6 
2.5 
3.8 
2.2 
2.9 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 
2.8 
2.8 
2.6 
2.5 
7.3 
4.4 
8.0 
8.5 
6.6 
7.3 
8.2 
7.1 
3.0 
1.3 
3.2 
3.0 
3.6 
4.1 
3.5 
4.2 
4.2 
3.1 
4.7 
5.3 
2.9 
3.0 
4.5 
2.8 
2.4 
2.8 
2.8 
7.9 
4.7 
8.7 
9.0 
7.6 
7.8 
8.8 
7.6 
2.9 
0.5 
3.3 
3.1 
3.7 
4.0 
3.7 
4.0 
4.9 
4.2 
5.2 
5.7 
3.8 
3.7 
4.9 
3.4 
2.2 
2.6 
2.5 
100.0 
17.0 
36.5 
22.2 
14.3 
46.5 
6.2 
40.3 
100.0 
50.2 
18.2 
13.3 
4.9 
31.6 
4.9 
26.7 
100.0 
33.8 
200.8 
167.3 
290.3 
147.1 
125.2 
151.1 
100.0 
14.0 
38.4 
25.7 
12.7 
47.6 
6.7 
40.9 
100.0 
42.1 
20.8 
14.5 
6.3 
37.0 
4.9 
32.1 
100.0 
33.2 
184.2 
176.8 
201.2 
128.6 
135.0 
127.5 
4.5 
100.0 
11.4 
38.3 
27.9 
10.5 
50.2 
8.3 
41.9 
100.0 
36.2 
20.9 
14.0 
6.9 
42.9 
5.4 
37.5 
100.0 
31.6 
183.4 
199.2 
151.3 
117.0 
152.0 
111.9 
6.9 
100.0 
9.1 
40.0 
30.1 
10.0 
50.8 
8.8 
42.0 
100.0 
30.7 
21.0 
13.6 
7.4 
48.3 
5.7 
42.7 
100.0 
29.8 
190.8 
221.7 
133.7 
105.2 
155.7 
98.5 
9.5 
100.0 
7.2 
41.6 
32.0 
9.6 
51.2 
9.4 
41.8 
100.0 
25.2 
20.9 
13.1 
7.8 
53.9 
5.8 
48.0 
100.0 
28.6 
198.6 
243.6 
123.0 
95.0 
160.1 
87.1 
10.2 
100.0 
8.7 
41.2 
31.3 
9.8 
50.1 
9.0 
41.1 
100.0 
30.6 
21.4 
14.1 
7.4 
47.9 
5.7 
42.1 
100.0 
28.5 
191.5 
222.2 
132.9 
104.7 
156.8 
97.6 
5.5 
100.0 
6.4 
44.0 
34.4 
9.6 
49.5 
9.8 
39.7 
100.0 
24.2 
22.5 
14.4 
8.1 
53.3 
6.2 
47.1 
100.0 
26.7 
195.7 
238.5 
118.9 
92.9 
156.9 
84.4 
2.3 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official data, 
a/ On the basis of values at 1975 prices, 
b/ Mining and quarrying, and construction. 
¿J Electricity, gas, water and sanitation, and transport and communications. 
d/ Commerce and finance, ownership of dwellings, general government, defence and miscellaneous 
in the previous decade; but even so its growth elasticity with 
respect to the total product would be considerably higher than 
one (1.12). 
Non-basic services would grow at the same time as the 
whole of the economy, or at an annual growth rate of about 6.0%. 
This expansion would come both from the modernization of the 
other sectors of activity and from the increases in employment 
shown traditionally by this sector, in the absorption of part 
of the increases in the labour force in the form of 
underemployment. 
These figures referring to Latin America as a whole do not 
reflect, however, the differences which exist among the 
countries, since the weight of the economically large countries 
in the regional economy frequently defines the course of- the 
variables. It is therefore worthwhile to break down the 
analysis, at least at the level of groups of countries, in 
order to observe how each affects the trends indicated above. 
In the Latin American context, as noted, the economically 
largest countries have been characterized by their higher level 
of industrialization and the lesser importance of the 
agricultural sector in their economies. These characteristics 
would be maintained according to the growth trends described 
above. The considerable volume of production they have 
achieved, and their supplies of available resources and bigger 
markets, among other factors, give them a relatively high growth 
potential. They should therefore continue, as in the past 20 
years, to have a growth rate higher than that of the average of 
the other Latin American countries. The most dynamic sectors 
would be manufacturing and basic services, with annual growth 
rates at 7%, while agriculture would maintain its growth of 
the past decade (3.7%) and non-basic services would evolve in 
the same way as the average of the economy (6.3%). The 
prolongation of these trends until the end of the century would 
considerably modify the productive structure, making it closer 
to the one presently shown by the urban, industrialized 
societies; however, this same circumstance might produce a 
redefinition of the role of the services sector, so that its 
share in the economy would be greater than projected here 
(see table 23). 
The economically medium-sized countries, as noted earlier, 
had serious problems in their industrialization process, which 
in turn had an impact on the slow and declining economic 
expansion during the past three decades. In comparative terms, 
then, in order to achieve growth rates which would be still 
lower than those of the other groups of countries, the medium-
sized countries would have to make greater efforts than in the 
past. Thus, for example, they would be faced with the prospect 
of raising the annual growth rate of the global product from 
3.2% in 1970-1980 to 4.6% in 1980-2000; although this increase 
might seem modest, it implies recovering at least the dynamism 
of the 1970s, mainly through a reactivation of the industrial 
sector, whose production grew very slowly (see table 24). In 
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Tab le 12 
LATIN AMERICA (LARGE COUNTRIES):a/ GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EMPLOYMENT, BY SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
(Trend s c e n a r i o and normat ive s c e n a r i o , 1980-2000) 
Annual growth r a t e s ( p e r c e n t ) P e r c e n t a g e of t h e t o t a l 
Gross domes t ic p r o d u c t b / 
A g r i c u l t u r e "" 
I n d u s t r y 
Manufac tu r ing 
O the r c / 
S e r v i c e s 
B a s i c d / 
O the r ][ / 
Employment 
A g r i c u l t u r e 
I n d u s t r y 
Manufac tu r ing 
Other cf 
S e r v i c e s 
B a s i c d / 
O the r e j 
Gross domes t ic p r o d u c t p e r p e r s o n employed 
A g r i c u l t u r e 
I n d u s t r y 
Manufac tu r ing 
O the r cf 
S e r v i c e s 
B a s i c d / 
Other J f 
T o t a l p o p u l a t i o n 
P o p u l a t i o n of working age 
Economical ly a c t i v e p o p u l a t i o n 
Rate of open unemployment 
1950-
1960 
I960 - 1970-
1970 1980 
Trend 
scenario 
Normative 
scenario 
1980-
1990 
1990- 1980-
2000 1990 
1990-
2000 
I960 1970 1980 
Trend 
s c e n a r i o 
Normative 
scenario 
1990 2000 1990 2000 
5 . 3 
3 . 8 
6 . 4 
6.6 
5 . 6 
5 . 2 
5 . 2 
5 . 2 
2 . 5 
1.0 
2.8 
2.6 
3 . 5 
5 . 0 
4 . 2 
5 . 1 
2.8 
2.8 
3 . 5 
3 . 9 
2.0 
0 . 3 
0.9 
0.1 
2 . 9 
5 . 8 
3 . 1 
6.9 
7 . 2 
5 . 9 
5 . 8 
6.2 
5 . 8 
2.1 
0 . 3 
3 . 7 
5 .0 
5 . 5 
3 . 6 
1 . 3 
4 . 1 
3 . 6 
2.8 
3 . 1 
4 . 1 
0 . 3 
2.1 
4 . 8 
1.6 
2 . 7 
6 . 4 
3 . 7 
7 . 1 
6 . 9 
8.0 
6 . 5 
8 . 3 
6.2 
2 . 5 
0 . 7 
2.8 
2.2 
4 . 0 
4 . 0 
3 . 9 
4 . 0 
3 . 8 
2 . 9 
4 . 2 
4 . 5 
3 . 8 
2 . 4 
4 . 3 
2.2 
2.6 
2 . 9 
2 . 7 
6 . 3 
3 . 7 
6.8 
6 . 9 
6 . 4 
6 . 4 
7 . 0 
6 . 3 
2 . 5 
0 . 5 
2.6 
2.2 
3 .2 
3 . 8 
3 . 0 
3 . 9 
3 . 7 
3 . 2 
4 . 1 
4 . 6 
3 . 0 
2 . 5 
3 . 9 
2 . 3 
2 . 3 
2 . 7 
2.8 
6 . 4 
3 . 7 
6.8 
6.8 
6 . 7 
6 . 5 
7 . 1 
6 . 3 
2 . 5 
0 . 0 1 
2 . 5 
2.1 
3 .2 
3 . 6 
2 . 9 
3 .8 
3 .8 
3 .7 
4 . 2 
4 . 6 
3 .4 
2 . 7 
4 . 1 
2 . 5 
2.0 
2 . 4 
2 .4 
7 . 4 
4 . 5 
8 . 3 
8 . 5 
7 . 5 
7 . 2 
8.1 
7 . 0 
2.8 
1.0 
3 . 2 
2 . 9 
3 . 6 
3 . 9 
3 . 5 
4 . 0 
4 . 5 
3 . 4 
4 . 9 
5 . 4 
3 . 7 
3 . 2 
4 . 5 
2 . 9 
2 . 3 
2 . 7 
2.8 
7 . 9 
4 . 8 
8 . 7 
8.8 
8 . 3 
7 . 7 
8.6 
7 . 5 
2 . 7 
0.1 
3 . 2 
3 . 0 
3 . 7 
3 . 8 
3 . 6 
3 . 8 
5 . 1 
4 . 7 
5 . 3 
5 . 7 
4 . 4 
3 . 8 
4 . 9 
3 . 5 
2.0 
2 . 4 
2 . 4 
100.0 
16 .9 
33 .6 
26.0 
7 . 6 
4 9 . 5 
6 . 4 
4 3 . 1 
100.0 
4 8 . 8 
18.2 
1 3 . 4 
4 . 8 
33 .0 
5 . 6 
2 7 . 4 
100.0 
3 4 . 6 
184 .7 
193 .9 
1 5 8 . 8 
150 .0 
1 1 4 . 4 
1 5 7 . 3 
100.0 
1 3 . 1 
3 7 . 3 
2 9 . 7 
7 . 6 
4 9 . 6 
6.6 
4 3 . 0 
100.0 
4 0 . 7 
21.2 
1 4 . 5 
6.6 
3 8 . 2 
5 . 1 
3 3 . 0 
100.0 
3 2 . 1 
176 .4 
2 0 4 . 4 
1 1 5 . 1 I29.9 
128 .7 
1 3 0 . 1 
2.8 
100.0 
10.0 
3 9 . 8 
3 1 . 0 
8.8 
5 0 . 1 
7 . 9 
4 2 . 2 
100.0 
34 .0 
21.8 
14 .2 
7 . 6 
4 4 . 2 
5 . 9 
3 8 . 1 
100.0 
2 9 . 5 
182 .8 
219.1 
115 .4 
113 .5 
134 .2 
111 .0 
4 . 8 
100.0 
7 . 8 
4 1 . 6 
3 2 . 8 
8.8 
5 0 . 6 
8 . 4 
4 2 . 1 
100.0 
28.0 
22.0 
1 3 . 8 
8.2 
5 0 . 3 
6.2 
4 3 . 8 
100.0 
2 7 . 9 
189.0 
2 3 7 . 2 
107 .6 
101.1 
136 .0 
9 6 . 2 
7 . 1 
100.0 6.0 
4 3 . 1 
3 4 . 1 
9 . 0 
5 0 . 9 
9 . 0 
4 1 . 9 
100 .0 
2 1 . 9 
22.1 
1 3 . 3 
808 
5 6 . 0 
6 . 4 
4 9 . 5 
100.0 
2 7 . 5 
195 .2 
2 5 5 . 5 
103 .4 
9 0 . 9 
139 .4 
8 4 . 5 
6.6 
100.0 
7 . 6 
4 3 . 1 
3 4 . 2 
8.8 
4 9 . 3 
8 . 4 
4 0 . 9 
100.0 
2 8 . 5 
2 2 . 5 
1 4 . 3 
8.2 
4 8 . 9 
6 . 3 
4 2 . 7 
100.0 
2 6 . 7 
I9I.2 
2 3 9 . 4 
1 0 7 . 5 
100.8 
134 .6 
9 5 . 8 
4 . 0 
100.0 
5 . 7 
4 6 . 2 
3 7 . 0 
9 . 1 
4 8 . 2 
9 . 0 
39 .2 
100.0 
22.0 
2 3 . 7 
1 4 . 6 
9 . 0 
5 4 . 3 
6.8 
4 7 . 5 
100.0 
2 5 . 8 
195 .0 
2 5 3 . 2 
100 .9 
8 8 . 7 
1 3 1 . 8 
8 2 . 5 
1.2 
Source ! CEPAL, on t h e b a s i s of o f f i c i a l d a t a , 
a / Comprises A r g e n t i n a , B r a z i l and Mexico. 
])/ On t h e b a s i s of v a l u e s a t 1970 p r i c e s , 
c / Mining and q u e r r y i n g , and c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
E l e c t r i c i t y , g$s , w a t e r and s a n i t a t i o n , and t r a n s p o r t and communicat ions. 
•5/ Commerce and f i n a n c e , ownership of d w e l l i n g s , g e n e r a l government, de fence and m i s c e l l a n e o u s s e r v i c e s . 
Table 24 
LATIN AMERICA (MEDIUM-SIZED COUNTRIES)a/: GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EMPLOYMENT, BY SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
(Trend scenar io and normative scenar io , 1980-2000) 
Gross domestic product b/ 
Agr icul ture 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Other c j 
Services 
Basic d/ 
Other J / 
Employment 
Agricul ture 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Other c / 
Services 
Basic d/ 
Other ]?/ 
Gross domestic product per person employed 
Agricul ture 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Other ç / 
Services 
Basic d/ 
Other ~êj 
Total populat ion 
Population of working age 
Economically a c t i v e populat ion 
Rate of open unemployment 
1930-
1960 
Annual growth r a t e s ( pe r cent) 
Trend Normative 
I960- 1970- scenario scenario 
Percentage of the t o t a l 
1970 I960 1980- 1990- 1980- 1990-
1990 2000 1990 2000 
I960 1970 1980 
Trend 
scenar io 
Normative 
scenar io 
1990 2000 I990 
5.9 4 . 5 3.2 4 . 6 4 .6 7 .0 7.9 
3 .4 4 . 1 3 .0 3.4 3 .1 4 . 3 4 .4 
7 . 3 5.9 1 .0 4 .5 4 .7 7 .0 8.4 
7 . 5 6 . 1 4 .6 5 .8 5 .7 8 . 8 9-7 
7 . 2 2 .9 - 1 . 9 2 . 8 3 .1 4 .5 5 .7 
5 .2 5 .4 5 .4 4 .9 4 .8 7 .5 8.2 
5 .2 6 . 5 7 .2 5 . 3 5 . 1 8 .2 9 .1 
5 .2 5 .2 5 .0 4 .8 4.7 7 . 3 7.9 
1 . 6 1 .8 3 .0 2 .6 2 .2 3 . 3 2 .9 
0 . 5 - 0 . 1 1 .9 1 .2 0 .4 1 . 3 0 .1 
1 .7 2 . 5 1 .8 2 . 1 2 .0 3 . 1 3 .3 
2 . 0 2 . 8 1.6 1.9 1.7 3.0 3.2 
1 . 5 1 .9 2.1 2.6 2 . 5 3.4 3.5 
3 . 1 5 . 3 4 .6 3.6 3.2 4 .5 4 .1 
3 .2 3 .2 3 . 1 2 .5 2 . 5 3.4 3.9 
5 .1 3 .4 4 .8 3.7 3.4 4 .6 4 .1 
4 .2 2 .7 0 . 2 2 .0 2 . 3 3.6 4 .8 
2 .9 4 .2 1 . 1 2 . 1 2 .7 2 .9 4 .3 
5 . 5 1 .4 - 0 . 8 2 . 3 2 .7 3.7 4.9 
5 . 5 3 .2 2 .9 3-8 3.9 5 .6 6 . 3 
5 .9 1 .0 - 3 . 9 0 .2 0 .6 1 . 1 2 .1 
2 . 0 2 . 0 0 .7 1 . 3 1 .5 2 .9 3.9 
1 .9 3.2 3.9 2 .6 2 .7 4 .7 3.2 
2 . 0 1 .8 0 . 1 1 .1 1 .3 2 .6 3.6 
2 . 9 2 .9 2 . 5 2 . 5 2 . 2 2 . 5 2 .2 ... 3.0 3 .3 2 . 8 2 .7 2 . 8 2 .7 ... ... 3.4 2 .8 2.6 2 .8 2.6 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
100.0 
12.9 
49 .5 
15.0 
54.5 
37.6 
5 .5 
32.1 
100.0 
44.4 
21.2 
14.4 
6.8 
54.4 
4 .7 
29.7 
100.0 29.O 
253.8 
104.6 
505.6 
109.2 
118.1 
107.8 
100.0 
1 2 . 3 
46.9 
17.5 
29 .4 
40.8 
6 .7 
34.1 
100.0 
57.0 
22.8 
15.9 
6 .9 
40.2 
5 .4 
34.8 
100.0 
35.5 
205.5 
109.7 
426.7 
101.5 
125.7 
98.1 
5 .8 
100.0 
12.1 
36.7 
20.0 
17.7 
50 .5 
9 . 8 
40 .5 
100.0 
33.0 
20.1 
13.8 
6 . 3 
46.9 
5 .4 
41.4 
100.0 
36.6 
187.2 
144.1 
282.7 
107.2 
179.4 
97.7 
9 - 3 
100.0 
10.7 
37.4 
22.4 
15.0 
51.9 
10.4 
41.5 
100.0 
29.0 
19 .3 
13.0 
6 . 3 
51.7 
5 .4 
46 .3 
100.0 
37.0 
193.4 
172.1 
258.1 
100.4 
192.2 
89.6 
100.0 
9 . 4 
37.8 
24 .9 
12.9 
52.9 
11.0 
41.9 
100.0 
24.2 
18.8 
12.4 
6 . 4 
57 .0 
5 .5 
51.6 
100.0 
38.7 
200.9 
200.7 
201.1 
92.8 
200.7 
81 .3 
11.4 14.2 
2000 
100.0 
9 . 3 
37.7 
25.7 
14.1 
52.9 
11.0 
41.9 
100.0 
27.4 
20.0 
13.5 
6 . 3 
52.7 
5 .5 
47.2 
100.0 
34.1 
190.0 
174.9 
216.7 
100.3 
199.7 
88.7 
5 .2 
100.0 
6 .7 
39.3 
27.9 
11.4 
54.0 
12.0 
41.7 
100.0 
20.6 
20.6 
13.9 
6 . 7 
58.8 
6.0 
52.7 
100.0 
32.5 
190.7 
200.4 
170.5 
91.9 
204.0 
79.0 
1.8 
Source! CEPAL, on t h e bas i s of o f f i c i a l d a t a . 
a7 Comprises Chi le , Colombia, Peru and Venezuela, 
tfl 
U1 
"È/ On "the bas i s of values a t 1975 p r i c e s , 
c / Mining and quarrying, and cons t ruc t ion . 
•ff/ E l e c t r i c i t y , gas , water and s a n i t a t i o n , and t r a n s p o r t and communications. 
e / Commerce and f i n a n c e , ownership of dwel l ings , genera l government, defence and miscellaneous s e r v i c e s . 
effect, industry as a whole grew at an annual rate of only 1% 
in 1960-1970, so that in order to sustain the economic growth 
referred to it would be necessary to raise this rate to '+.5% in 
the 1980s and 4.7% in the 1990s; in this context, the 
manufacturing industry would play a more dynamic role, with an 
annual rate of about 5.7%, while the construction and mining 
subsectors would have very low rates, with an annual average of 
barely 3%, mainly due to the low growth expected in oil 
production in Venezuela. 
Services would grow at an annual rate of 4.9% and their 
share in the productive structure would show the highest 
relative increases towards the year 2000; this, however, would 
to some extent reflect the inadequate growth of the other 
sectors, since some services, especially those with very low 
productivity, would not exist if there were a higher level of 
employment in the goods-producing sectors. 
The economically smaller countries would have the least 
variation in their growth rate compared with that recorded in 
1970-1980. The increase in this rate has been steady and 
progressive over the last three decades (3.5%, 4.6% and 5.0% 
respectively), so that in order to maintain the dynamic trend 
they would require an annual growth of 5.3% during the period 
1980-2000 (see table 25). 
Industry and basic services, as in the other groups of 
countries", would be the most dynamic sectors, while agriculture 
would decrease its contribution to the global product from 
22.4% in 1980 to 16% by the year 2000, as a result of an annual 
growth of only 3.5%. Industry, however, would grow at an annual 
rate of 6.3% and would substantially increase its share from 
26.9% in 1980 to 33% in the year 2000. Basically the changes 
in the relative shares in the product of these countries would 
originate in industrial growth of a similar size to the fall 
in the agricultural share, while services would maintain a 
stable coefficient approximately equal to the average for 
Latin America. 
The production structures of the three groups of countries 
would differ substantially by the year 2000. The large 
countries would be characterized by their advanced level of 
industrialization, 43.1% of the gross domestic product, the 
medium-sized countries would achieve around 38% and the small 
countries around 33%. Conversely, agriculture would continue 
to have a considerable impact on the structure of the small 
countries, with 15.9% of the product, in contrast with a mere 
6% in the large countries. There would be practically no 
difference among the three groups of countries as regards the 
share of the service sector, with small variations around the 
average of 51.2% for the entire region; however, this does not 
mean that the structure within this sector would be similar. 
Production in absolute figures would vary enormously among the 
different countries and groups of countries and would therefore 
include services of different type in each case. 
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Table 24 
LATIN AMERICA (SMALL COUNTRIES)a/: GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AND EMPLOYMENT, BY SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
(Trend scenar io and normative scenar io , 1980-2000) 
Annual growth r a t e s (per cent) Percentage of the t o t a l 
Gross domestic product b / 
Agr icul ture "" 
Indust ry 
Manufacturing 
Other of 
Services . 
Basicd/ 
Other e / 
Employment 
Agr icu l ture 
Industry 
Manufacturing 
Other of 
Services 
Basic d/ 
Other e / 
Gross domestic product pe r person employed 
Agr icul ture 
Indust ry 
Manufacturing 
Other o j 
Services 
Basic d/ 
Other Ì / 
Total populat ion 
Populat ion of working age 
Economically ac t ive populat ion 
Rate of open unemployment 
1950- I960- 1970-
I960 
Trend 
scenar io 
Normative 
scenario 
1970 1980 1980- 1990- 1980- 1990-
1990 2000 1990 2000 
3 .5 4 .6 5 .0 5 .2 5 .3 6 . 9 7 .8 
2 . 6 3 .4 3 . 3 3 .5 3 .5 4 .5 4.7 
4 . 3 5 .7 6 . 8 6 .2 6 . 3 8 .4 9 .1 
3 .6 5 . 8 5 .6 6 . 5 6 .6 8 . 8 9 . 6 
7-0 5 .4 10.0 5 .7 5 .6 7 .5 8 .0 
3 .8 4 .8 4 .9 5 .4 5 .4 7 .0 7 .9 
5 .0 5 .9 6 .9 6 .5 6 .6 8 .6 9-4 
3.7 4 .6 4 .5 5 .1 5 . 1 6 .7 7 .5 
1 . 3 1.7 2 .6 2 . 5 2 .5 3.1 3 .3 
0 . 6 0 . 3 1 .5 1 .5 1 .5 1.9 1.7 
2 . 0 3 .4 3.2 2 .7 2 .6 3.6 3.8 
2 . 0 3.2 3 .0 2 .4 2 . 3 3.4 3.7 
1 .9 3 .8 4 .0 3 .4 3 .2 4 .1 4.2 
3 . 3 4 .0 4 .1 3.8 3.6 4 .5 4 .7 
3 .0 3 .8 3 .1 2 .9 2 .8 3 .8 4 .1 
3 .4 4 . 0 4 .2 3.9 3.7 4 .6 4 .8 
2 . 2 2 . 8 2 . 3 2 .6 2 .7 3.7 4 .3 
2 . 0 3 .1 1 .8 2 .0 2 .0 2 .6 3 .0 
2 . 3 2 . 3 3.4 3 .5 3.6 4.6 5 .1 
1 .6 2 .5 2 . 5 4 .0 4 .2 5 .2 5.7 
5 .0 1 . 5 5 .8 2 .2 2 . 3 3 .3 3 .6 
0 . 5 0 .7 0 .8 1 .5 1 .7 2 . 4 3 .0 
1 .9 2 .0 3.6 3 .5 3.7 4.6 5 .1 
0 . 3 0 .5 0 . 3 1.2 1 . 3 2 .0 2 .6 
2 .7 2 .8 2 .7 2 .7 2 .7 2 .7 2 .7 ... 2 .6 3.0 3 .0 3.0 3.0 3.0 ... ... 2.9 3 .0 2 .8 3.0 2 . 8 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
Trend Normative 
I960 1970 1980 
scenar io scenar io 
1990 2000 1990 2000 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
29.4 2 6 . 3 22 .4 I9.O 15.9 17.8 13 .3 
20.4 22.7 26.9 29.7 32.6 30.9 35.0 
15.4 17.3 18 .3 20.7 23.4 21.8 25.7 
5 .0 5 .4 8 .6 9 . 0 9 . 2 9 .1 9 . 3 
50.2 51.1 50.7 51.4 51.5 51 .3 51.7 
6 . 0 6 .9 8 . 2 9 . 3 10.4 9 . 6 11.2 
44.1 44.2 42.4 42.1 41 .1 41.7 40.6 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
62 .3 54.1 48.5 43.9 39.6 42.9 36.4 
14.8 17 .3 18.4 18.7 18.8 19 .3 20.2 
11 .3 13.0 13.5 13.4 13.1 13.9 14.4 
3 .5 4 . 3 4 .9 5 .4 5 .7 5 .4 5 . 8 
23.0 28.6 33.0 37.3 41.5 37.8 43.0 
2 .9 3.5 3.7 3.8 3 .9 3.9 4 .2 
20.1 25.1 29 .4 33.5 37.6 33.8 38.8 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
47 .3 48.5 46.1 .43.2 40.2 41.5 36.6 
138.2 131.3 146.1 158.3 172.9 I6O.O 172.8 
136.7 132.8 135.3 154.4 177.8 156.5 178.6 
143.1 126.0 175.9 168.2 161.6 169.4 158.6 
218.5 178.4 153.4 137.6 124.0 135.8 120.2 
211.8 196.2 223.5 243.8 267.2 244.9 265.6 
219.4 175.9 144.6 125.5 109.1 123.2 104.4 
-
9 .4 12.0 I6.3 18.4 11.1 6 .7 
Source: CEPAL, on the b a s i s of o f f i c i a l da t a . 
Tf Comprises Bol iv ia , Costa Rica, Dominican Republic , Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, H a i t i , Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
•f>/ On the bas i s of values a t 1970 p r i c e s , 
c / Mining and quarrying and cons t ruc t ion . 
"d/ E l e c t r i c i t y , gas , water and s a n i t a t i o n , and t r a n s p o r t and communications. 
e/ Commerce and f i nance , ownership of dwel l ings , general government, defence and miscellaneous s e r v i c e s . 
The share of the economically largest countries in the 
regional gross domestic product would increase from 72.9% in 
1980 to 78.4% in the year 2000. The medium-sized countries 
would show a decline from 19.1% in 1980 to 14.6% in the year 
2000, and the small countries from 8% to 7% in the same years. 
The prolongation of the long-term trends would consequently 
accentuate differences among the countries from the point of 
view of production structure. 
In general, the increase in productivity would be 
maintained by, among other factors, the introduction of 
technological changes, the formation of capital and the greater 
possibilities which larger volumes of production would provide 
for taking advantage of economies of scale. The annual growth 
rate of the product per person employed in Latin America would 
rise to 3.4% over the next two decades (see table 22), which 
would involve an appreciable increase compared with that 
observed in the 1970s (2.9%). 
There is a marked heterogeneity in the growth of the 
product per person employed, both among countries and among 
sectors. In the economically largest countries, the rate 
would be higher (3.8%) due to the better conditions for 
developing national technology suited to local resources, and 
for taking better advantage of imported technology in view of 
the levels of production achieved and the higher skills of the 
labour available. In medium-sized and small countries this 
growth would be lower, with annual rates of 2.2% and 2.6% 
respectively. 
Different growth rates of the product per person employed 
would also be observed among sectors. In Latin American 
agriculture the annual rate would be 2.9% for the period 
1980-2000, an improvement on the 2.4% recorded in the previous 
decade. The increase would be gradual, from 2.7% in the first 
decade to 3.1% in the decade 1990-2000. In the large countries 
this growth would be more intense, reaching an annual rate 
throughout the entire projection period of 3.4%, and it would 
be much higher than that of medium-sized and small countries, 
which would have 2.4% and 2.0% respectively. 
As a consequence of the trends described, the annual 
growth rate of employment in Latin American agriculture would 
be small, reaching on the average only 0.6%, and would follow 
a downward trend, since the 0.8% of the first decade would be 
followed by 0.4% in the period 1990-2000. This would confirm 
the tendency towards a reduction in the ability of agriculture 
to absorb labour, which is one of the main causes of the 
persistence of rural-urban migratory movements. 
In Latin American industrial manufacturing, the annual 
growth rate of the product per person employed would be 4.4% 
higher, thus exceeding the trend observed in the past three 
decades (4.0% in the period 1950-1980). At the country level, 
the annual increase would be greater in the large countries, 
where it would reach 4.6% for the projection period. In the 
medium-sized and small countries this rate would be 3.9% and 
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4.1% respectively, but even so it would remain substantially 
higher than in other sectors of activity and its own trends of 
the past decade (2,9% and 2,5% in each case). Generally 
speaking, the wider dissemination of technological innovations 
and the incorporation of more complex capital goods into their 
production system would allow the industrially less developed 
countries to make greater progress in productivity compared with 
their earnings levels in earlier periods. However, this greater 
growth has implications for employment levels. It has been 
found empirically that if a country achieves a specific level of 
per capita income a certain time after another country, it will 
not be able to generate similar volumes of employment, since to 
do so would require a larger volume of manufacturing output; 
technical progress, by increasing productivity in time, would 
thus place greater demands on the capacity of the economy to 
absorb the same or larger amounts of labour compared with the 
past. 
Industrial manufacturing in the region would play a small 
role in the direct creation of employment in the sector. 
Although in the next two decades it would sustain an annual 
growth similar to that recorded in the 1970s (2.2%), its 
contribution to total employment would decline slightly from 
14.0% in 1980 to 13.1% in the year 2000, thus confirming its 
low direct capacity for absorption of employment. From the 
point of view of employment, it is clear that manufacturing 
development has more quantitative importance for its expansive 
effects on other sectors, especially on services, than for the 
direct employment that it generates. For the other subsector, 
a recovery of the stagnation in its productivity in the 1970s is 
projected (see table 22); as a result, its annual employment 
growth rate would decline from 3.6% in 1970-1980 to 3.2% in 
1980-2000; but even so its contribution to total employment 
would increase from 6.9% in 1980 to 7.6% in the year 2000. 
In summary, in accordance with the trends described, the 
industrial sector as a whole would only be able to sustain, by 
the end of the century, a contribution to total employment of 
21%, an amount already recorded in 1980. At the level of groups 
of countries, employment dynamism in Latin American industry 
would follow the pattern of the economically larger countries, 
with an annual growth rate of 2.5%, while the medium-sized 
countries would show 2.1% and the small countries 2.7%. 
Productivity per person employed in the services sector 
has historically been low, among other reasons because in many 
countries it includes the most underemployment. Its annual 
growth, although better in the last decade (1.9%), would be 
lower than that of the other sectors and would reach an annual 
rate of 2.2% in 1980-1990 and 2.5% by the end of the century. 
Thus, although an improvement in the trend is projected, 
services would continue to absorb, in conditions similar to 
those now existing, a high proportion of labour. The annual 
rate of employment would grow by about 3.7% in the next 
two decades. At the level of groups of countries, productivity 
of services would grow •unevenly. In the economically larger 
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countries it would reach an annual rate of 2.6% for the period 
1980-2000, while in the medium-sized and small countries it 
would be substantially lower (1.4% and 1.6% respectively). 
However, the annual growth rate of employment would vary less 
among the different groups of countries: in the economically 
largest and in the small countries it would be on the order of 
3.7%, and in the medium-sized countries 3.4%, on the average 
during the period 1980-2000. 
In brief, the growth of employment in Latin America 
according to this scenario would reach an annual rate of 2.5% 
in the next twenty years, which would be inadequate to absorb 
the growth of the economically active population (EAP) of 2.8% 
in the first decade, and only in the second decade would it 
reach an equal magnitude of 2.5%. This slow rate of employment 
growth would thus contribute to increasing open unemployment 
from an initial level of 6.9% in 1980 to 9.5% in 1990 and 10.2% 
in the year 2000. 
The rate of open unemployment would not be the same in all 
the groups of countries. In the economically larger ones it 
would increase considerably, from 4.8% in 1980 to 7,1% in 1990, 
but in the 1990s there would be a gradual drop to 6,6% in the 
year 2000, mainly as the result of a significant drop in the 
growth rate of the EAP, 
In the medium-sized and small countries the employment 
situation would be far more pressing. The growth rate of 
employment would decrease annually from 2,6% in the period 
1980-1990 to 2.2% in 1990-2000; however, that of the EAP would 
do so more gradually from 2.8% to 2.6% respectively; as a 
result, the open unemployment rate would rise from 9.3% in 1980 
to 11.4% in 1990 and 14.2% in the year 2000. 
In the small countries the employment balance would be 
more critical. The annual growth of the EAP would be extremely 
high and difficult to reduce significantly, since the 3,0% 
estimated for this decade would only decline to 2.8% in the 
next one. If we compare these figures with the growth in 
employment supply proposed by this scenario, 2.5% annually for 
the entire period 1980-2000, the unemployment rates would reach 
12.0% in 1980, 16.3% in 1990 and 18.4% by the end of the 
century. 
It should be noted, however, that the figures on open 
unemployment used above may include some percentage of 
underemployment, on account of the difficulties in classifying 
the quality of employment by sectors of activity using primary 
data sources. 
As a result, although open unemployment might be over 
estimated, if the problem is analysed from the point of view 
of total unemployment it would tend to grow worse, since the 
figures mentioned above certainly do not include undermployment, 
which determines another equivalent percentage of unemployment, 
to its full extent. In any case, results reveal the inadequacy 
of the growth postulated in this scenario for solving the 
problems of unemployment and underemployment. 
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(ii) Normative scenario 
The appraisal of the Latin American economic and social 
development process and the consequences implicit in maintaining 
the growth trends make it essential to give a new orientation 
to development strategies and policies. Whatever alternative 
is adopted, however, one of the basic elements of this new 
orientation is the speeding up of economic growth. In this 
regard, country targets were set which resulted in an annual 
growth rate of the product for Latin America as a whole in 
1980-1990 of 7.3%. This growth is consistent with the 
postulates of the new International Development Strategy for the 
Third United Nations Development Decade (IDS), at both the 
sectoral and global levels; in this last area it exceeded, 
although only by a small margin, the goal of the new IDS for 
developing countries as a whole (7%). 
Naturally the greater dynamism postulated in this scenario 
proposes more profound changes, in relation to both the 
productive structure and inter-sectoral processes. 
The product of the agricultural sector would reach an 
approximate annual growth rate of 4.4% during the period 
1980-1990. This growth, which implies considerable efforts, 
would contribute substantially to satisfying the increases in 
domestic demand which might arise from the increase and better 
distribution of income, and at the same time the need for 
larger exportable surpluses to implement the external sector 
strategy. Moreover, it is consistent with the 4% recommended 
by the IDS for all developing countries, in view of the 
greater potential of Latin America in this field. The 
requirements proposed for the growth of the agricultural sector, 
then, are also high and exceed the long-term trend by 
almost one percentage point annually (see table 22). 
As in the previous scenario, industry would be the 
main dynamic factor. During the period 1980-2000 its annual 
growth rate would be 8.3%, with the result that its share in 
the structure of production would increase significantly, from 
38.3% in 1980 to 44% in the year 2000. This increase in its 
share would be chiefly explained by the high growth rate 
proposed for the manufacturing industries, since the 
contribution of the other industrial activities (mines and 
quarrying, and construction) would experience a decline. In 
the large and small countries, the intensity of industrial 
growth would be greater. In the former, the annual rate for 
the first and second decade would reach 8.3% and 8.7%, 
respectively, and in the small countries 8.4% and 9.1%. In the 
medium-sized countries there would be a relatively smaller 
annual rate, 7.0% in the first decade and 8.4% in the second. 
In any case these are high growth targets for the long term, 
whether we consider the countries separately, by groups or as 
a regional whole. Some of them have achieved and even exceeded 
these rates during short periods, but obviously in order to 
sustain them at least during this decade they will have to 
make enormous efforts at accumulation in order to modernize 
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the sector and raise productivity. On the other hand, policies 
would probably be applied simultaneously which would tend to 
modify the structure and dynamism of demand, especially in 
regard to the distribution of income, regional integration and 
access to foreign markets. 
Industrial manufacturing, in particular, would have to 
face the greatest demands. In this scenario, Latin America 
would have to raise its annual growth rate from 6.5% in 
1970-1980 to 8.5% in 1980-1990 and to 9.0% by the end of the 
century. This expansion in terms of production volume would 
be extraordinarily great, or 36% of the increase in the total 
product projected from 1980 to the year 2000. 
Achieving the goals formulated in the IDS would thus 
imply an intense process of industrialization, which would 
require not only efficient policy measures to expand markets 
but also the support of a sustained agricultural development and 
an extraordinary, long-term acceleration. 
The large countries, in view of their combination of 
relatively high production levels and bigger markets, would be 
in a better position to absorb a growing volume of investments 
and to incorporate more complex, high-productivity technology 
into their industrial systems. Moreover, their long-term 
dynamism has been greater than that of the other countries of 
the region, so that the speeding up of industrial growth would 
imply raising their annual rate by somewhat more than one 
percentage point in this decade, with respect to the past three 
decades; this would be in contrast with the medium-sized 
countries, which would have to more than double this rate, and 
the small countries, which would have to increase it by 2.5 
points. 
In the medium-sized countries, there has been a systematic 
decline in the industrial growth rate during the past three 
decades (see table 24). In the past decade the mining and 
construction subsector even experienced an absolute contraction 
of its production, due mainly to the fall in oil production; 
this, added to the persistently decreasing dynamism of the 
manufacturing product, amounted to a situation of relative 
stagnation which was reflected in the extremely low industrial 
growth rate of recent years (1.0% annually in 1960-1970). Under 
these conditions, the achievement of the goals proposed in this 
scenario will require drastic changes in the development 
strategies of these countries. Thus, for example, the policy of 
conserving oil resources applied by Venezuela, currently aimed 
at maintaining the rate of extraction at a constant level, will 
be enormously important. On the other hand, the dynamism shown 
in the past by Peru, whose economic performance in the 1970s 
showed a frank stagnation, will have to be recovered; C.olombia 
will also have to find a suitable way of dealing with its energy 
balance, which has become negative with respect to hydrocarbons. 
Finally, there are many situations which will have to be resolved 
in order to interrupt the inertia of those economies which are 
at an intermediate stage of industrialization in the 
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Latin American context. The normative targets for the 
industrial sector, although certainly high for their size alone, 
could be largely reached by the recovery of the dynamism lost 
during the past decade for various reasons. 
In the small countries there is also a heterogeneity in 
respect of resources and potential for industrialization. 
However, a common denominator is their low level in this area, 
and their considerable margin for making progress by 
incorporating relatively simple, moderately priced technologies. 
This is true, naturally, in the context of policy measures 
which encourage an expansion and stimulation of demand. In 
the long run, industry in the small countries as a whole grew 
at annual rates lower than 6% (see table 25) and raised its 
contribution to the total product to 27% in 1980 (40% in the 
large countries). This situation might suggest that the 
normative targets of annual rates of 8.4% for this decade and 
9.1% for the next are exaggerated; nevertheless, precisely in 
view of the low starting point of industrial productivity in 
these countries, it is possible that the multiplier effect of 
marginal investment might be relatively greater than that of 
the more industrialized countries of the region. Thus, under 
the conditions of a New International Economic Order and the 
domestic changes postulated by IDS, these countries may have 
a chance to accelerate their growth until they achieve the 
abovementioned goals. 
In Latin America, services as a whole would grow at a 
rate similar to the average of the economy. In this scenario 
their value added would reach annual growth rates of 7.3% and 
7.8% in the 1980s and 1990s respectively, so that their 
contribution' to the total product would remain practically 
unchanged at about 50%. This expansion, which represents a 
growth elasticity equal to one, would be conditioned by the 
tendency for non-basic services to absorb the underproductive 
labour force; this does not mean, however, that the stagnation 
in the participation of services in the economy will have 
similar implications to those of the dynamic trend scenario 
(whose contribution is 51%), since the higher productivity 
of services in this scenario would involve a sizable reduction 
in underemployment. Basic services, for their part, would 
grow with a slightly higher elasticity in respect of the total 
product than that of the industrial sector, as a way of 
suitably accompanying the process of production of goods and 
satisfying the growing demand for social services. 
At the level of groups of countries, only in the 
economically larger ones would the contribution of services to 
the generation of the total product decrease, from 50% in 1980 
to 48% by the end of the century. This decrease would be 
explained by the type of industrial development of these 
countries and the intensity with which this process continued. 
In comparison with the productive structure of some 
developed countries in a market economy, the percentages of 
participation of the service sector in all the groups of 
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countries, and certainly in the region as a whole, are 
apparently low. By the year 2000, for example, the large 
countries of Latin America would have a per capita product of 
around 3 800 dollars at 1975 prices, a similar figure to that 
recorded by Japan in 1970; however, the share of services in 
the total product in that country was 53.3%, showing a growing 
trend (55.3% in 1975 and 61.8% in 1978), in contrast to the 
48% projected for the Latin American countries. In this 
perspective, two observations may be made. Firstly, it is 
possible that because of their type of development the countries 
of the region might include as industrial production a certain 
type of services produced in the sector itself, a phenomenon 
which would not occur in the developed countries where the 
broader and more diversified supply of services would enable 
them to acquire these services from other enterprises, sharply 
defining what corresponds to industrial production as such. 
Secondly, the tendency of the share of services in developed 
countries to grow could be due, apart from the speed of 
modernization of the economic system and the high dynamism in 
the demand for social services, to changes in the price 
relationship between industrial production and that of services. 
As a result, it is possible that in these projections a 
certain percentage of the contribution of the service sector to 
the generation of the total product has been underestimated, 
and on the contrary that of the industrial sector somewhat 
overestimated. 
The high level of activity postulated in this scenario 
would enable the per capita product of all the countries to 
double in the next fifteen years at the most and that of the 
region as a whole in 13 years (5.4% annually); but even if 
this trend continues, by the year 2000 it would be only 
approximately half of that recorded in the Federal Republic 
of Germany and France in 1975. Although these figures are 
not strictly comparable, they serve to illustrate in some way 
the gap separating Latin America from the developed countries. 
The expansion of the gross domestic product in the region 
would be based especially on the progress achieved in the 
modernization of the economies. In this context, industrial 
manufacturing and basic services would play a more dynamic role, 
with annual growth rates of the product per person employed of 
5.5% and 4.7% respectively, in the period 1980-2000. In 
agriculture also, this rate would have to increase from the 
2.4% of the past decade to 3.1% and 4.2% in the next two 
decades. In other words, the rapid expansion postulated for 
these sectors will set the pattern for reaching the global 
target of an annual growth of the product per person employed 
of 4.5% in the period 1980-2000. This pattern of growth, 
however, would result in a greater heterogeneity in 
intersectoral productivity, with the highest levels being 
concentrated in manufacturing and basic services and the 
lowest levels in agriculture and the remaining services (see 
table 22). 
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According to groups of countries, the larger ones would 
have higher increases in productivity than those of Latin 
America in all sectors of activity. However, the higher degree 
of growth proposed for the industrial sector, in particular, 
would mean greater differences in productivity than they have 
now, and greater than those of the other groups of countries. 
The total product per person employed in the large countries 
would grow at an annual average of 4.8% in the next 20 years, 
whereas in the medium-sized and small countries their rate 
would be 4.2% and 4.0% respectively, showing in all cases 
rising curves of productivity through time. 
It should be pointed out that although these projections 
generally show a trend towards increasing differences in 
intersectoral productivity, and as a result a relative 
deterioration in the distribution of income, it should be borne 
in mind that although distribution through production-employment 
is the most direct, it is not the only way; in addition, since 
drastic changes are not proposed in the growth pattern, no 
significant modification of intersectoral productivity is 
contemplated. Improving the distribution of income, therefore, 
largely depends on complementary, clearly defined policies, 
which ultimately result in an increase in real income for the 
population now employed in the sectors with lowest productivity. 
The high degree of economic activity proposed in this 
scenario, along with the transformations which would result by 
the end of the century in a productive structure approximately 
like that of the industrialized countries, would significantly 
change the sectoral competition of employment in Latin America. 
In relation to the dynamic trend scenario, for example, 
although the annual growth rate of employment would rise to an 
apparently small extent, from 2.5% to 3.0%, this latter rate 
would make it possible to absorb the increase in the labour 
force and even reduce part of the current underemployment (see 
tables 22 to 25). 
In all groups of countries, most displacements of 
intersectoral employment would occur between agriculture and 
services. Between 1980 and the year 2000 employment in 
agriculture in different groups of countries would decrease by 
approximately 12 percentage points with respect to the total, 
while services would increase by 10 in the large and small 
countries and by 12 in the medium-sized ones. Industry would 
increase this share by 2 percentage points in the large and 
small countries, while in the medium-sized countries it would 
remain practically constant; in any case it is interesting to 
note that in marginal terms the expansion of employment in 
industry would be significant, considering that it would have 
highest growth rates of productivity and, on the other hand, 
by prolonging the long-term trends, it might at best maintain 
its current proportional contribution as a source of employment. 
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The percentage of population employed in Latin American 
agriculture by the end of the century (24%) would be similar to 
that of France in 1960, which shows a correlation with the 
respective levels of per capita product. However, with regard 
to employment in industry, its participation in Latin America 
would be 14- percentage points lower than in France and 
correspondingly higher by the same proportion in the service 
sector. This phenomenon shows the greater need of countries 
with slow industrialization, either to increase or simply 
maintain the employment percentages in this sector, since as 
the time goes on an increasingly large global product per 
person employed is needed 24/ in order to generate similar 
levels of employment. Absorption of technology from countries 
in more advanced stages of industrialization involves a larger 
supply of capital per person employed, which in turn increases 
the productivity of the sector and reduces the capacity to 
offer employment at lower rates than those offered in the past 
by the presently developed countries. A challenge is thus 
presented for the developing countries: to industrialize and 
at the same time provide more jobs and better salaries; with 
the current growth model this appears possible with a high 
degree of activity in the economy, but certainly one cannot 
expect the experience of the developed countries to be repeated, 
where the industrial sector provided employment for more than 
one-third of the employed population.25/ It is important, 
therefore, in addition to speeding up the growth of production, 
to structure the service sector, which, along with economic 
and social development, would eliminate underemployment and 
reach high enough levels of productivity to make it possible 
to improve the distribution of income through employment. 
According to the results of the projections of the 
normative scenario, which postulates an annual growth in the 
global product of 7.3% for this decade and 7.9% in the 1990s, 
unemployment would be substantially reduced by the end of the 
century, but the problem of underemployment would not be 
solved; this is true of groups of countries or of the region as 
a whole. Nevertheless, since displacements from the 
agricultural sector to certain branches of the service sector 
would gradually occur, especially in view of the greater 
relative productivity in the latter sector (see tables 22 to 25), 
24/ Latin America, by the year 2000, would have some 
US$ 9 500 (1975 dollars) per person employed, whereas France 
had US$ 7 900 in 1960. 
25/ In the countries with the highest per capita 
product, however, the proportion is declining. Thus, for 
example, between 1950 and 1975 in the United States it dropped 
from 35.0% to 30.8%, in Canada from 35.1% to 28.1%, and in 
Sweden from 40.1% to 35.7%, to cite countries of different 
economic and demographic size. 
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there would be an appreciable reduction in underemployment. 
Under these conditions, employment policies designed to improve 
the productivity of the services in which underemployment is 
concentrated would have special importance. 
The share of the service subsector which excludes basic 
services in the employment total for Latin America, which would 
rise from 38% in 1980 to 37% in the year 2000, although it is 
high and does not correspond with that shown by the developed 
countries with a similar per capital product to that which the 
region would reach in the year 2000, would have few chances of 
being reduced; in this respect, for example, even with an 
annual economic growth rate much higher than that proposed in 
the dynamic trend scenario (7.6% and 6.0% respectively "in the 
period 1980-2000), this share would experience variations of 
relatively small significance (see tables 22 to 25). 
Qualitatively speaking, however, an interesting phenomenon 
occurs: when economic growth speeds up in 1990-2000, employment 
percentages clearly decrease in agriculture and in the subsector 
of services excluding basic services, and corresponding 
increases occur in manufacturing, mainly, and in other 
industries and basic services, the sectors with the highest 
productivity. It may be observed, then, that it is possible 
to broaden the capacity for absorption of employment in the 
most dynamic sectors with fairly high rates of expansion; 
however, as noted earlier, an occupational distribution by 
sectors cannot be achieved like that of the currently developed 
countries in the past. As a result, the positive effects 
generating a higher economic dynamism in employment tend to be 
located in the improvement of the quality of services, which 
restricts the residual role traditionally played by this sector 
as a source of employment. 
The persistence of unemployment and underemployment, 
despite the considerable economic growth postulated in this 
scenario, would be due to a large extent to the sharp increase 
in the labour force in the countries of the region, in view of 
the demographic transition phase through which they are going. 
Thus, although a decrease is projected in the annual growth 
rate of the economically active population (EAP) of Latin 
America from 2.9% in 1970-1980 to 2.8% and 2.5% in the 
following two decades, it is obvious that these are high rates 
even for developing countries. However, in the normative 
scenario open unemployment in the region would be reduced from 
6.9% of the labour force in 1980 to 5.5% in 1990 and 2.3% in 
the year 2000 -in this last year due to the greater decline in 
the growth rate of the labour force in the 1990s, since the 
rate of expansion of employment would remain practically 
constant (see table 22). 
In the large countries the EAP grew at a more moderate 
rate than the regional average, and this, along with their 
greater economic dynamism, has enabled them to maintain a 
relatively low open unemployment level (4.8% in 1980). In the 
next two decades they could slightly reduce this rate to 4.0% 
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in 1990 and significantly to 1=2% by the year 2000; as in the 
region as a whole in this latter year, the decline expected in 
the growth of the labour force in the 1990s would be especially 
important. 
In the medium-sized countries, however, the EAP grew 
strongly in the 1970s (3.4% annually); as a result, although 
employment increased at an annual average of 3»0%, the mere 
difference between these rates drove open unemployment rates 
from 5.8% in 1970 to 9*3% in 1980, As seen in table 24, the 
economic growth proposed for the next 20 years means more than 
doubling the annual rate of the 1970s, where the per capita 
product only increased by 0.7% annually; thus the annual 
expansion of employment of 3.3% in the 1980s and 2.9% in the 
1990s, accompanied by a sharp decrease in the growth of the 
EAP (to 2.8% and 2.6% respectively) would make it possible to 
reduce the open unemployment rate to 5.2% in 1990 and 1.8% by 
the end of the century. This group of countries showed the 
lowest share of the EAP in the total population at the beginning 
of the past decade (28.2% in 1970); however, at the end of the 
period (30.7% in 1980) it tended to be equal to that of the 
large countries (31.9%). 
The sharp increase in the EAP in small countries has 
neutralized most of the effects of the increases shown in 
employment. Despite the systematic increase in the growth rate 
of employment in the past three decades, open unemployment 
-including a certain percentage of underemployment- rose from 
9.4% in 1970 to 12.0% in 1980. In this decade the annual growth 
of the EAP shown in the last decade (3.0%) would persist, so 
that the annual increase in the employment rate of 3.1% in 
1980-1990 would only make it possible to reduce open 
unemployment to 11.1% in 1990; in the 1990s, with the annual 
rate of expansion of employment rising to 3.3% and the 
corresponding EAP figure decreasing to 2.8%, a substantial 
drop would occur in the open unemployment rate to slightly less 
than 7% by the end of the century. Now this coefficient not 
only is comparatively high in relation to that of the other 
groups of countries, but also has a particular connotation. 
Firstly, in order to reduce it to the above-mentioned size the 
global product would have to speed up its annual growth by 1.9 
and 2.8 additional percentage points in the 1980s and 1990s 
respectively, in comparison with the period 1970-1980. 
Secondly, even if it achieves this difficult goal, the structure 
of production and employment would continue to show a 
considerable relative sluggishness by the end of the century, 
since agriculture would still generate 13.3% of the gross 
domestic product and would employ 36.4% of the employed 
population. These figures are consistent with the per capita 
product which would be reached by the year 2000 (1 424 dollars 
at 1975 prices) and in relative terms are similar to that 
prevailing under similar conditions in the first half of the 
1960s and in the 1970s in Spain and Portugal respectively, but 
with one very important difference: while these latter 
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countries still managed to employ slightly more than 30% of the 
employed population in industry and retained a share of the 
service subsector excluding basic services of about 27%, Latin 
American countries showed proportions of 20% and 39% 
respectively; the tendency of the newly industrialized countries 
to absorb increasingly large proportions of employment in 
services rather than industry would thus be confirmed, with 
various degrees of productivity. 
From the point of view of increase, it is also 
illustrative to note the sectoral contribution of each sector 
of economic activity to the product and to employment. If we 
take, for example, the differences between the absolute values 
of the product and of employment of the years 2000 and 1980, 
and we calculate their respective sectoral structures with 
respect to the total increase, we obtain for the average of 
the region a share in the agricultural sector of 5.0% in the 
product and 8.7% in employment, while industry would have 4-5.7% 
and 24.5%, and services 49.3% and 66.6% respectively. In 1980 
the contribution by services to the generation of the product 
was around 12 percentage points higher than that of industry, 
and that corresponding to employment 22 points; on the other 
hand, adopting the structure of sectoral increases between the 
years 2000 and 1980, this difference in the share of the 
product reduces to 4 percentage points and that of employment 
expands to 44 points. This trend towards the concentration of 
eiftployment in the service sector would take place with greater 
intensity in the large and medium-sized groups of countries, 
while in the small countries, although it would also be 
considerable, it would not reach the same dimensions, among 
other reasons because the industrial sector would not have the 
same expansive potential over services as in the other 
countries; in this respect it is useful to note that the 
industrial product of the 12 small countries in the year 2000 
would be more or less similar to that of the 3 large countries 
in 1968. 
The characteristics shown by the different groups of 
countries are the result of adding up the national projections. 
Thus, both the possibilities for growth at the global and 
sectoral levels, and the projections for productivities and 
recent repercussions on the level and composition of employment, 
reflect these particular situations. Regional and subregional 
integration, therefore, are very relevant, especially in 
respect of the small countries whose limitations with respect 
to resources and the market are obvious. 
However, if the targets proposed in this normative 
scenario were reached, it would be an important step forward in 
the economic transformation of Latin American countries. In 
fact, there would be a substantial improvement in both the 
employment situation and the quality of goods and services 
produced, which would ultimately mean higher standards of 
living; moreover, this is a relatively accelerated growth in 
the context of which the application of wide-ranging 
redistributive policies would be easier. 
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3. External sector 
(a) General considerations 
During the 1970s, Latin America continued to show a 
pronounced asymmetry in its external economic relations in terms 
of the nature of its flows of exports and imports and the 
deterioration in the terms of trade in the non-oil-exporting 
countries; this was compounded by mounting external 
indebtedness, with its real and financial effects on the 
national income and the balance of payments. Furthermore, these 
problems have become more acute as deficits in the balance-of-
payments current account grow and the external debt reaches very 
high levels in absolute and relative terms. 
Three factors have had a particular impact on this 
situation. The first is related to the persistent deterioration 
in the balance of trade throughout the entire decade. This 
deterioration was brought on in part by the performance of both 
trade in merchandise and service transactions. The balance of 
trade in goods, traditionally favourable to the region, went 
into the red in 1974, as a result of the crisis of 1974-1975; 
it was positive again in 1979 although less than at the 
beginning of the decade. Service transactions, excluding those 
relating to interests and profits, which have systematically 
resulted in deficits for the region, have shown negative 
balances of increasing magnitude.26/ 
This situation is basically derived from the new 
conditions of the international market since the beginning of 
1974. Imports, which had shown more dynamism in the mid-1970s, 
aftfer the well-known process of import substitution, grew at an 
annual rate of 10.5% in the period 1970-1973, exceeding even the 
7.5% rate recorded in 1966-1970; however, in 1975 and 1976 they 
contracted by -2.3% and -0.2% respectively, and then increased 
by 8.4% in 1977-1979 (4.1% excluding Mexico). The evolution of 
imports, in fact, depended on the vicissitudes of exports; these 
grew in 1970-1973 at an annual rate of 6.2%, also exceeding the 
4.0% of the period 1966-1970, but in 1974 and 1975 they 
decreased by -2.8% and -7.2% and then recovered extraordinarily 
in 1976-1979 with an annual increase of 9.2% (7.5% excluding 
Mexico). As can be seen, efforts by the region to neutralize 
the international crisis were considerable, and even grew in 
the oil-importing countries, which in recent years significantly 
expanded their exports (10.8% in 1976-1979) and slowed down the 
rate of increase of imports (6.3% in comparison with 7.7% for 
Latin America in 1976-1979).27/ 
26/ These deficits have, with the exception of 1973, 
normally exceeded the surpluses obtained from the trade in goods 
27/ This process was furthered by the growth of 
industrial or agricultural production capacity which had begun 
yéars previously, and especially by export promotion policies. 
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The second factor was world inflation, a phenomenon which, 
in addition to generating speculative movements and uncertainty 
in many fields of activity, has resulted in a further 
deterioration in the terms of trade. 
The third factor which has seriously affected the external 
position of Latin America is the worsening of the terms of 
external financing. An important change has occurred in the 
sources of financing, with resources from private banking and 
commercial sources growing by leaps and bounds, Thus, while 
direct investment and loans from official sources, taken 
together, rose from US$ 2 billion in 1970 to US$ 6 billion in 
1979, loans from private sources climbed from less than US$ 1 
billion to over US$ 18 billion during the same period. 
Moreover, world inflation itself has caused an increase in 
interest rates and a reduction in the amortization periods of 
new loans granted. As a corollary, a given volume of external 
financing now requires a larger amount of servicing than in 
previous decades, and this is compounded by the fact that the 
servicing is concentrated in the short and medium term. 
The end results of a process of this kind are complex. 
On the one hand, the high level of external debt servicing will 
make it necessary to find additional sources of resources. If 
recourse continues to be had to external financing, the process 
will be cumulative and payments may eventually tie up extremely 
high percentages of export earnings. Furthermore, an external 
situation in which such commitment exists may obstruct the flow 
of capital and the access to external financing and worsen the 
corresponding payment periods and interest rates, thereby making 
it more difficult to solve the balance-of-payments problem and 
to accumulate capital to raise the economic growth rate (for 
example, by reducing essential imports). 
Naturally, the situation and prospects vary from country 
to country. Most of the countries, however, have similar 
balance-of-payments and external-debt problems, although with 
different degrees of seriousness. Even some of the oil-
exporting countries, which have strengthened their balance of 
trade, still face foreign debt service payments which absorb a 
high percentage of export earnings. 
(b) Assumptions on which the projections are based 
The projections of external variables which have been made 
in the context of the two scenarios described above are aimed 
at quantifying the external changes needed for more symmetrical 
relations resulting in an acceptable balance-of-payments 
situation and tolerable external debt levels. 
The assumptions used are described below, classed 
according to the main components of the external situation: 
imports, magnitude and terms of external financing, terms of 
trade and inflation and exports. 
The import requirements for maintaining the growth rates 
proposed were estimated on the basis of the functional 
relationship between imports, on the one hand, and the product 
and investment, on the other; also, particular importance is 
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attached to external supplies of fuels. In this respect, and 
as has been stated above in connexion with the energy situation, 
in the case of the oil-short countries, the accepted elasticity 
of imports of petroleum and its derivatives with respect to the 
gross domestic product is 0.8. This degree of elasticity calls 
for a considerable effort to contain and substitute the 
consumption of hydrocarbons and to palliate the effect of the 
cost of such imports on the balance of payments. Nevertheless, 
because of the continued and growing preponderance of imports 
of intermediate products and capital goods and because it is 
hoped to step up regional trade, imports will tend to increase 
in the case of virtually all the countries and of the region as 
a whole at a higher rate than that of the gross domestic 
product. 
The terms of external financing were examined separately 
for each country in the light of the experience of recent years. 
Assumptions were adopted with regard to the share of loans in 
the gross inflow of foreign capital, the profit rate on foreign 
capital and the amortization and interest attached to loans. 
Amortization and interest are broadly based on the terms on 
which the present loans of each country were contracted, and 
more unfavourable terms are assumed in the case of new debts, 
taking into account inflation and the change in the composition 
of sources of indebtedness. 
In the case of net external financing, the general rule 
adopted was that around 1990 its average ratio to gross domestic 
product (at 1975 prices) would not exceed that recorded in the 
1970s, provided that external debt servicing does not rise 
above a given level of value of exports. In calculating 
averages, the balance of payments for years considered to be 
atypical was not taken into consideration. These criteria are 
reflected in a gradual decrease in the coefficient of external 
financing with respect to the gross domestic product recorded at 
the end of the past decade. 
For the region as a whole, the level of net external 
financing reached on the basis of this method amounts to about 
2.7% of the gross domestic product. In practice, this average 
applies to the larger countries and the situation is quite 
different in the case of the medium-sized and small countries, 
for which the corresponding averages are generally higher. The 
higher coefficient for small countries reflects both the 
difficult situation through which many of them have passed and 
the fact that their greater external openness means that the 
ratio of debt and financing to the product is higher. 
The evolution of world export and import prices presupposes 
a deceleration in the rate of increase, which is expected to 
decline gradually from 14% in 1981 so that the average price 
index would rise by 12% a year during the period 1980-1985 and 
by 10% during the period 1985-1990. It is postulated that the 
indexes of unit value of imports and exports of the region other 
than petroleum and petroleum products will follow the path of 
world inflation and that the price of hydrocarbons will increase 
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in real terms, rising faster than inflation, so that an 
elasticity of 1.05 has been used. This implies that if 
petroleum and petroleum products are not taken into 
consideration, the terms of trade will remain at approximately 
the same level as in 1979. If these products, whose price 
elasticity is greater than 1, are included, the terms of trade 
improve in the cases of countries which are net exporters of 
petroleum and worsen in that of countries without petroleum. 
In the last analysis, the terms of external trade used in the 
projections differ from those recorded in 1979 only because of 
the relatively higher price of petroleum. 
In projecting and analysing exports, two aspects were 
considered. Firstly, an estimate was made of the export 
earnings needed to finance the imports required in order to 
achieve the balance of payments predicted. Secondly, 
consideration was given to the changes which should be made in 
the composition and destination of exports in order to achieve 
the corresponding earnings. This second exercise calls for an 
analysis of the export capacity of the countries and the 
possibilities of Latin American exports being absorbed by the 
region and the rest of the world. 
The projection of the main balance-of-payments and 
external-debt.variables resulting from the assumptions outlined 
above makes it possible to analyse the macroeconomic evolution 
of the external sector at both the national and the regional 
levels. 
(c) Main conclusions 
As has already been indicated, import needs will tend to 
improve in almost all the countries and the region as a whole 
at a rate higher than that of the gross domestic product. Thus, 
in the trend scenario, imports would increase at a rate of 6.2% 
a year between 1979 and 1990 (as compared to 5.9% for the gross 
domestic product), and in the normative scenario, they would 
increase at a rate of 7.8% (7.1% of the gross domestic product). 
These rates assume a decrease in the product elasticity of 
imports from the high levels recorded in the period 1975-1979 
(1.24), which was due fundamentally to the high levels for 
Mexico and Venezuela, to levels slightly over one. In this 
respect, it is useful to note a combination of factors that 
are to a certain extent opposed. On the one hand, the current 
approach to development tends to increase the degree of openness 
of the economies and this, together with a New International 
Economic Order, should produce a substantial increase in 
external trade and, eventually, make it possible to assume 
import elasticity with respect to the product that would be 
higher than 1. On the other hand, policies aimed at containing 
the consumption of hydrocarbons, together with policies aimed 
at reducing external dependency and solving the balance-of-
payments problems the countries are facing, would suggest 
elasticities lower than one. A careful weighting of these 
considerations, with the close relationship between the 
acceleration of growth and the overall demand for imports also 
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being taken into account, led to the adoption of the assumption 
that the elasticity of imports would decrease but would still 
remain higher than 1. In this way, Latin American imports, 
which accounted for 15.3% of the gross domestic product in 1979, 
would represent 15.8% and 16.4% in 1990 for the trend and the 
normative scenarios, in that order. The differences between 
countries as regards external openness would tend to remain the 
same, resulting in an import coefficient with respect to the 
product of the order of 12% for the big countries, 30% for the 
medium-sized countries and 34% for the economically and 
demographically smaller countries. 
For the region as a whole, export needs are relatively 
high in both scenarios. In the trend scenario, the annual 
growth rate is 6.3% for the period 1979-1990, while in the 
normative scenario, the corresponding rate is 7.6% (see table 
14). The growth of exports represents a break in the long-term 
trend, considering that during the last three decades, the 
yearly average was only 4.3%. However, it is evident that, with 
the new external relations prevailing, the region has developed 
a considerable export potential; after the oil crisis which 
brought about a drop in external sales in 1974 and 1975, these 
were increased during the next five years at an annual rate of 
almost 9%. And although this is too short a time period to 
draw conclusions, it does illustrate the region's capacity to 
respond in times of crisis. Moreover, it is essential to 
strengthen the system of international co-operation in general 
and regional integration in particular; these aspects are 
crucial to the realization of the IDS goals discussed below. 
As regards groups of countries, the large countries have 
the greatest requirements, not only because of the higher 
economic growth rates postulated but also because of their high 
external indebtedness. This external indebtedness explains to 
a large extent the need for exporting at higher rates during 
the 1980s .than during the 1990s (see table 15), as the 
cumulative process to which the service of the debt gives rise 
calls for high export earnings in order to meet the goals 
established for external financing; this is true both for the 
trends scenario and the normative scenario. As regards the 
long-range growth of exports, the annual rate in the trends 
scenario would have to increase from 5.3% for the period 
1950-1979 to 7.5% for 1980-1990; it could then decline to 6.4% 
towards the end of the century, even to the point of causing 
a slight reduction in the net external financing product ratio, 
from 2.7% in 1990 to 2.6% in the year 2000. In the normative 
scenario, these rates go up to 8.5% for the 1980s and to 7.8% 
for the 1990s; this would mean keeping up the considerable 
dynamism of the past decade (8.2% in 1970-1979). In this 
regard, it is worthwhile stressing the efforts of Argentina 
and Brazil, which during the last decade had rates of 6.2% and 
8.9% respectively, with Argentina showing a relative 
equilibrium in its energy balance and Brazil maintaining its 
position as a large oil importer. Mexico, for its part, by 
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breaking into the world oil market, more than recovered its 
export rate, which had even been negative in 1974 and 1975, and 
had reached a rate of 9.1% during the aforementioned period. 
In the medium-sized countries, on the other hand, the rate 
of growth of exports in both scenarios would be more moderate 
during the first decade projected than during the second; this 
is because of the positive effect of terms of trade, which 
would significantly complement export earnings (approximately 
7% of the product in the trend scenario and 8% in the normative 
scenario). In this context, the price increases assumed for 
Venezuelan petroleum exports would carry special weight; 
however, if we compare the export rates required in the two 
scenarios with the long-term trend (3.4% per year in 1950-1979), 
we will note than even with very favourable terms of trade, a 
great effort would have to be made to achieve the magnitudes 
required in the trend scenario during the second decade 
projected (5.0%) and even more so in the normative scenario for 
the 1980s and 1990s (5.7% and 8.4% respectively). 
In the small countries, exports grew at an annual rate of 
around 5% during the last three decades and 6% during the 1970s. 
In the trend scenario, an annual rate of 6.7% is postulated for 
the period 1979-1990 and of 5.6% for 1990-2000; the reasons for 
this unique trajectory are in some ways similar to those 
mentioned in the .analysis of the large countries, i.e., the 
high amount going to servicing the external debt tends to 
increase even more and, if exports do not show greater dynamism 
over the short term, the possibilities of growth are 
increasingly limited by the cumulative effect of the debt on 
its servicing. Moreover, in these countries that have a more 
open economy and produce few capital goods and intermediate 
products, the problem is aggravated by the fact that any 
reduction in their import capacity, even if proportionally 
similar to that of other groups of countries, has a stronger 
impact on their accumulation process and thus on their 
potential for growth. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the 
export growth rate required in the trend scenario is not 
significantly different from the historical trajectory (see 
table 17). As regards the normative scenario, on the other 
hand, an annual growth rate of around 8% for 20 years does 
indeed call for substantial changes in the origin and 
destination of exportable goods and services; these factors are 
analysed later on. 
In 1979, debt servicing absorbed nearly 44% of current 
export earnings -a large proportion mainly determined by the 
55% recorded by the economically larger countries. In the 
medium-sized and small-countries, this proportion was 31.5% 
and 35.1% respectively. It seems surprising that in the 
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oil-exporting countries 28/ this servicing amounted to 4-7% of 
the value of exports, while in non-oil-exporting countries it 
accounted for slightly under 42%. It is of interest to note 
that these high levels of debt servicing are largely a 
reflection of the deterioration already referred to in the 
terms of external financing, a phenomenon which became more 
serious after 1975, when, although high, they were 
significantly lower than now (see tables 26 to 31). 
The restrictions.imposed on the net external financing 
product ratio, as well as on the proportion of currerft export 
earnings that may be absorbed by the servicing of the external 
debt, no doubt call for a major effort to accelerate the growth 
of exports in both scenarios. However, if that were done, 
around 1990 the Latin American external sector would experience 
a recovery that would allow for a decrease in the debt 
servicing/export coefficient to a level close to the one which 
prevailed up to the mid-1970s; among groups of countries, only 
the medium-sized ones would depart notably from this trend, 
thanks to Venezuelan exports which would benefit from rising 
oil prices and lead to a more drastic drop in this coefficient. 
Nevertheless, in 1990 the servicing of the region's external 
debt would amount to around 150 billion dollars and the volume 
of this debt would be over 650 billion dollars at current 
prices; this is four times higher than the amount recorded at 
the end of the 1970s. 
At the same time, and despite the relatively high level 
of indebtedness projected for Latin America, the external debt/ 
gross domestic product ratio (at 1975 prices) 29/ would decline 
gradually and in 1990 would account for slightly under 17% in 
the trend scenario and nearly 16% in the normative scenario. 
The situation is very similar to the regional average in the 
economically and demographically larger countries, but is 
different in the medium-sized and small countries. In the 
medium-sized countries, this ratio, which in 1979 was about a 
quarter of the product, would drop by 1990 to less than 7% in 
the trend scenario and to 6% in the normative scenario (owing 
to the obvious influence of Venezuela); in the small countries, 
28/ Including Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. 
A decisive factor in this was undoubtedly the high 
indebtedness of Mexico, in the first place, and then of 
Venezuela, which, after showing significant surpluses in the 
balance of payments because of the increase in oil prices, had 
a deficit in 1977-1979 equivalent to 6.8% of the product (at 
1975 prices). 
29/ In calculating this ratio, the external debt was 
deflated at the country level using the implicit import index. 
Thus the debt is expressed in terms of the purchasing power 
of imports. 
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Table 26 
LAHM AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES) a / : EVOLUTION AND PROJECTIONS OF EXTERNAL SECTOR 
(Percentages on the b a s i s of current p r i c e s ) 
Propor t ions with respec t to expor ts of goods and se rv i ces External deb t / 
Net payments Net external Servic ing of ex te rna l debt Gross inf low Net inf low gross 
Year of p r o f i t s f inancing of fo re ign of fo re ign domestic product 
and i n t e r e s t y Amortization I n t e r e s t Total c a p i t a l c a p i t a l of r a t i o Aj 
H i s to r i ca l evolut ion 
I960 12.7 12.2 15.0 2.9 17.9 28 .6e/ 0 .9 ... 
1965 14.8 3 .3 21.9 4 . 1 26.0 28 .5e / - 0 . 8 ... 
1970 15.5 16.4 18.7 5.6 24 .3 42.0e/ 7 . 8 ... 
1975 12.8 34.1 16.1 7.9 24.0 52 .3e/ 23 .4 25 .0 
1979 16.1 22.8 30.6 13.2 43.8 61 .2e/ 14.5 26 .4 
Trend scenario 
1990 15.1 18.5 15 .3 11.2 26.5 33.8 3 .4 16.8 
2000 14.1 18.0 15 .3 10.4 25.7 33.3 3 .8 16.2 
Nonnative scenar io 
1990 15.4 17.5 13.6 10.0 23.6 31.0 4 . 1 15.7 
2000 11.3 16 .3 12.6 8 .4 21.0 28.9 5 .0 14.6 
Source! CEPAL, on the bas i s of o f f i c i a l d a t a . 
a / Does not inc lude Cuba and the English-speaking Caribbean coun t r i e s , 
b/ Including net p r i v a t e t r a n s f e r payments. 
c / Gross inf low of fore ign cap i t a l l e s s ( - ) amort izat ion of external debt and net payments of p r o f i t and i n t e r e s t . 
d/ On values a t 1975 p r i c e s . The balances of the debt was de f l a ted by t h e i m p l i c i t index of imports of goods and s e r v i c e s . 
e/ Includes va r i a t i on in i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s . — 
Table 27 
LATIN AMERICA (LARGE COUNTRIES) _a/ s EVOLUTION AND PROJECTIONS OF EXTERNAL SECTOR 
(Percen tages on the b a s i s of c u r r e n t p r i c e s ) 
P ropor t i ons with r e s p e c t t o expor t s of goods and s e r v i c e s E x t e r n a l d e b t / 
Net payments Net e x t e r n a l S e r v i c i n g of e x t e r n a l debt Gross i n f l o w Net i n f l o w g r o s s 
Year of p r o f i t s f i n a n c i n g of f o r e i g n of f o r e i g n domest ic p roduc t 
and i n t e r e s t y Amort izat ion I n t e r e s t To ta l c a p i t a l c a p i t a l c / r a t i o d / 
H i s t o r i c a l evolu t ion 
I960 10.8 2 7 . 1 18 .2 5 . 1 2 3 . 3 5 0 . 7 e / 21 .7 ... 
1965 12 .2 - 0 . 6 35 .1 5 .7 40 .8 39 .6e / - 7 . 7 ... 
1970 16.7 2 3 . 3 2 5 . 3 7 .6 32.9 5 7 . 8 e / 15 .8 ... 
1975 21 .4 6 4 . 0 19-7 14.9 34 .6 73 .7e / 32.6 2 5 . 0 
1979 24 .4 37 .1 36 .1 18.8 54 .9 77 .3e / 16 .8 2 5 . 0 
Trend scenar io 
1990 2 1 . 3 24 .7 22 .4 16 .1 38 .4 4 7 . 1 3 .4 1 7 . 3 
2000 19.4 2 3 . 1 19 .8 14 .3 34 .1 42 .9 3 . 6 1 5 . 3 
Normative scenar io 
1990 19.9 2 4 . 0 20 .9 15.0 36 .0 44 .9 4 . 2 16 .6 
2000 17 .1 2 2 . 1 17 .5 12.7 30 .2 39.7 5 . 0 13 .9 
Source: CEPAL, on t h e b a s i s of o f f i c i a l d a t a . 
_a/ Comprises Argent ina , B r a z i l and Mexico, 
b / Inc luding ne t p r i v a t e t r a n s f e r payments. 
c / Gross in f low of f o r e i g n c a p i t a l l e s s ( - ) amor t i za t ion of e x t e r n a l debt and ne t payments of p r o f i t and i n t e r e s t . 
"&/ On va lues a t 1975 p r i c e s . The ba lance of t h e debt was d e f l a t e d by t h e i m p l i c i t index of impor t s of goods and s e r v i c e s . 
e / Inc ludes v a r i a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s . 
Table 26 
LATIN AMERICA: (MEDIUM-SIZED COUNTRIES) a / : EVOLUTION AND PROJECTIONS OF EXTERNAL SECTOR 
(Percentages on t h e b a s i s of current p r i c e s ) 
Propor t ions with respec t to exports of goods and s e r v i c e s External deb t / 
Year 
Net payments 
of p r o f i t s 
and i n t e r e s t 
Net external 
f inanc ing 
y 
Servic ing of ex te rna l debt 
Amortization I n t e r e s t Total 
Gross in f low 
of f o r e ign 
c a p i t a l 
Net inf low 
of fo re ign 
c a p i t a l c / 
gross 
domestic product 
r a t i o df 
H i s t o r i c a l evolut ion 
I960 16.4 - 3 . 9 13.4 1 . 3 14.7 6 . 8 e / - 2 3 . 0 ... 
1965 20 .6 3 .8 10.8 3 .1 13.9 I 6 . 5 e / - 1 4 . 9 ... 
1970 16.9 5.2 12.1 4.0 16 .1 25.Be/ - 5 . 2 ... 
1975 5 .4 0 .4 11.3 0 .7 12.0 28. l e / 11.4 22 .2 
1979 6 . 2 - 0 . 3 24 .1 7 .4 31.5 4 0 . l e / 9 . 8 27 .2 
Trend scenar io 
1990 4 .9 7 .8 3 .0 3 .1 6 . 1 10.9 2 .9 6 . 8 
2000 4 . 5 8 . 1 7.9 3.2 11.1 16 .1 3.6 13.9 
Normative scenar io 
1990 5.9 7 . 5 2 .4 2 .5 4.9 9 .9 3 .5 5 .6 
2000 5 . 5 7 .7 6 . 4 2 .4 8 .8 14.2 4 . 4 12.3 
Source« CEPAL, on the b a s i s of o f f i c i a l da t a , 
a / Comprises Ch i l e , Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. 
b/ Including net p r i v a t e t r a n s f e r payments. 
cf Gross inf low of fo re ign c a p i t a l l e s s ( - ) amort izat ion of ex te rna l debt and net payments of p r o f i t and i n t e r e s t . 
d/ On values a t 1975 p r i c e s . The balance of t h e debt was d e f l a t e d by the i m p l i c i t index of imports of goods and s e r v i c e s . 
_e/ Includes v a r i a t i o n in i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e se rves . 
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Table 29" 
LATIN AMERICA (12 COUNTRIES) a / s EVOLUTION AND PROJECTIONS OF EXTERNAL SECTOR 
( P e r c e n t a g e s on t h e b a s i s o f c u r r e n t p r i c e s ) 
Year 
P r o p o r t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o e x p o r t s o f goods and s e r v i c e s 
Net payments 
of p r o f i t s 
and i n t e r e s t 
Net e x t e r n a l 
f i n a n c i n g 
b / 
S e r v i c i n g of e x t e r n a l d e b t 
Amor t i za t i on I n t e r e s t T o t a l 
Gross i n f l o w 
of f o r e i g n 
c a p i t a l 
Net i n f l o w 
of f o r e i g n 
c a p i t a l c / 
E x t e r n a l d e b t / 
g r o s s 
d o m e s t i c p r o d u c t 
r a t i o d / 
I960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1979 
1990 
2000 
6 . 3 
7 . 4 
9 . 1 
4 . 9 
11.0 
10.2 
9 . 0 
1 7 . 1 
12 .9 
21.6 
2 3 . 7 
2 7 . 6 
1 4 . 3 
1 4 . 0 
H i s t o r i c a l e v o l u t i o n 
1 0 . 1 1 . 2 1 1 . 3 
1 3 . 2 2 . 5 1 5 . 7 
1 4 . 5 3 . 3 1 7 . 8 
1 1 . 8 3 . 7 1 5 . 5 
2 7 . 5 7 . 6 3 5 . 1 
Trend s c e n a r i o 
11.0 
9 . 9 
7 . 6 
6.8 
18.6 
1 6 . 7 
28.9e/ 
2 7 . 9 e / 
37.2te/ 
4 3 . 8 e / 
5 5 . 9 e / 
2 5 . 3 
2 3 . 9 
1 2 . 5 
7 . 3 
1 3 . 6 
2 7 . 1 
1 7 . 4 
4 . 2 
5 . 0 
3 1 . 3 
3 7 . 1 
3 3 . 3 
3 0 . 7 
1990 
2000 
9 . 4 
7 . 8 
1 4 . 4 
1 4 . 0 
10.2 
8.6 
Normative s c e n a r i o 
7 . 1 
6.0 
1 7 . 3 
1 4 . 6 
2 4 . 6 
22.6 
5 . 0 
6.2 
3 0 . 4 
2 6 . 5 
Source : CEPAL, on t h e b a s i s of o f f i c i a l d a t a . 
a / Comprises B o l i v i a , Cos ta R i c a , Dominican R e p u b l i c , Ecuador , E l S a l v a d o r , Guatemala , H a i t i , Honduras , N i c a r a g u a , Panama, 
Paraguay and Uruguay, 
b / I n c l u d i n g n e t p r i v a t e t r a n s f e r payments . 
0/ Gross i n f l o w of f o r e i g n c a p i t a l l e s s ( - ) a m o r t i z a t i o n of e x t e r n a l deb t and n e t payments of p r o f i t and i n t e r e s t , 
d / On v a l u e s a t 1975 p r i c e s . The b a l a n c e of t h e d e b t was d e f l a t e d by t h e i m p l i c i t i ndex of i m p o r t s of goods and s e r v i c e s , 
e / I n c l u d e s v a r i a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s . 
Table 26 
LATIN AMERICA (OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIES) a / : EVOLUTION AND PROJECTIONS OF EXTERNAL SECTOR 
(Percentages on the bas i s of cur ren t p r i c e s ) 
Propor t ions with respec t to exports of goods and s e r v i c e s External debt / 
Year 
Net payments Net ex te rna l Serv ic ing of external debt Gross inf low Net inf low gross 
of p r o f i t s 
and i n t e r e s t 
f inanc ing 
y 
of f o r e ign 
c a p i t a l 
of f o r e ign 
c a p i t a l _c/ 
domestic product 
r a t i o d / 
Amortization I n t e r e s t Total 
H i s t o r i c a l evolution 
I960 18.1 - 0 . 1 13.8 1.7 15.5 10 .3e / - 2 1 . 6 ... 
-1965 14.9 1 .4 8 .6 2 .4 11.0 9 . 1 e / - 1 4 . 4 ... 
1970 19.2 20 .5 11 .1 5 .6 16.7 34 .6e/ 4 . 3 ... 
1975 10.6 13.4 9 . 6 2 .5 12 .1 4 l . 2 e / 21.0 24.4 
1979 12.8 17 .3 33.8 13.3 
Trend scenario 
47.1 55 .5e / 8 .9 29 .5 
"990 10.0 11.4 7 . 8 7 . 6 15.4 19.2 1 .5 12.8 
2000 8 . 5 11.8 10.0 6 . 6 
Normative scenario 
16.6 21 .8 3 . 3 14.6 
1990 8 .2 10.7 6 . 5 6 . 3 12.8 17 .2 2 . 5 11.6 
2000 6 . 4 10.8 8 . 0 5 .0 13.0 18.8 4 .4 13.0 
Source! CEPAL, on the b a s i s of o f f i c i a l d a t a , 
a / Comprises Bol iv ia , Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela-, 
b / Including net p r i v a t e t r a n s f e r payments. 
c / Gross inf low of fore ign c a p i t a l l e s s ( - ) amort iza t ion of ex te rna l debt and net payments of p r o f i t and i n t e r e s t . 
&/ On values at 1975 p r i c e s . The balance of .the debt was d e f l a t e d by the i m p l i c i t index of imports of goods and s e r v i c e s . 
_e/ Includes v a r i a t i o n in i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s . 
Table 31 
LATIN AHERICA (NON-CHL EXPORTING COUNTRIES) a / : EVOLUTION AND PROJECTIONS OF EXTERNAL SECTOR 
(Percentages on the basis of current p r i ces ) 
Proportions with respect to exports of goods and services External debt / 
Net payments Net external Servicing of external debt Gross inflow Net inflow gross 
Year of p r o f i t s f inancing of foreign of foreign domestic product 
and i n t e r e s t Amortization In te res t Total cap i t a l cap i t a l of r a t i o d/ 
His tor ica l evolution 
I960 8.6 21.5 15.8 4.0 19.8 42. 3e/' 17.9 ... 
1965 14.7 4.8 31.9 6 .0 37.9 43 . l e / - 3 . 5 ... 
1970 14.2 15.2 22.9 7.9 30.8 4 7 . l e / 10.0 ... 
1975 14.3 48.8 20.7 11.7 32.4 6 0 . l e / 25.1 25.2 
197° 18.4 26.5 28.5 13.1 41.6 6 5 . l e / 18.2 24.9 
Trend scenario 
1990 18.3 22.8 20.0 13.5 33.5 42.8 4.5 18.6 
2000 17.6 21.8 18.7 12.8 31.4 40.5 4.2 16.9 
Normative scenario 
1990 17.0 22.2 18.7 12.6 31.2 40.9 5 . 3 17.8 
2000 15.2 20.7 16.3 11.1 27.5 37.0 5.5 15.5 
Source: CEPAL, on the bas i s of o f f i c i a l da ta . 
a / Comprises Latin America except Bol ivia , Ecuador, Mexico, Venezuela, Cuba and the English-speaking Caribbean countr ies , 
b/ Including net p r iva te t r a n s f e r payments. 
of Gross inflow of foreign cap i ta l l e s s ( - ) amortization of external debt and net payments of p r o f i t and i n t e r e s t , 
d/ On values a t 1975 p r i c e s . The balance of the debt was def la ted by the impl ic i t index of imports of goods and serv ices , 
e / Includes var ia t ion in in te rna t iona l reserves . 
from 37.1% in 1979, this proportion would only fall to 33.3% in 
the trend scenario and to slightly over 30% in the normative 
scenario. From another standpoint, if the countries were 
grouped according to whether they are net exporters or net 
importers of oil, there would be a wide difference in the 
magnitudes to which the debt/product ratio would be reduced; 
while in the oil-exporting countries, the drop would be from 
30% in 1979 to somewhat under 13% in 1990 in both scenarios, 
the proportions would only be 25% and 19% respectively in 
the countries that are net importers of oil (see tables 30 
and 31). 
The above aspects have been stressed in order to 
illustrate the importance of financial variables in balance-of-
payments problems. Although the high export requirements would 
be smaller if net external financing were greater, payments of 
interests and profits on foreign capital would grow appreciably 
and create situations very difficult to handle in practice. 
In this regard, in the normative scenario the question was 
examined of the requirements in terms of exports of goods and 
services, and their implications from the standpoint of 
indebtedness and its servicing if external financing were to 
increase in the 1980s to reach 3.7% of the gross domestic 
product 30/ around 1990 (i.e., 1% more than the average 
considered). The results indicate that the export needs would 
continue to be high and their level in 1990 would be only 3.4% 
less than that of the basic normative scenario (which would 
mean an average annual rate of approximately 7.3% instead of 
7.6%). On the other hand, the external debt and its servicing 
that year would be 25% higher than in the basic scenario and 
amortization and interest payments would exceed 30% of foreign 
export earnings. Moreover, everything suggests that a level 
of external financing such as that proposed would cause 
lending terms to worsen, which would give rise to a sharper 
increase in these variables and, consequently, greater export 
requirements. 
In assessing the balance-of-payments situation and 
analysing the projections, some important aspects may be 
stressed: 
(i) the high level of indebtedness already accumulated 
and the burden of servicing it are in themselves a serious 
problem owing to their impact on the balance of payments, the 
ensuring risk involved and the vulnerable position in which 
the Latin American countries are placed; 
(ii) nevertheless, external financing will continue to be 
of special importance for achieving specific economic growth 
goals, in view of the import requirements of the development 
process itself; 
30/ Calculated on the basis of values at 1975 prices. 
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(iii) export earnings constitute a key variable for 
handling the balance-of-payments problem and, consequently, 
condition the possibilities of increasing the rate of economic 
growth. 
(d) The possibilities of achieving the export requirements 
To analyse the conditions in which it would be possible 
to increase exports sufficiently to meet the balance-of-payments 
requirements estimated in the inacroeconomic projections, the 
model used breaks down Latin America's trade flows by type of 
goods and sets them in the context of world trade; in this 
context, two areas are distinguished: the intraregional and the 
extraregional. The former takes into account the integration 
processes that are underway and the eventual growth 
possibilities, whereas in the second, hypotheses are formulated 
on the economic growth of the developed market economy countries, 
of the socialist countries and of the other developing countries 
(see table 32). It was thus possible to study the nature and 
scope of the structural changes that should be encouraged in 
the international order to promote the expansion of regional 
trade. 
In view of the results obtained with the external trade 
model, the alternative that is consistent with the goals 
proposed in the normative scenario would involve, fundamentally, 
the following changes in transactions with goods:31/ 
(i) Intraregional trade, which currently represents around 
20% of total exports, would have to rise to over 35% around 
1990 (see'table 33). This implies an annual growth rate of 
13.2%;32/ 
(ii) Exports outside the region should therefore grow at 
an annual rate of 5.8% until 1990. This means cutting down 
the share of the markets outside"the area from over 80% in 1978 
to less than 65%. These percentages include other developing 
countries and the socialist countries which in 1978 absorbed 
approximately 14-% of Latin American exports.33/ If this share 
increased by 2 percentage points, the market-economy developed 
countries would in 1990 absorb less than half the region's 
export s; 
(iii) Manufactures should constitute the most dynamic 
item in Latin American exports. From the current 15% of total 
exports, they would have to rise to 4-2% in 1990, implying an 
annual average rate of around 17.2%. This increase should stem 
31/ The percentages quoted below have been calculated on 
the basis of 1975 prices and include, in addition to the 19 
countries, Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Cuba, French Guiana, 
Greenland, Guadeloupe, Guyana, Jamaica, Martinique, Netherlands 
Antilles, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and the United States 
Virgin Islands. (See table 32.) 
32/ It should be noted that the low level of exports 
during the initial period influences these rates. 
33/ Including exports from Cuba. 
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Table 32 
DEVELOPING AMERICA a / : EXPORTS (FOB) AND IMPORTS (FOB) BY GROUPS OF 
GOODS AND BY ORIGIN AND DESTINATION 
(Bil l ions of do l la rs at 1975 pr ices) 
1975b/ 1978 1990 2000 
Total exports of goods 47.9 54.1 133.1 297.2 
Primary commodities c/ 23.2 26.2 47.8 77.3 
Fuels d/ 18.3 19.4 29.6 41.8 
Manufactures 6 .1 8 .3 55.7 178.1 
Machinery and t ransport equipment e/ 1.8 2.2 21.7 91.0 
Other manufactures f / 4 .3 6 .1 34.0 87.1 
Unclassified goods and t ransact ions _g/ 0 .3 0.2 - -
Exports to countries outside the region 38.2 43.5 85.1 146.1 
Primary commodities c/ 20.8 23.5 40.2 63.0 
Fuels d/ 13.8 14.8 20.2 25.8 
Manufactures 3.4 5.0 25.7 57.3 
Machinery and t ransport equipment e/ 0.7 1.1 8 . Í 24.? 
Other manufactures f / ~~ 2.7 3.9 17.3 33.1 
Unclassified goods and transact ions g/ 0.2 0.2 - -
Intraregional t rade 9.7 10.6 47.0 151.1 
Primary commodities c/ 2.4 2.7 7.6 14.3 
Fuels d/ 4.5 4.6 9.4 16.0 
Manufactures 2.7 3.3 30.0 120.8 
Machinery and t ransport equipment e/ 1.0 1.1 13.3 66.8 
Other manufactures f / 1.7 2.2 16.7 54.0 
Unclassified goods and transact ions g/ 0 .1 - - -
Imports from outside the region 46.6 52.8 103.0 188.3 
Primary commodities c/ 6.0 6.4 15.7 31.9 
Fuels d/ 9.0 10.1 20.0 35.0 
Manufactures 32.5 35.4 73.0 121.4 
Machinery and transport equipment e/ 18.5 19.6 43.0 67.0 
Other manufactures f / 14.0 15.8 30.0 54.4 
Unclassified goods and t ransact ions g/ 1.1 0.9 - -
Total imports of goods 58.2 63.4 155.7 339.4 
Primary commodities c/ 8.4 9-1 23.3 46.2 
Fuels d/ 13.5 14.7 29.4 51.0 
Manufactures 35.2 38.7 103.0 242.2 
Machinery and t ransport equipment e/ 19.5 20.7 56.3 133.8 
Other manufactures f / 15.7 18.0 46.7 108.4 
Unclassified goods and transact ions g/ 1.2 0.9 - -
Source! CEPAL, Tendencias h i s tór icas y proyecciones del comercio latinoamericano en el 
ámbito mundial (CEPAL/VP/CPE/184, November 1978), revised and updated to 
incorporate the growth t a rge t s of the normative scenario« 
a/ Includes the member countries of LAFTA and the Central American Common Market and 
Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Cuba, Dominican Republic, French Guiana, Greenland, 
Guadeloupe, Guyana, Hai t i , Jamaica, Martinique, Netherlands Ant i l les , Panama, 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and U.S. Virgin Islands» 
_b/ United Nations, ninthly Bulletin of S t a t i s t i c s , July 1980. 
c/ SITC Sections 0, 1, 2 and 4 and division 68 (non-ferrous metals) . 
df SITC Section 3. 
e/ SITC Section 7-
f / SITC Sections 5, 6 and 8, excluding division 68 (non-ferrous metals) . 
¡ J SITC Section 9 . 
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Table 33 
DEVELOPING AMERICA a / : EXPORTS (FOB) AND IMPORTS (FOB) BY GROUPS OF GOODS, 
AND BY ORIGIN AND DESTINATION: NORMATIVE SCENARIO GROWTH RATES 
( i n percentages of exports and imports) 
Normative 
1975 1978 1990 2000 
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Tota l exports of goods 
Primary commodities b/ 
Fuels cf ~ 
Manufactures 
Machinery and t r a n s p o r t 
equipment d/ 
Other,manufactures e / 
Unclass i f ied goods ancT 
t r ansac t i ons f / 
Exports ou t s ide the region 
Primary commodities b/ 
Fuels c / 
Manufactures 
Machinery and t r a n s p o r t 
equipment if 
Other manufactures e/ 
Unclass i f ied goods ariH" 
t r ansac t i ons f / 
I n t r a r eg iona l t r a d e 
Primary commodities b/ 
Fuels c / — 
Manufactures 
Machinery and t r a n s p o r t 
equipment d./ < 
Other manufactures —' 
Unclass i f ied goods and 
t r a n s a c t i o n s f / 
Imports from outs ide the region 
Primary commodities b/ 
Fuels cf ~ 
Manufactures 
Machinery and t r a n s p o r t 
equipment d/ , 
Other.manuTactures —' 
Unclass i f ied goods and 
t r a n s a c t i o n s f / 
Tota l imports of goods 
Primary commodities b/ 
Fuels c / 
Manufactures 
Machinery and t r anspo r t 
equipment d/ 
Other manuTactures 
Unc lass i f i ed goods and 
t r a n s a c t i o n s f / 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
79.7 
89.7 
75.4 
55.7 
38.9 
62.8 
66.7 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
80.4 
89.7 
76 .3 
60.2 
50.0 
63.9 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
63.9 
84.1 
68.2 
46.1 
38.7 
50.9 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
49.2 
81.5 
61.7 
32.2 
26.6 
38.0 
20.3 16.7 19.6 16.7 35.3 30.2 50.8 44.5 
10.3 28.6 10.3 29.7 15.9 32.6 18.5 31.0 
24.6 33.3 23.7 31.3 31.8 32.0 38.3 31.4 
44.3 7.7 39.8 8 .5 53.9 29.1 67.8 49.5 
55.6 5 . 1 50.0 5 . 3 61 .3 23.6 73 .4 49.9 
39.5 10.8 36.1 12.2 49.1 35.8 62 .0 49.8 
33.3 8 . 3 - - - - - -
- 83.5 - 83.3 - 69.4 - 55.5 
- 71.4 - 70.3 _ 67.4 - 69.0 
- 66.7 - 68.7 - 68.0 - 68.6 
- 92.3 - 91.5 - 70.9 - 50.1 
- 94.9 _ 94.7 _ 76.4 _ 50.1 
- 89.2 - 87.8 - 64.2 - 50.2 
- 91.7 - - - - - -
- OO.O - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 
- .00.0 - 100.0 _ 100.0 _ 100.0 
- 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 _ 100.0 
- 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 
_ 100.0 _ 100.0 _ 100.0 _ 100.0 
- 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 
- 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 _ 100.0 
Source: CEPAL, Tendencias h i s t ó r i c a s y proyecciones del comercio lat inoamericano en el ámbito 
mundial (CEPAL/VP/CPE/164, November 1 9 7 8 ) . R e v i s e d and updated to incorpora te t h e growth 
t a r g e t s of t h e normative scenar io , 
a / Includes the member count r ies of LAFTA and the Central American Common Market and Bahamas, 
~ Barbados, Bermuda, Cuba, Dominican Republic, French Guiana, Greenland, Guadeloupe, Guyana, Hai t i 
Jamaica, Martinique, Netherlands A n t i l l e s , Panama, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago and U.S. Virgin 
I s l a n d s . 
SITC Sect ions 0, 1, 2 and 4 and d iv i s ion 68 (non- fe r rous me ta l s ) . 
cf SITC Section 3 . 
<1/ SITC Section 7 . 
e/ SITC Sect ions 5, 6 and 8, excluding d iv is ion 68 (non- fe r rous me ta l s ) . 
tf SITC Section 9 . 
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above all from intraregional trade, although the growth 
required for exports of manufactures to countries outside the 
region is also important. In particular, there should be an 
increase in products with a higher technological content, 
specifically machinery and transport equipment; 
(iv) Exports of primary commodities and fuels should also 
grow more than in the past; i.e., although the main thrust 
should be in manufactures, a large-scale effort must be made to 
increase such exports. Thus, primary commodities and fuels 
should grow at an annual rate of 4.5% till 1990. 
The foregoing analysis leads inter alia to the following 
conclusions: In the first place, the growth rates of export 
needs cannot be achieved without a substantial modification of 
the structure by type of goods. At present, the majority of 
Latin America's exports correspond to primary commodities and 
fuels, a fact which is responsible for one of the central 
aspects of the asymmetry in the region's external relations. 
This structure must change in favour of a larger share of 
industrial products. 
In the second place, if it is recalled that towards the 
end of the last decade nearly two-thirds of Latin American 
exports went to industrial countries, it must be recognized 
that better access to those markets must be achieved. A 
decidedly co-operative attitude on the part of those countries 
is therefore essential, as regards both the necessary 
adjustments of their domestic economic activity and the creation 
of favourable conditions through a greater openness of their 
markets. 
In the third place, the progress which can be achieved by 
increasing and diversifying exports.to the developed countries, 
although important and necessary, is inadequate in view of 
export requirements, which makes it essential to expand 
intraregional trade. Similarly, trade with other developing 
areas and with the socialist countries must be increased. 
In brief, in order to achieve the faster economic growth 
which they have set themselves, the Latin American countries 
must increase and diversify their exports far beyond the 
historical trends. In order to do so, they must concentrate 
on two central aspects: on the one hand, the growth and 
diversification of exports must be consistent with the 
transformation in production and technology that accompanies the 
economic development process. In addition, a necessary 
condition is a substantial increase in intraregional- trade and 
growth of trade with nontraditional markets so as to take 
advantage of the exceptional potential provided by the markets 
of other developing countries and of the socialist countries, 
and thus to make the external sector less vulnerable and 
capable of responding to the demands of a relatively rapid 
growth such as the one considered here. But in addition to 
this effort incumbent on Latin America itself, since the 
achievement of these exports goals depends largely on tne 
evolution of the external demand of the industrial countries, 
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the latter should change their restrictive policies and 
co-operate with determination in creating the basic conditions 
for a new and expanding place for the developing countries in 
the world economy. 
Moreover, although no explicit theories have been advanced 
in the global analysis on the possibility of improving the terms 
of external financing through low interest rates and extended 
repayment periods, it must not be forgotten that in any event 
the current high levels of indebtedness call for a considerable 
effort to increase exports over the short and medium terms, in 
order to help overcome the external constraints which are 
currently holding back most of the economies of the region. 
Thus, the intensification of intraregional trade is 
conceived in this projection exercise as being complementary and 
essential to the achievement of a rapid growth of exports; this 
calls for the substitution of an increasing portion of imports 
from other regions. Since the bulk of such imports consists of 
manufactures, basically intermediate and capital goods, this 
means that intraregional trade must also include a significant 
volume of this type of goods. 
In this respect, several observations are in order. In 
the first place, the more rapid growth proposed for Latin 
America would also give rise to the expansion of the regional 
market, particularly for manufactured goods, in view of the 
greater income elasticity of demand for such goods. 
The expansion of the regional market and a certain degree 
of co-ordination of national policies would create more 
favourable conditions for Latin American industry to begin 
producing a wide range of intermediate and capital goods which 
it currently does not produce. It is precisely in respect of 
this type of goods, so important for technological and economic 
development, that the greatest weakness of the productive 
structure of Latin America lies. Moreover, if they are to be 
developed efficiently, larger markets than the domestic ones 
are required. 
In view of the above, the production in the region of 
different types of goods in these sectors would place the 
region in a more competitive position internationally, would 
allow it significantly to improve its technological capacity 
and would help reduce the existing asymmetry in the structure 
of external trade vis-a-vis the developed countries. In 
addition, closer co-operation with other developing areas could 
be based on sounder grounds. 
In the context of these propositions, the quantitative 
exercises that have been carried out show that fundamental 
changes would be brought about in the structure of the origin 
and destination of imports and exports. Purchases of goods 
from outside the region, which towards the end of the 1960s were 
around 83% of the total, would be reduced by the year 2000 to 
56%; on the other hand, the share of extraregional exports 
would also drop from 80% of the total to 49%, in similar years. 
8 8 
Nevertheless, the fact that is more important from the 
qualitative standpoint is that there would be a sharp drop in 
the share of manufactures imported from other areas which, even 
though it would be 50% towards the end of the century, would be 
considerably lower than the current 90% share (see table 33). 
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